Opinion
April 20, 1993
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Bronx County (Ivan Warner, J.).
Defendant has failed to overcome the strong presumption of competent representation by demonstrating a reasonable probability that but for counsel error the result of the proceeding would have been different (People v Diaz, 157 A.D.2d 569, lv denied 76 N.Y.2d 733). Here, the supposed errors are merely listed in conclusory fashion and indicate nothing more than "simple disagreement with the strategies employed" (People v Grigas, 185 A.D.2d 245, 246, lv denied 80 N.Y.2d 930). Moreover, upon a review of the record, it is clear that counsel moved for and conducted the appropriate hearings, cross-examined the witnesses and delivered a summation consonant with the defense strategy that defendant had been mistakenly identified, and made appropriate objections.
The victim's identification testimony of defendant while handcuffed was properly admitted, it being undisputed that she backed up her car to where defendant and the police officers were standing, exited, and spontaneously pointed defendant out as the perpetrator (see, People v Melette, 176 A.D.2d 480, lv denied 79 N.Y.2d 861; Matter of Darryl G., 184 A.D.2d 204). In any event, since the entire episode was one unbroken chain of events all taking place within minutes and within a few blocks, such identification would have been admissible even if the showup had been arranged by the police (see, People v Duuvon, 77 N.Y.2d 541, 544-545).
In light of defendant's prior convictions, his commission of a previous crime while on parole and his conviction of the present offense only 12 days after being paroled from a previous sentence, we find that the sentence imposed was not an abuse of discretion.
We have considered defendant's other contentions and find them either unpreserved or without merit.
Concur — Carro, J.P., Kupferman, Kassal and Rubin, JJ.