Opinion
No. 349379
11-19-2020
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICHEAISZHA KING, Defendant-Appellant.
If this opinion indicates that it is "FOR PUBLICATION," it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports. UNPUBLISHED Saginaw Circuit Court
LC No. 18-045072-FC Before: JANSEN, P.J., and FORT HOOD and RONAYNE KRAUSE, JJ. PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by delayed leave granted her jury conviction of second-degree murder, MCL 750.317. Defendant was sentenced to serve 9 to 55 years' imprisonment. We affirm.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This appeal arises from events that occurred on April 11, 2018, in the parking lot of a Family Dollar store. Defendant and the victim, Ty Johnson, who were in an on and off dating relationship and who shared children, ended up in a physical altercation. After defendant confronted Johnson, defendant stabbed Johnson in the neck with a pocket knife. Johnson died from the resulting injury. Johnson had recently served a 93-day jail sentence for domestic violence against defendant.
Multiple witnesses were at the scene when these events transpired. Although accounts are inconsistent on some points, it appears that defendant confronted Johnson about providing diapers for their children. Defendant and Johnson started arguing outside a parked car in which Johnson was a passenger, and the argument included, by some accounts, physical confrontation. After several parties attempted to intervene and stop the confrontation, defendant returned to the vehicle that she arrived in. Johnson followed her to the vehicle, insulted her, and spit on her. Defendant retrieved a pocket knife from the vehicle, and the confrontation resumed in front of the vehicle. Defendant was seen swinging the knife at Johnson. Johnson was stabbed in the center of the throat, puncturing his larynx. He later died from this injury.
At trial, defendant was convicted of second-degree murder, and sentenced as described supra. This appeal followed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
On appeal, defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence for the jury to find her guilty of second-degree murder, and respectfully requests this Court reduce her conviction to voluntary manslaughter. "This Court reviews de novo defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence." People v Meissner, 294 Mich App 438, 452; 812 NW2d 37 (2011). "We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime to have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. "[T]he standard of review is deferential: a reviewing court is required to draw all reasonable inferences and make credibility choices in support of the jury verdict." People v Oros, 502 Mich 229, 239; 917 NW2d 559 (2018) (quotation marks, citation, and emphasis omitted).
III. ANALYSIS
After a careful review of the record before us, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence presented to the jury to support defendant's conviction of second-degree murder.
This Court may not "determine the credibility of witnesses, no matter how inconsistent or vague that testimony might be." People v Mehall, 454 Mich 1, 6; 557 NW2d 110 (1997). "The hurdle that a judge must clear in order to overrule a jury and grant a new trial is unquestionably among the highest in our law." People v Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 232; 749 NW2d 272 (2008).
Defendant contends that evidence was insufficient to prove she had the requisite malice to convict her of second-degree murder. "In order to convict a defendant of second-degree murder, the prosecution must prove: (1) a death, (2) caused by an act of the defendant, (3) with malice, and (4) without justification or excuse." People v Roper, 286 Mich App 77, 84; 777 NW2d 483 (2009) (quotation marks and citation omitted). "Malice is defined as the intent to kill, the intent to cause great bodily harm, or the intent to do an act in wanton and wilful disregard of the likelihood that the natural tendency of such behavior is to cause death or great bodily harm. Malice may be inferred from evidence that the defendant intentionally set in motion a force likely to cause death or great bodily harm." Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted). "The offense of second-degree murder does not require an actual intent to harm or kill, but only the intent to do an act that is in obvious disregard of life-endangering consequences." Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Our Supreme Court has defined voluntary manslaughter as follows:
"[I]f the act of killing, though intentional, be committed under the influence of passion or in heat of blood, produced by an adequate or reasonable provocation, and before a reasonable time has elapsed for the blood to cool and reason to resume its habitual control, and is the result of the temporary excitement, by which the control of reason was disturbed . . . then the law, out of indulgence to the frailty of human nature . . . regards the offense as of a less heinous character than murder, and gives it the designation of manslaughter." [People v Pouncey, 437 Mich 382,
388; 471 NW2d 346 (1991), quoting Maher v People, 10 Mich 212, 219 (1862) (alteration and ellipses in Pouncey).]Therefore, the test for voluntary manslaughter is: (1) the defendant must kill in the heat of passion; (2) the passion must be caused by an adequate provocation; and (3) there cannot be a lapse of time during which a reasonable person could control his passions. Pouncey, 437 Mich at 388. "The provocation necessary to mitigate a homicide from murder to manslaughter is that which causes the defendant to act out of passion rather than reason." Id. at 389, citing People v Townes, 391 Mich 578, 590; 218 NW2d 136 (1974). In Pouncey, the Court commented further:
One commentator interprets the law as requiring that the defendant's emotions be so intense that they distort the defendant's practical reasoning:
"The determination of what is reasonable provocation is a question of fact for the factfinder." Id. at 390."The law does not excuse actors whose behavior is caused by just any . . . emotional disturbance . . . . Rather, the law asks whether the victim's provoking act aroused the defendant's emotions to such a degree that the choice to refrain from crime became difficult for the defendant. The legal doctrine reflects the philosophical distinction between emotions that only cause choice and emotions so intense that they distort the very process of choosing." [Pouncey, 437 Mich at 389, quoting Moore, Causation and the excuses, 73 Cal L R 1091, 1132 (1985) (ellipses in Pouncey).]
