Opinion
January 31, 1992
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Onondaga County, Gorman, J.
Present — Boomer, J.P., Pine, Balio, Lawton and Davis, JJ.
Order unanimously reversed on the law, motion denied, indictment reinstated and matter remitted to Supreme Court, for further proceedings on the indictment. Memorandum: Supreme Court erred in dismissing the indictment on the ground that the evidence before the Grand Jury was legally insufficient to establish the offenses of sexual abuse in the first degree (Penal Law § 130.65), assault in the second degree (Penal Law § 120.05) and assault in the third degree (Penal Law § 120.00). A Grand Jury "may indict a person for an offense when (a) the evidence before it is legally sufficient to establish that such person committed such offense * * * and (b) competent and admissible evidence before it provides reasonable cause to believe that such person committed such offense" (CPL 190.65; see, People v. Reyes, 75 N.Y.2d 590, 593; People v. Groff, 71 N.Y.2d 101, 107; People v. Jennings, 69 N.Y.2d 103, 115). On a motion to dismiss an indictment on the ground that the evidence was not legally sufficient to establish the offense charged pursuant to CPL 210.20 (1) (b), "the court's inquiry is keyed only to that legal sufficiency postulate, since the adequacy of the proof to establish reasonable cause is necessarily within the exclusive fact-finding function of the Grand Jury" (People v Reyes, supra, at 593). Sufficiency is determined by inquiry whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the People, if unexplained and uncontroverted, would warrant a conviction by a petit jury (see, People v. Jennings, supra, at 114).
Here, the evidence presented by the People before the Grand Jury established that on March 18, 1991, the 16-year old complainant was beaten and sexually assaulted on Fellows Avenue in the City of Syracuse. She was taken to a nearby hospital for treatment. As a result of the incident, she sustained a broken nose, two black eyes and various scratch, bite and strangulation marks. The following day, defendant made admissions regarding the incident to one Arthur Daley and, thereafter, to police investigators. Defendant's admissions were sufficiently corroborated by the testimony of complainant and other witnesses (see, CPL 60.50; People v. Groff, supra, at 107; People v Booden, 69 N.Y.2d 185, 187; People v. Daniels, 37 N.Y.2d 624, 629). Accordingly, the evidence before the Grand Jury established a prima facie case that there was reasonable cause to believe that defendant committed the offenses charged.