Opinion
4-23-0634
12-18-2023
In re I.S., a Minor v. Kayla S., Respondent-Appellant The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee,
This Order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Ford County No. 20JA5 Honorable Matthew J. Fitton, Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE ZENOFF delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Cavanagh and Lannerd concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
ZENOFF JUSTICE
¶ 1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, holding the trial court did not err in finding it was in the minor's best interest to terminate respondent's parental rights.
¶ 2 Respondent, Kayla S., appeals from the trial court's order terminating her parental rights to the minor child, I.S. (born in 2020). The child's father, Robert B., also had his parental rights terminated but is not a party to this appeal. Kayla asserts the court erred by determining it was in I.S.'s best interest to terminate her parental rights. We affirm.
¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 4 On August 31, 2020, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship alleging I.S. was neglected under section 2-3(1)(b) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2020)) in that her environment was injurious to her welfare. The State alleged Kayla and Robert had "unresolved domestic violence issues" and that Robert had "unresolved substance abuse issues." According to a shelter care report, Kayla's history with the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) included: (1) "police contact for domestic disputes" prior to I.S.'s birth, (2) an April 2020 report of Robert damaging a truck while he was intoxicated and with I.S. in the home, (3) the offer of intact services from DCFS related to this April 2020 truck incident that was declined, and (4) an August 10, 2020, report that Robert threatened to slash Kayla's tires if she did not leave his house. The August 10, 2020, incident resulted in the opening of an intact case and ultimately the filing of the petition for adjudication of wardship.
¶ 5 At the August 31, 2020, shelter care hearing, the trial court determined that I.S. would remain in the custody of Kayla.
¶ 6 At the December 11, 2020, adjudication hearing, Kayla stipulated to the neglect allegation for "unresolved domestic violence issues."
¶ 7 A. Dispositional Report
¶ 8 An appointment for an integrated assessment was scheduled between Kayla and a therapist on March 15, 2021. Kayla was unable to make the appointment due to phone difficulties. The appointment was rescheduled to March 19, 2021. The rescheduled assessment was not completed for "similar reasons." Kayla was in communication with the therapist's office and set up a new assessment for March 24, 2021.
¶ 9 On March 26, 2021, the Center for Youth and Family Solutions (CYFS), which the record indicates was an agency designated by DCFS to provide case management, filed a dispositional report. The report was prepared by Kyle Dunlap, a foster case manager with CYFS. The information in the report related to Kayla was obtained from a prior integrated assessment conducted on October 22, 2020.
¶ 10 On March 30, 2021, CYFS filed an addendum to the dispositional report. The addendum included information on Kayla's participation in counseling services and the Building Resilience and Victim Education program.
¶ 11 B. Dispositional Hearing
¶ 12 At the March 30, 2021, dispositional hearing, the trial court noted Kayla's prior stipulation to the neglect allegation and found her unfit and unable to care for I.S. because Kayla "need[s] to complete services; need[s] to establish her financial independence." The permanency goal was set to return I.S. home within 12 months. I.S. was made a ward of the court with DCFS having discretion to authorize unsupervised visits with Kayla. The order admonished the parents "that they must cooperate with [DCFS]. The parents must comply with the terms of the service plan and correct the conditions that require the minor to be in care or they risk termination of their parental rights."
¶ 13 Permanency reports dated September 8, 2021, and March 9, 2022, were filed and permanency hearings took place on September 14, 2021, October 12, 2021, and March 15, 2022. ¶ 14 C. Petition to Terminate Parental Rights
¶ 15 On March 15, 2022, the State filed a petition to terminate Kayla's parental rights and appoint a guardian with the power to consent to adoption of I.S. The petition alleged that Kayla was an unfit person under the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1D (West 2022)) based on four counts. Relevant to this appeal, the State alleged that:
"[S]he failed to make reasonable efforts to correct conditions that were the basis for the removal of the minor from her under Section 2-3 of the [Juvenile Court Act] during the initial nine-month period following adjudication of neglect (from
December 11, 2020, through September 11, 2021) or any subsequent nine-month period, under 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(i)."
The petition alleged that it was in I.S.'s best interest that all parental rights be terminated.
¶ 16 On October 4, 2022, Kayla stipulated to the allegation of unfitness in that she did not make reasonable efforts by having contact with Robert in the nine months after the State filed the neglect petition. The trial court set the case for a best interest hearing.
¶ 17 D. Best Interest Hearing
¶ 18 On March 13, 2023, the trial court held a best interest hearing. CYFS caseworker Leigh Kmetz testified for the State, with the court and all parties acknowledging receipt of her March 9, 2023, best interest report.
¶ 19 Kmetz testified that I.S. had one foster parent, her maternal grandmother, since she came into care in August 2020. The foster parent provided a stable, loving home, and permanency, was attached to I.S., and was willing to adopt I.S. If the foster parent adopted I.S., she would still like to involve her with Kayla in an appropriate way and not sever the relationship. Kmetz testified that, based on her observations, the foster parent and Kayla have "at least the same level of attachment" with the child. Kmetz testified that Kayla completed the domestic violence program and addressed the issues that gave rise to the petition. Kayla had a strong bond with I.S. At the start of visits with Kayla, I.S. was very excited and happy, and she typically ran to and hugged Kayla. I.S. was inconsolable when visitations ended.