The first part of the Pouncey test asks whether defendant killed in a heat of passion. Pouncey, 437 Mich at 388. Defendant was clearly involved in an active altercation with Johnson, and was apparently angry going into the confrontation. Multiple witnesses described a confrontation that started in one location, was briefly interrupted, and then resumed in a different location. There is conflicting testimony regarding whether the victim assaulted defendant during this confrontation, although this had clearly happened before. The evidence of the back-and-forth nature of the conflict, defendant's reactions to Johnson, the history of physical abuse, the possible assault during the current confrontation, defendant's perception that Johnson neglected their children, and the fact that he spit on her, all arguably support the possibility that defendant could have been acting in a heat of passion at the time of the stabbing.
The second issue is whether there was adequate provocation. Pouncey, 437 Mich at 388-389. Here the analysis involves essentially the same facts. But the standard here is high, as described in the quotations from Pouncey above. The evidence demonstrates that there was certainly some provocation of defendant by Johnson, regardless of whether defendant started the confrontation. There is the history, the issue of the diapers, the possible assaults, and the spitting. All of this information was available for the jury to weigh. The jury had access to the witnesses, video surveillance recordings, and the police interview of defendant to determine how much provocation actually existed. The jury was instructed by the trial court on the requirements for a finding of voluntary manslaughter. As stated above, whether the provocation was reasonable is a question of fact to be determined by the jury. See Pouncey, 437 Mich at 390. While there certainly appears to have been some provocation of defendant on the part of Johnson, this Court cannot offer greater insight into defendant's state of mind than the jury was given at trial.
The third part of the test, the absence of a cooling-off period, Pouncey, 437 Mich at 388, is the most problematic for defendant. The evidence indicates that defendant engaged in the confrontation with Johnson, went back to the car in which she had been a passenger, retrieved the knife, and returned to resume the conflict. This occurred despite the efforts of several other people trying to keep her and Johnson apart. The jury could have reasonably concluded that when defendant went back to the car she arrived in, it was possible for her to remain in the car and let the others present keep Johnson away from the car, giving her time to think about the situation and remove herself from it. The jury could have concluded that there was no need to retrieve the knife and return to confront Johnson, and that there was time to calm down and think it through.
Returning to the malice element of second-degree murder, the jury could have concluded that this element was satisfied by the evidence that defendant made a choice to swing the knife at Johnson. Regardless of whether defendant had formed an actual intent to kill or cause great bodily injury, the evidence supports a conclusion that defendant's actions intentionally set in motion a force likely to cause death or great bodily harm. Multiple witnesses saw defendant bring the knife toward Johnson in an attacking, swinging motion. Defendant chose to take this action, and in this case it had the likely outcome; Johnson was killed. The jury could have reasonably inferred that defendant intended this result. In her brief, defendant does not contest any of the other elements of second-degree murder. The first two are obviously satisfied: Johnson was killed, and his death was caused by defendant. Defendant did not raise a self-defense argument, or any other argument that would characterize the killing of Johnson as justified. Thus, we are bound to conclude that there is simply no basis for reversal of the jury's finding that defendant was guilty of second-degree murder.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
/s/ Amy Ronayne Krause