Opinion
A149813
11-15-2019
In re K.B., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. K.B., Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Napa County Super. Ct. No. JV18248)
Our prior opinion in this matter addressed appellant K.B.'s challenge to a postdisposition order and, specifically, the reasonableness of an electronic search condition under People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 (Lent). We concluded the condition was reasonable but overbroad and modified it accordingly. (In re K.B. (Aug. 10, 2017, A149813) [nonpub. opn.].)
The case now returns to us following a grant of review and transfer by the California Supreme Court. Pursuant to the Supreme Court's order to this court, we vacated our prior opinion and reconsidered the cause in light of In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113 (Ricardo P.). We now dismiss the appeal as moot.
I. BACKGROUND
K.B. resided in a number of out-of-home placements due to escalating behavior associated with threats of physical violence against others, self-harm, lying, and stealing. K.B. was initially declared a ward of the court after she admitted a felony assault, and she was placed in a residential treatment program. K.B. absconded three times from her placement and was subsequently transported to juvenile hall for violating her probation. She admitted one count of escape and the probation violations. The probation department recommended K.B. remain in juvenile hall while it attempted to locate an appropriate residential placement. The probation officer also recommended additional terms and conditions of probation, including the electronic search provision. The juvenile court accepted the probation department's recommendation and modified its order of probation, including imposing an electronic search condition.
K.B. appealed, arguing the electronic search condition was invalid pursuant to the criteria established in Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d 481 and unconstitutionally overbroad. We modified the condition to address the issue of overbreadth, and affirmed the condition as modified.
The California Supreme Court granted review (Oct. 18, 2017, S244301) and deferred further action pending consideration and disposition of a related issue in Ricardo P., S230923. In August 2019, our high court decided Ricardo P. and, as relevant here, invalidated an electronic search condition under the third prong of Lent where there was no evidence the defendant had used or would "use electronic devices in connection with . . . illegal activity." (Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 1116, 1119-1120.) Ricardo P. did "not 'categorically invalidate electronic search conditions' in juvenile delinquency cases. [Citation.] . . . . The court held only that the broad search condition, as written and imposed by the juvenile court, was invalid under Lent because it was not reasonably related to [the defendant's] future criminality." (In re Alonzo M. (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 156, 165-166.)
After issuing its decision in Ricardo P., the California Supreme Court transferred this case back to this court and directed us to vacate our decision and reconsider the cause in light of Ricardo P. We vacated our opinion and received supplemental briefing. According to that supplemental briefing, K.B.'s probation terminated in February 2019.
II. DISCUSSION
"As a general rule, ' " 'the duty of this court, as of every other judicial tribunal, is to decide actual controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it.' " ' [Citation.] Thus, an ' "action that originally was based on a justiciable controversy cannot be maintained on appeal if all the questions have become moot by subsequent acts or events." ' [Citations.] Put another way, ' "[a]n appeal should be dismissed as moot when the occurrence of events renders it impossible for the appellate court to grant appellant any effective relief." ' " (People v. Pipkin (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 1146, 1149-1150.)
According to the letter brief submitted by the Attorney General, the parties stipulate the appeal is moot because K.B.'s probation has terminated. We agree. The termination of a defendant's probation renders an appeal challenging probation conditions moot. (People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1120, fn. 5; In re Charles G. (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 608, 611 [termination of probation mooted complaints regarding probation conditions].) Because K.B.'s probation has terminated, this court cannot provide K.B. the relief she sought because she is no longer subject to the contested probation condition. Any ruling on the validity of the challenged electronic search condition would have no practical impact or effect.
The parties also concede, given the fact-bound and contextual nature concerning the validity of the probation condition at issue, that application of a mootness exception is not warranted. Again, we agree with the parties and decline to exercise our discretion to consider the merits of this moot appeal. The California Supreme Court has ruled on the validity of a similar probation condition. Accordingly, this appeal does not present such "a novel question of continuing public interest" (In re Stevens (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1232), "capable of repetition, yet evading review" (Ogunsalu v. Superior Court (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 107, 111), that we should review the issues notwithstanding mootness. No other exceptions to the mootness doctrine apply.
III. DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed as moot.
/s/_________
Margulies, J. We concur: /s/_________
Humes, P. J. /s/_________
Sanchez, J.