Opinion
C099051
09-17-2024
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. LUKE SEQUOIA KITCHEL, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
(Super. Ct. No. 22CF06230)
FEINBERG, J.
Defendant Luke Sequoia Kitchel pleaded no contest to one count of shooting at an inhabited dwelling (Pen. Code, § 246). The trial court sentenced him to five years in state prison and issued a 10-year postjudgment criminal protective order, prohibiting him from contacting the victim. Kitchel contends, and the People concede, that the protective order was unauthorized and must be stricken. Having reviewed the record and applicable law, we accept the People's concession and will strike the protective order.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Penal Code section 136.2, subdivision (a)(1) provides that "[u]pon a good cause belief that harm to, or intimidation or dissuasion of, a victim or witness has occurred or is reasonably likely to occur, a court with jurisdiction over a criminal matter may issue" various types of protective orders. The purpose of the provision is to"' "protect victims and witnesses in connection with the criminal proceeding in which the restraining order is issued in order to allow participation without fear of reprisal." '" (People v. Corrales (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 283, 286.) It authorizes protective orders that are"' "operative only during the pendency of criminal proceedings and as prejudgment orders." '" (Id. at pp. 285-286.) It "generally does not authorize a trial court to impose a postjudgment restraining order against a criminal defendant." (Id. at p. 286.)
There are exceptions to this general rule, but no party contends that any applies here. For example, section 136.2, subdivision (i)(1) authorizes a criminal court to issue a postconviction restraining order against a defendant, valid for up to 10 years, when the defendant has been convicted of certain enumerated offenses, including domestic violence, human trafficking, and rape, among others. (See generally People v. Corrales, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 287, fn. 3 [discussing other statutory sources for protective orders].) It is undisputed that the circumstances here did not involve domestic violence, any of the other offenses enumerated in section 136.2, subdivision (i)(1), or other statutes authorizing postconviction restraining orders for specific offenses. Accordingly, the 10-year postconviction restraining order based on Kitchel's conviction for shooting into an inhabited dwelling is unauthorized and must be stricken. (See People v. Garcia (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 887, 901 [because defendant's "convictions for robbery and assault are not domestic violence offenses," the trial court lacked "statutory authority to impose the [10-year] postconviction protective order, and it must be stricken"].)
DISPOSITION
The 10-year criminal protective order issued on July 5, 2023, is stricken. As modified, the judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: KRAUSE, ACTING P. J., BOULWARE EURIE, J.