Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. YA070440 Mark S. Arnold, Judge.
Alan Siraco, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey and Viet H. Nguyen, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
SUZUKAWA, J.
Victor Kennard appeals from the judgment entered following the denial of his motion to suppress evidence and his no contest plea to possession of a controlled substance, cocaine (base). (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a).) Pursuant to his negotiated plea, prior conviction allegations were stricken, imposition of sentence was suspended, and he was placed on formal probation for three years under certain terms and conditions, including that he spend 208 days in jail. Credit was given for time already served. He contends his detention was a violation of his privilege against being subjected to an unreasonable search and seizure. For reasons stated in the opinion, we affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
The evidence at the suppression hearing established that on January 11, 2008, at approximately 8:50 a.m., Los Angeles County Deputy Sheriff Jorge Juarez and his partner Deputy Angelo Lopez were on patrol in the neighborhood of 97th Street and Vermont Avenue in the County of Los Angeles. Deputy Juarez observed a Chevrolet Impala fail to make a complete stop when it reached a stop sign on Vermont, turn right, and then drive into a motel parking lot on the northwest corner of 99th and Vermont. The deputies followed the vehicle in their patrol car and turned on one red light as they entered the motel parking lot. After losing sight of the vehicle for a brief period, Deputy Juarez saw appellant exit the driver’s side of the vehicle and walk to room No. 4 of the motel. Deputy Juarez walked to room No. 4 and knocked on the closed door. When the occupant asked who was at the door, the deputy said it was the Sheriff’s Department. Appellant opened the door and stood in the doorway. Deputy Juarez advised appellant he was being contacted regarding the traffic violation and asked appellant if he would step outside the room. The deputy asked appellant to step outside because occasionally people have just closed the door and the deputy did not want that to happen. As he complied, appellant tossed some white objects on the carpet, approximately three feet from the door. Deputy Juarez recognized the objects as an off-white, rocklike substance resembling rock cocaine and entered the room to recover them. Approximately 30 seconds later, the deputy reentered the room to make sure he had not missed any other narcotics that might have rolled away. The deputy spent only 10 to 15 seconds in the room and did not intend to search it. He did not ask the woman who was in the room for permission to search it.
DISCUSSION
Appellant contends the detention was unlawful because Deputy Juarez had no legal basis for expanding or prolonging the detention beyond issuing the traffic citation. Appellant does not challenge the justification for detaining appellant at the front door of the motel room but asserts the deputy exceeded the scope of an otherwise proper detention when he succeeded in drawing appellant out of his doorway because it was not reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place. We disagree.
“‘An appellate court’s review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress is governed by well-settled principles. [Citations.] [¶] In ruling on such a motion, the trial court (1) finds the historical facts, (2) selects the applicable rule of law, and (3) applies the latter to the former to determine whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated. [Citations.] “The [trial] court’s resolution of each of these inquiries is, of course, subject to appellate review.” [Citations.] [¶] The court’s resolution of the first inquiry, which involves questions of fact, is reviewed under the deferential substantial-evidence standard. [Citations.] Its decision on the second, which is a pure question of law, is scrutinized under the standard of independent review. [Citations.] Finally, its ruling on the third, which is a mixed fact-law question that is however predominantly one of law,... is also subject to independent review.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 182, quoting People v. Williams (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1268, 1301; accord, People v. Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 255.)
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. “A detention is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when the detaining officer can point to specific articulable facts that, considered in light of the totality of the circumstances, provide some objective manifestation that the person detained may be involved in criminal activity.” (People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 231; People v. Williams (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 949, 958-959.)
“‘The scope of the search must be “strictly tied to and justified by” the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible.’ [Citation.]” (Florida v. Royer (1983) 460 U.S. 491, 500.) It “will vary to some extent with the particular facts and circumstances of each case.... [A]n investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. Similarly, the investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer’s suspicion in a short period of time. [Citations.]” (Ibid.)
The record establishes that the officers approached the motel room to talk to appellant after seeing him commit a traffic violation. Appellant does not challenge the justification for this action. Thereafter, Deputy Juarez asked appellant to step outside the motel room to discuss the violation. There is no evidence the deputy intended to do anything other than to discuss the violation and possibly cite appellant. Further, there was no finding by the court that the deputy’s action was a subterfuge to avoid obtaining an arrest warrant as required by People v. Ramey (1976) 16 Cal.3d 263, 275. Further, the record establishes that immediately upon stepping outside the doorway, the officer observed appellant drop what appeared to be contraband. The officer properly seized the contraband which had been tossed in plain sight. There is no evidence that the detention of appellant lasted any longer, or that the investigative methods used were any more intrusive, than was necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop and the trial court properly denied the suppression motion. (Cf. People v. McGaughran (1979) 25 Cal.3d 577, 587.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: EPSTEIN, P. J., WILLHITE, J.