Summary
holding that, where police officers unlawfully continued to question the accused after he had invoked his Miranda rights, this did not affect his later spontaneous confession, as the accused made no incriminating statements during the first interview, officers ended that interview, and the accused later initiated contact by indicating that he wanted to make a statement
Summary of this case from Commonwealth v. DeseiOpinion
Decided June 12, 1984
Appeal from the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Third Judicial Department.
Dennis A. First for appellant.
Sol Greenberg, District Attorney, for respondent, precluded.
MEMORANDUM.
The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed.
Appellant was arrested for rape, taken to the precinct, and given Miranda warnings. He said he understood his rights but did not wish to talk with the police officers. The officers nonetheless questioned him about the crime but elicited no incriminating responses. When the officers completed their interrogation, they escorted him from the interview room and commenced the booking procedure. During this process, appellant suddenly said that he wanted to make a statement. The officers then completed booking him, took him to another interview room, administered Miranda warnings again, and took his statement.
When a suspect exercises his right to remain silent, the police must scrupulously honor that decision and questioning must cease ( Michigan v Mosley, 423 U.S. 96; People v Wander, 47 N.Y.2d 724). The police violated that obligation here. But a suspect, even after exercising his right to remain silent, may change his mind and voluntarily make a statement ( People v Buxton, 44 N.Y.2d 33, 37). Given the pronounced break in the interrogation, the commencement of the booking process, the absence of any incriminating responses to the police questioning, and appellant's subsequent unprompted decision to make a statement, we cannot say that the courts below erred as a matter of law in concluding that the initial unlawful questioning did not taint the spontaneity of the later confession.
For the reasons stated in the Appellate Division's memorandum, the trial court committed no error in refusing to submit attempted rape as a lesser included offense. Appellant's remaining contentions are meritless.
Chief Judge COOKE and Judges JASEN, JONES, WACHTLER, MEYER, SIMONS and KAYE concur.
On review of submissions pursuant to section 500.4 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals (22 N.Y.CRR 500.4), order affirmed in a memorandum.