People v. Kelly

29 Citing cases

  1. People v. Perry

    22024 Ill. App. 230167 (Ill. App. Ct. 2024)

    ¶ 28 The dissent relies on our decision in People v. Kelly, 2012 IL App (1st) 101521, as the basis for holding that a lengthy time delay in a case can support a finding of unreasonable assistance. This case is a far cry from Kelly.

  2. People v. Childrous

    2023 Ill. App. 4th 230078 (Ill. App. Ct. 2023)

    ¶ 23 Defendant suggests unreasonable delay alone can constitute unreasonable assistance. In support of his assertion, he cites People v. Kelly, 2012 IL App (1st) 101521, 977 N.E.2d 858. However, in that case, the delay was 12 years, and counsel failed to shape one of the defendant's arguments into an appropriate form in violation of the requirements of Rule 651(c).

  3. People v. Caldwell

    2023 Ill. App. 201375 (Ill. App. Ct. 2023)   Cited 1 times

    ¶ 78 Defendant cites to several cases in which reviewing courts or individual justices have expressed concern about extreme delays in second-stage proceedings. People v. Kelley, 2012 IL App (1st) 101521; People v. Bennett, 394 Ill.App.3d 350 (2nd Dist. 2009); People v. Woidtke, 313 Ill.App.3d 399 (5th Dist. 2000) (Maag, J., specially concurring).

  4. People v. James

    2023 Ill. App. 192232 (Ill. App. Ct. 2023)   Cited 7 times
    In James, the defendant argued that postconviction counsel "declined to file any response" to the State's motion to dismiss and "offered no argument on [defendant's] behalf' at the hearing on that motion.

    See People v. Veach, 2017 IL 120649, ¶ 47 ("[A] defendant must generally raise a constitutional claim alleging ineffective assistance of counsel on direct review or risk forfeiting the claim."). His claim of unreasonable assistance of postconviction counsel is not (People v. Kelly, 2012 IL App (1st) 101521, ¶ 27), because there is no constitutional right to counsel in proceedings under the Act (People v. Johnson, 2018 IL 122227, ¶ 16). "If a court can resolve a case on nonconstitutional grounds, it should do so," and "[c]onstitutional issues should be reached only as a last resort."

  5. People v. Blake

    2022 Ill. App. 2d 210154 (Ill. App. Ct. 2022)   Cited 11 times

    Defendant cites several cases in which reviewing courts or individual justices have expressed concern about extreme delays in second-stage proceedings. See People v. Lyons, 46 Ill.2d 172 (1970); People v. Kelly, 2012 IL App (1st) 101521; People v. Bennett, 394 Ill.App.3d 350 (2009); People v. Woidtke, 313 Ill.App.3d 399, 413 (2000) (Maag, J., specially concurring).

  6. People v. Jones

    2019 Ill. App. 5th 160083 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019)   Cited 1 times

    During that time, postconviction counsel sought numerous continuances to file an amended postconviction petition but filed nothing on his behalf. In support, he relies on People v. Lyons, 46 Ill. 2d 172 (1970), and People v. Kelly, 2012 IL App (1st) 101521.¶ 21 In Lyons, our Illinois Supreme Court determined that postconviction counsel was unreasonable where, on six occasions, he moved for a continuance of the hearing on the State's motion to dismiss; during the hearing, he declared that he was not ready to proceed; and he made no reply to the State's motion to dismiss, all apparently without filing a Rule 651(c) certificate.

  7. People v. Schlosser

    2017 Ill. App. 150355 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017)   Cited 30 times

    ¶ 36 First, it was error to reappoint the same APD after this court found hat his representation was unreasonable and that he failed to make even a routine amendment. Schlosser , 2012 IL App (1st) 092523, ¶¶ 22-26, 362 Ill.Dec. 564, 973 N.E.2d 960 ; see also People v. Kelly , 2012 IL App (1st) 101521, ¶¶ 40-41, 48, 364 Ill.Dec. 949, 977 N.E.2d 858 (postconviction counsel's failure to provide a reasonable level of assistance required appointment of new counsel on remand); People v. Nitz , 2011 IL App (2d) 100031, ¶¶ 19, 21, 355 Ill.Dec. 525, 959 N.E.2d 1258 (same); People v. Jones , 2016 IL App (3d) 140094, ¶¶ 33-34, 36, 401 Ill.Dec. 778, 50 N.E.3d 1260 (same); People v. Shortridge , 2012 IL App (4th) 100663, ¶¶ 14-15, 358 Ill.Dec. 10, 964 N.E.2d 679 (same).¶ 37 Second, the Rule 651(c) certificate, which the trial court directed him to file, does not indicate whether he has communicated with defendant at any time since 2009, when the last certificate was filed, and the record does not disclose any such evidence.

  8. People v. Hotwagner

    2015 Ill. App. 5th 130525 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015)   Cited 65 times
    In Hotwagner, this court explained that trial counsel and postconviction counsel serve different roles, because a postconviction petitioner has "already been stripped of the presumption of innocence," and because the right to postconviction counsel is not constitutionally required, the reasonable level of assistance required under the Act is not coextensive with the level of assistance required under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

    ¶ 39 The defendant argues that Brian "failed to cite controlling law" in support of her argument that the State violated the defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel. See People v. Kelly, 2012 IL App (1st) 101521, ¶¶ 31, 32, 40 (holding that postconviction counsel failed to provide a reasonable level of assistance where counsel failed to cite "controlling Supreme Court precedent," failed to present the defendant's arguments in appropriate legal form, allowed the defendant's petition to languish for years, and made comments indicating that counsel "either lacked basic knowledge of the Act or fundamentally misunderstood it"). The controlling precedent in the present case was Card, however, and the defendant concedes that his cause was remanded for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether there was a constitutional violation under Card. Nevertheless, citing Boyd v. Dutton, 405 U.S. 1 (1972), the defendant suggests that Brian

  9. People v. Mason

    2014 Ill. App. 121995 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014)

    ¶ 39 The right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings is not constitutional but statutory under the Act, and thus a defendant is entitled to only a reasonable level of assistance. People v. Suarez, 224 Ill. 2d 37, 42 (2007); People v. Kelly, 2012 IL App (1st) 101521, ¶ 28. The purpose of the duties imposed by Rule 651(c) is to ensure that a defendant's complaints are adequately presented by ascertaining the basis of those complaints, shaping them into appropriate legal form, and presenting them to the court.

  10. People v. Porter

    2014 Ill. App. 112037 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014)

    Instead, in the end, APD Haze rested on defendant's amended petition filed in 1997, making only the perceived contribution of an admittedly defunct supplemental Apprendi claim. He offered no explanation for the delay and lack of a simple amendment to the petition, which would have helped adequately present defendant's claims. See People v. Kelly, 2012 IL App (1st) 101521, ¶ 40. Moreover, the State has not developed an argument on appeal that the claims raised in defendant's petition were necessarily without merit.