¶ 20 On cross-examination, Kmetz acknowledged that there was an unquantifiable risk of emotional harm to I.S. if Kayla's parental rights were terminated. The basis of Kmetz's recommendation to terminate parental rights was "the length of the case and [Kayla's] stability at this time." Kmetz's concern was "mainly home instability." Kmetz also acknowledged that the home and financial stability challenges Kayla faced were related to having a low income. Kmetz stated that Kayla's ability to provide housing and financial stability was a "consideration" in the child's best interest.
¶ 21 Kayla testified that she did not believe it was in I.S.'s best interest to terminate parental rights, since (1) I.S. thinks she is abandoned every time visits end, (2) I.S. can distinguish between her mother and grandmother, (3) I.S. refers to Kayla as "mom," (4) I.S. refers to the foster parent as "Ni-Ni," (5) I.S. "throws herself on the floor and rolls around, and clings to me" when Kayla arrives for visits, and (6) when leaving visits, I.S. cries and clings to the foster parent. Kayla testified that it was difficult to obtain housing and employment stability on her own. She had a series of jobs but had to deal with some setbacks, including issues with transportation and not having a working car. Kayla requested time to get everything in place and keep her parental rights. ¶ 22 The State asked Kayla a series of questions related to a traffic case where Robert was allegedly driving Kayla's car. Kayla asserted her fifth amendment (U.S. Const., amend. V) rights to many of the questions, with the admonishment that negative inferences can be drawn from asserting that right in a civil case. The State questioned Kayla regarding a traffic ticket that Kayla pleaded guilty to by paying the citation. The citation was for permitting an unauthorized person to drive her vehicle.
¶ 23 The State argued it was in I.S.'s best interest to terminate parental rights by highlighting the foster parent's (1) willingness to adopt, (2) ability to provide a stable home, and (3) bond with the child.
¶ 24 Kayla argued that it was not in the best interest of the child to terminate parental rights because of her strong bond with I.S. Kayla asked for time to remedy the financial and housing issues.
¶ 25 After hearing testimony and arguments, the trial court stated that it was a "close" case. The court continued the case to give Kayla time to show that she could apply what she learned in her life to help her daughter.
¶ 26 On June 21, 2023, the trial court held the continued best interest hearing. The State presented newly discovered evidence that Kayla was charged with a felony in October 2022 for possession of methamphetamine. Kayla did not disclose the case to her caseworker at any point. She had pleaded guilty to that offense on May 8, 2023, and received first offender or second chance probation.
¶ 27 Kayla testified she was employed but did not have housing. She testified she could live with her mother, who was the foster parent to I.S., if she had to.
¶ 28 The State asked the trial court to take judicial notice of a 2023 felony case and a 2023 misdemeanor case where Kayla was charged with criminal offenses.
¶ 29 The trial court took judicial notice of the criminal charges and permanency report.
¶ 30 The State argued that Kayla did not make progress. She was in a worse position than she was at the first best interest hearing. She had a newly discovered substance abuse issue, and it was in I.S.'s best interest to terminate parental rights.
¶ 31 Kayla's counsel argued that Kayla improved the situation by obtaining employment and reiterated the strong bond between Kayla and I.S. Counsel argued that Kayla never abused the child, never did anything to harm the child, and never acted with malice toward the child. The issues were Kayla's inability to gain stable housing and an economic footing.
¶ 32 The guardian ad litem argued that the situation "went negative instead of positive" with the newly discovered methamphetamine conviction.
¶ 33 The trial court ruled that the State met its burden in the best interest hearing by a preponderance of the evidence through showing how Kayla's substance abuse issues, housing instability, and length of the case weighed in favor of termination.
¶ 34 The trial court terminated Kayla's parental rights, finding that Kayla had stipulated to being unfit and it was in the best interest of the minor, I.S., that all parental rights and responsibilities of Kayla were terminated.
¶ 35 This appeal followed.
¶ 36 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 37 Kayla argues that the trial court erred in finding that it was in the best interest of I.S. that her parental rights be terminated.
¶ 38 After Kayla stipulated to unfitness, the focus shifted to the best interest of the child. At the best-interest hearing, "the parent's interest in maintaining the parent-child relationship must yield to the child's interest in a stable, loving home life." In re D.T., 212 Ill.2d 347, 364 (2004). The trial court's determination of the child's best interest in a termination of parental rights proceeding lies within its sound discretion, "especially when it considers the credibility of testimony presented at the best interests hearing." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re F.P., 2014 IL App (4th) 140360, ¶ 93. Under the Juvenile Court Act, the best interest of the child is the paramount consideration to which no other takes precedence. In re I.H., 238 Ill.2d 430, 445 (2010). "The purpose of the best interest hearing is to minimize further damage to the child." In re B.B., 386 Ill.App.3d 686, 697 (2008).
