Opinion
D040676.
7-15-2003
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. SHELLEY KAY KOLLER, Defendant and Appellant.
The issue in this case is whether there is substantial evidence to support a finding that Shelley Kay Koller would be likely to use a firearm in an unsafe or unlawful manner and therefore, pursuant to Welfare & Institutions Code section 8103, subdivision (f)(1), should be prohibited from possessing it. The evidence is sufficient.
FACTS
The evidence consisted of a police officers request for a 72-hour detention of Koller for evaluation, a report of Kollers mental health history, a "Short-Stay Summary" by Aurora Behavioral Health Care (Aurora), and Kollers statements at the section 8103 hearing.
The reports indicate that on June 17, 2002, Kollers friends called the police because she was acting out of the ordinary and had been diagnosed as manic depressive. The police officer who responded found Koller had barricaded herself in her house to avoid her friends, was living in "hazardous conditions," and had disorganized and paranoid thoughts. Koller voluntarily agreed to go Alvarado Hospital with a friend. She was evaluated at Alvarado Hospital where she initially volunteered for treatment at "API." On their way there, Koller jumped out of the moving car and fought with the police officers. She was restrained by the police. She was brought to the San Diego County Mental Health facility but when it was determined she had insurance, she was transferred to Aurora.
The mental history report reflected that Koller stated she had cut her wrists in 1982 when her boyfriend was murdered and stated eight years ago she "was going to O. D. on pills." Koller stated she was currently depressed and despondent; her cockatiel had recently died. She denied currently having suicidal thoughts.
The Short-Stay Summary stated Koller had a 15-year history of depression and that she reported symptoms of low mood, low energy, and fluctuating sleep that had worsened over the last 18 months. She also reported that about a month before her admission, she had experienced an increasing elevation of her mood, increasing activity, and more impulsive behavior. Three days before being admitted, she became paranoid about her neighbors and had visual hallucinations. The Short-Stay Summary noted Koller had a family history "positive for suicide"; a second cousin who had been diagnosed as schizophrenic and a half-sister who was depressed and paranoid. It was noted during the initial examination that she had poor insight and her insight remained poor during her stay at Aurora. She was diagnosed as having a "probable bipolar mood disorder." She was treated with medication and was released at the end of 72 hours. The summary stated she was not a danger to herself or others.
At the hearing, Koller stated she had not barricaded herself in her home; she had put up boxes to keep dogs away from kittens on her porch and birds inside her home. She claimed she got out of the car while it was stopped (not while it was moving); she did not want to go to Alvarado Hospital. She wanted to go to Mercy Hospital where her sister worked. She denied being evaluated at Alvarado Hospital, insisting that she had been taken to San Diego County Mental Health. She said that the relatives who had been suicidal were not blood relatives, but were a daughter of her mothers second husband and a cousin who was not related by blood. Koller stated she had never attempted suicide by cutting her wrists; she had tried to overdose on pills.
She said she had been hospitalized twice. When the court asked if she suffered from a mental disease, Koller answered she believed she suffered from depression. She stated that the hallucinations had been due to a medication prescribed for her depression.
The court found that "given all the signals that are contained in [the] reports . . . it would be unreasonable and unwise to release this firearm to [her]." The court found it would be more likely than not that Koller would use the firearm for an unsafe purpose, "not because [she was] a bad person," but because Koller was "dealing on a day-to-day basis with at least a depressive illness, which is a very serious situation."
DISCUSSION
Section 8103 prohibits a person who has been taken into custody and evaluated because the individual is a danger to herself or others from possessing a firearm if the prosecution shows by a preponderance of evidence that the person would not be likely to use the firearm in a safe and lawful manner. ( § 8103, subd. (f)(1), (6).)
When a challenge is made to the sufficiency of the evidence, we must view all factual matters in the light most favorable to the prevailing party and the judgment. (Washington v. Farlice (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 766, 771-772.) " "We have no power to judge of the effect or value of the evidence, to weigh the evidence, to consider the credibility of the witnesses, or to resolve conflicts in the evidence or in the reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom." " (White v. Inbound Aviation (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 910, 927.) " All of the evidence most favorable to the respondent must be accepted as true, and that unfavorable discarded as not having sufficient verity, to be accepted by the trier of fact. " (Buehler v. Sbardellati (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1527, 1542, italics omitted.) When the record contains substantial evidence, "no matter how slight it may appear in comparison with the contradictory evidence, the [order] must be upheld." (Howard v. Owens Corning (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 621, 631.)
Koller argues most of the various reports should have been disregarded as unreliable. For example, she argues the statement in the "Application for Detention" that she had barricaded herself in her home should have been disregarded because it did not appear that the police officer who reported that information had personally observed the situation but had been told about it by a third party. She argues the statement in the "Comprehensive Assessment Tool" (Assessment) that she had cut her wrists in 1982 should have been disregarded as unreliable because "only two pages of an apparent eight-page report were offered," the Assessment did not identify the date on which it was prepared or who signed it, and her statement about cutting her wrists was "susceptible of misinterpretation." She argues her statement at the hearing that she did not do so was more reliable evidence. Additionally, she argues that nothing else in the Assessment supported the courts finding. As to the Short-Stay Summary, Koller concedes that document was "reliable" but notes that it ultimately concluded she did not present a danger to herself or others.
Essentially, Koller is asking us to reweigh the evidence, to accept as true her statements at the hearing and to reject, as not worthy of belief, the statements contained in the various reports. Under the substantial evidence rule, we are precluded from doing so; we must accept as true the evidence supporting the order, in this case, the statements in the reports. A limited exception exists when evidence is inherently incredible (see Rivard v. Board of Pension Commissioners (1985) 164 Cal. App. 3d 405, 413, fn. 1, 210 Cal. Rptr. 509), but this is not such a case.
As to Kollers claim that the court lacked a basis for finding she would handle a firearm in an unsafe manner because the Short-Stay Summary indicated she was not a danger to herself or to others, we are unpersuaded. Given the evidence presented, a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that while Koller might not generally present a danger to herself or others that conclusion would change if she had a firearm in her possession given the evidence showing Koller generally suffered from depression, had attempted suicide in the past, had engaged in recent unusual, destructive behavior including jumping out of a moving car, had been recently hospitalized for mental illness, had suffered a recent traumatic event (the death of her cockatiel), and the firearm had been fairly recently purchased (Koller described it as "brand new").
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: BENKE, Acting P. J. AARON, J. --------------- Notes: All statutory references are to the Welfare & Institutions Code unless otherwise specified.