People v. Kourani

6 Citing cases

  1. People v. Bryant

    205 N.Y.S.3d 490 (N.Y. App. Div. 2024)

    [1] There is no merit to the defendant’s contentions that his rights to confrontation and a fair trial were violated when the trial court allowed the People to elicit hearsay statements that a nontestifying codefendant had made to a detective. The defense counsel opened the door to such testimony (seePeople v. Simpson, 256 A.D.2d 205, 206, 682 N.Y.S.2d 376; People v. Kourani, 256 A.D.2d 620, 622, 683 N.Y.S.2d 570). In addition, the testimony at issue was not received for its truth, but, rather, to rebut the testimony of the defendant that his own confession was coercively derived (see Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 105 S.Ct. 2078, 85 L.Ed.2d 425; People v. Reynoso, 2 N.Y.3d 820, 781 N.Y.S.2d 284, 814 N.E.2d 456; People v. Ewell, 12 A.D.3d 616, 617, 786 N.Y.S.2d 545; People v. Garcia, 2 A.D.3d 821, 322, 768 N.Y.S.2d 606).

  2. People v. Bryant

    2024 N.Y. Slip Op. 1194 (N.Y. App. Div. 2024)

    There is no merit to the defendant's contentions that his rights to confrontation and a fair trial were violated when the trial court allowed the People to elicit hearsay statements that a nontestifying codefendant had made to a detective. The defense counsel opened the door to such testimony (see People v Simpson, 256 A.D.2d 205, 206; People v Kourani, 256 A.D.2d 620, 622). In addition, the testimony at issue was not received for its truth, but, rather, to rebut the testimony of the defendant that his own confession was coercively derived (see Tennessee v Street, 471 U.S. 409; People v Reynoso, 2 N.Y.3d 820; People v Ewell, 12 A.D.3d 616, 617; People v Garcia, 2 A.D.3d 321, 322).

  3. State v. Bryant

    39 A.D.3d 768 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007)   Cited 42 times

    There is no merit to the defendant's contentions that his rights to confrontation and a fair trial were violated when the trial court allowed the People to elicit hearsay statements that a nontestifying codefendant had made to a detective. The defense counsel opened the door to such testimony ( see People v Simpson, 256 AD2d 205, 206; People v Kourani, 256 AD2d 620, 622). In addition, the testimony at issue was not received for its truth, but, rather, to rebut the testimony of the defendant that his own confession was coercively derived ( see Tennessee v Street, 471 US 409; People v Reynoso, 2 NY3d 820; People v Ewell, 12 AD3d 616, 617; People v Garcia, 2 AD3d 321, 322).

  4. People v. Rodriguez

    28 A.D.3d 496 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006)   Cited 8 times

    05; People v. Gray, 86 NY2d 10, 20; People v. Cato, 22 AD3d 863, lv denied 6 NY3d 774). In any event, the prosecution was properly permitted to question Detective Kevin Smith about the knowledge he derived from other persons for the nonhearsay purpose of rebutting the defense argument that the detective had fabricated portions of the defendant's second written statement (see Tennessee v. Street, 471 US 409, 414; People v. Reynoso, 309 AD2d 769, 770-771, affd 2 NY3d 820; People v. Rodriguez, 210 AD2d 266), and further, the defense had already opened the door to the prosecutor's inquiry (see People v. Massie, 2 NY3d 179, 183-184; People v. Summers, 20 AD3d 546; People v. Reynoso, supra at 770; People v. Kourani, 256 AD2d 620, 622). The defendant's contention that the prosecutor's comments on summation constituted reversible error is unpreserved for appellate review (see People v. Heide, 84 NY2d 943, 944; People v. Tevaha, 84 NY2d 879, 881; People v. Hudgins, 20 AD3d 489, 490, lv denied 5 NY3d 853).

  5. People v. Devorce

    293 A.D.2d 550 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002)   Cited 12 times

    The defendant's challenges to prospective jurors for cause were properly denied by the trial court because the jurors gave unequivocal assurances that they could set aside any bias and render an impartial verdict based upon the evidence (see People v. Johnson, 94 N.Y.2d 600). The defendant failed to make a prima facie showing that the People's peremptory strikes were racially motivated pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky ( 476 U.S. 79). Although he alleged that the People had established a pattern of striking black jurors, he failed to cite any other facts or circumstances to support his claim of racial bias (see People v. Bolling, 79 N.Y.2d 317, 324; People v. Cousin, 272 A.D.2d 477; People v. Kourani, 256 A.D.2d 620; People v. Williams, 253 A.D.2d 901; People v. Morla, 245 A.D.2d 468). The stop of a vehicle in which the defendant was a passenger was based upon reasonable suspicion. The vehicle generally matched a description of a vehicle spotted close to the scene moments after the incident, there were few other vehicles on the road at that time of night, and it was spotted in close geographical and temporal proximity to the scene of the incident (see People v. Hicks, 68 N.Y.2d 234; People v. Flanagan, 224 A.D.2d 633; People v. Bianchi, 208 A.D.2d 551, affd 85 N.Y.2d 1022).

  6. People v. Wallace

    282 A.D.2d 482 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001)

    The Supreme Court properly denied the defendant's request for a missing witness charge. Because the defendant waited until both sides had rested to ask for that charge, his request was untimely (see, People v. Bowman, 270 A.D.2d 355; People v. France, 265 A.D.2d 424; People v. Kourani, 256 A.D.2d 620, 622; People v. Asphill, 208 A.D.2d 550, 551; People v. Correll, 207 A.D.2d 410). The defendant's remaining contentions raised in his supplemental pro se brief are either unpreserved for appellate review or without merit.