¶ 39 The trial court considers the following statutory factors in determining the child's best interest while considering the child's age and developmental needs:
"(a) the physical safety and welfare of the child, including food, shelter, health, and clothing;
(b) the development of the child's identity;
(c) the child's background and ties, including familial, cultural, and religious;
(d) the child's sense of attachments, including:
(i) where the child actually feels love, attachment, and a sense of being valued (as opposed to where adults believe the child should feel such love, attachment, and a sense of being valued);
(ii) the child's sense of security;
(iii) the child's sense of familiarity;
(iv) continuity of affection for the child;
(v) the least disruptive placement alternative for the child;
(e) the child's wishes and long-term goals;
(f) the child's community ties, including church, school, and friends;
(g) the child's need for permanence which includes the child's need for stability and continuity of relationships with parent figures and with siblings and other relatives;
(h) the uniqueness of every family and child;
(i) the risks attendant to entering and being in substitute care; and
(j) the preferences of the persons available to care for the child."705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2022).
¶ 40 While all statutory factors must be considered when determining whether it is in a child's best interest to terminate parental rights, no single factor is dispositive. In re Ca. B., 2019 IL App (1st) 181024, ¶ 31. When determining whether termination of parental rights is in the child's best interest, the juvenile court's best interest determination need not contain an explicit reference to each of the statutory factors that it must consider. In re M.W., 2019 IL App (1st) 191002, ¶ 61.
¶ 41 In matters involving best interest determinations, the trial court receives broad discretion and great deference. In re D.D., 2022 IL App (4th) 220257, ¶ 28. The court is in the best position to determine the credibility and weight of parties' and witnesses' testimony by observing their conduct. D.D., 2022 IL App (4th) 220257, ¶ 28. A reviewing court will not disturb the trial court's best interest findings unless they are contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, meaning that the opposite conclusion is clearly apparent. D.D., 2022 IL App (4th) 220257, ¶ 28. The State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence, meaning more likely than not, that a parental rights termination is in the minor child's best interest.
D.D., 2022 IL App (4th) 220257, ¶ 50.
¶ 42 Citing B.B., Kayla argues that the trial court erred by not weighing Kayla's bond with I.S. as the deciding factor to maintain parental rights. B.B., 386 Ill.App.3d at 697. In B.B., the mother had unfettered access to her children by living with the foster parent during the pendency of the case. B.B., 386 Ill.App.3d at 689-90. This meant that her children retained a strong bond with the mother, which was verified through a bonding assessment by a licensed clinical professional counselor. B.B., 386 Ill.App.3d at 699-700. The mother was unfit due to ongoing substance abuse issues and poor cooperation with DCFS. B.B., 386 Ill.App.3d at 692-93. The trial court acknowledged the strong parent-child bond and found it in the best interest of the children to terminate parental rights, citing instability and a lack of progress by the mother to remedy issues leading to her unfitness. B.B., 386 Ill.App.3d at 696-97. The appellate court reversed the trial court's order, reasoning that the mother's unusually frequent contact with the children and strong bond, verified by the bonding study, meant it was in the best interest of the children to continue contact with the mother to avoid a "sense of abandonment, confusion, or inevitable crisis." B.B., 386 Ill.App.3d at 703. The appellate court remanded the case to the trial court for a permanency review and to develop an appropriate service plan. B.B., 386 Ill.App.3d at 704.
¶ 43 This case is distinguishable from the unique circumstances of B.B. Here, there was an undisputed bond between Kayla and I.S. However, no bonding study was conducted. In B.B., the mother had uninhibited access to her children. In this case, Kayla had limited supervised visits with I.S. for almost two years, and the case lasted almost three years. I.S. had developed a strong bond with her maternal grandmother, who was her foster parent with whom she lived her entire life. Even though I.S. had a strong bond with Kayla, the CYFS caseworker testified at the best interest hearing that I.S. had a similar bond with her grandmother. While I.S. knew the difference between her mother and her grandmother, she had a loving relationship with both adults. Her grandmother provided stability, permanency, and a loving and caring home for I.S.
¶ 44 Kayla's bond with I.S. was a consideration for the trial court. However, the court was not required to weigh Kayla's bond with I.S. as the ultimate deciding factor in the best interest determination. The court had to consider all the statutory factors, including the physical safety and welfare of the child. Here, the court acknowledged that it was a "close" case at the initial best interest hearing and gave Kayla her requested continuance to obtain stable housing and income. At the continued best interest hearing three months later, Kayla had obtained seasonal employment, but she had not obtained a stable home and a new substance abuse issue was discovered through Kayla's guilty plea to possession of methamphetamine. The court considered these factors and also considered that I.S. was being cared for in a loving and stable home by her foster parent grandmother, who was willing to adopt the child. The court considered the statutory factors and found that the State met its burden of proof. The court's conclusion was reasonable under the facts and circumstances presented, and our standard of review does not allow us to disturb the judgment. With the court being in the best position to consider the credibility of witnesses' testimony, weigh the statutory factors, and determine the best interest of the child based on each unique situation, it was not against the manifest weight of the evidence for the court to find it in the best interest of I.S. to terminate respondent's parental rights.
¶ 45 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 46 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
¶ 47 Affirmed.