People v. Kats

16 Citing cases

  1. People v. Taylor

    2013 Ill. App. 3d 100914 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013)

    The scope of a defendant's consent is limited by the expressed object or purpose of the search. People v. Kats, 2012 IL App (3d) 100683 (citing Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991)). Thus, when a defendant explicitly limits his consent to a search for only narcotics, for example, he consents to a search of all areas in which narcotics might reasonably be located, including small containers or packages hidden from view.

  2. People v. Cappadora

    2015 Ill. App. 2d 131281 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015)

    ¶ 26 The standard for assessing the scope of consent requires the consideration of what a reasonable person would have understood by the exchange between the officer and the person giving consent. People v. Kats, 2012 IL App (3d) 100683, ¶ 27. The scope of the search is defined by its expressed object and purpose.

  3. People v. Thomas

    2018 Ill. App. 4th 170440 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018)   Cited 11 times
    In Thomas, the defendant was charged with several drug offenses after a canine alert on his vehicle led to the discovery of cannabis.

    See id. He did not use language or a tone of voice signifying that defendant had to answer his questions. See id. Thus, even though, " ‘practical[ly]’ " and " ‘realistic[ally],’ " few motorists would feel free to drive away when a police officer was asking them questions (see id. at 556, 306 Ill.Dec. 94, 857 N.E.2d 187 ), Henkel's questioning of defendant after the traffic stop was, under Luedemann , a consensual encounter instead of a seizure (see id. at 565, 306 Ill.Dec. 94, 857 N.E.2d 187 ; People v. West , 2017 IL App (3d) 130802, ¶ 25, 412 Ill.Dec. 620, 76 N.E.3d 60 ; People v. Kats , 2012 IL App (3d) 100683, ¶¶ 21-22), 359 Ill.Dec. 605, 967 N.E.2d 335. ¶ 73 D. Reasonable, Articulable Suspicion to Justify the Second Seizure of Defendant

  4. People v. Veal

    2017 Ill. App. 150500 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017)   Cited 5 times   1 Legal Analyses
    In Veal, police officers effectuated a traffic stop on a vehicle after observing that the two backseat passengers, one of whom was defendant, were not wearing seatbelts.

    As a general matter, we have held that the return of paperwork—e.g ., a driver's license, vehicle registration, or proof of insurance—signifies the conclusion of the stop as it conveys to the driver that he is free to leave, and any ensuing search must be supported on grounds independent of the initial violation prompting the stop. See, e.g. , People v. Cosby , 231 Ill.2d 262, 276, 325 Ill.Dec. 556, 898 N.E.2d 603 (2008) ; People v. Kats , 2012 IL App (3d) 100683, ¶ 20, 359 Ill.Dec. 605, 967 N.E.2d 335 ; People v. Al Burei , 404 Ill.App.3d 558, 565, 344 Ill.Dec. 591, 937 N.E.2d 297 (2010) ; People v. Miller , 345 Ill.App.3d 836, 842, 281 Ill.Dec. 206, 803 N.E.2d 610 (2004). ¶ 15 But Illinois courts have not squarely confronted the issue presented in this case, which is whether a traffic stop ends when, instead of returning papers to the driver, the officers arrest or restrain him.

  5. People v. Ward

    2016 Ill. App. 2d 150792 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016)

    ¶ 31 The scope of a search is defined by its expressed objective. People v. Kats, 2012 IL App (3d) 100683, ¶ 27 (citing Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991)). By indicating the intended object of the search to the person giving consent, the police not only apprise the person

  6. People v. Ward

    2016 Ill. App. 2d 150792 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016)

    ¶ 31 The scope of a search is defined by its expressed objective. People v. Kats, 2012 IL App (3d) 100683, ¶ 27 (citing Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991)). By indicating the intended object of the search to the person giving consent, the police not only apprise the person

  7. People v. Canizalez-Cardena

    2012 Ill. App. 4th 110720 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012)   Cited 99 times

    In that case, however, the trial court found that the duration of the traffic stop was unreasonable where the officer, after he decided not to give the defendant a ticket, prolonged the stop approximately 9 1/2 minutes by questioning defendant and calling for a drug-sniffing dog. See People v. Kats, 2012 IL App (3d) 100683, ¶ 21, 359 Ill.Dec. 605, 967 N.E.2d 335. In the present case, the trial court found that Owen was gathering information for the warning tickets, and this did not prolong the stop, especially considering the language barrier increasing the difficulty of communication between the men.

  8. Commonwealth v. Ortiz

    478 Mass. 820 (Mass. 2018)   Cited 7 times

    See United States v. McSween, 53 F.3d 684, 688–689 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 874, 116 S.Ct. 199, 133 L.Ed.2d 133 (1995) (suspect's general consent to search vehicle, coupled with his failure to object to breadth of search, authorized police to search under vehicle's hood); United States v. Sierra–Hernandez, 581 F.2d 760, 764 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 936, 99 S.Ct. 333, 58 L.Ed.2d 333 (1978) (search beneath hood within scope of suspect's general consent); Pincherli v. State, 295 Ga. App. 408, 412–413, 671 S.E.2d 891 (2008) (same); State v. Lopez, 219 N.C. App. 139, 142, 148–149, 723 S.E.2d 164 (2012) (general consent to "search the vehicle" for weapons or drugs "included under the hood and in the air filter compartment"); Hoskins v. State, Nos. 07–03–0053–CR & 07–03–0054–CR, 2003 WL 23015076 (Tex. App. Dec. 23, 2003) (search beneath hood within scope of suspect's general consent). Cf. People v. Kats, 2012 IL App (3d) 100683, ¶¶ 28–30, 359 Ill.Dec. 605, 967 N.E.2d 335 (consent to search "vehicle and its contents for contraband" authorized search behind vehicle's door panel); State v. Powell, 294 N.J. Super. 557, 562–563, 683 A.2d 1175 (1996) (general consent to search authorized removal of side panel of vehicle's door).--------

  9. People v. Acosta

    2024 Ill. App. 3d 200214 (Ill. App. Ct. 2024)

    ¶ 33 It can be said generally that it should not take over 14 minutes to write a warning ticket for a minor traffic violation. See People v. Pulling, 2015 IL App (3d) 140516 (Illinois State Trooper testified that it generally took him between three and five minutes to write a speeding ticket); People v. Kats, 2012 IL App (3d) 100683 (approximately nine minutes not unreasonably long to write a warning ticket); People v. Baldwin, 388 Ill.App.3d 1028 (2009) (deputy was ready to conclude the initial purpose of the traffic stop dealing with lane violations in approximately four and a half minutes); People v. Ruffin, 315 Ill.App.3d 744 (2000) (officer wrote the traffic ticket in approximately five minutes and the "business" portion of the stop took approximately ten minutes); People v. Koutsakis, 272 Ill.App.3d 159 (1995) (affirming the trial court's ruling that "a stop of 14, 18, or 20 minutes was too long to write a speeding ticket for a minor speeding offense."). However, each case presents its own particular circumstances as to the time necessary to complete the traffic portion of the stop, including writing a ticket.

  10. People v. Maybon

    2022 Ill. App. 2d 200557 (Ill. App. Ct. 2022)

    A 12-minute stop is generally not unreasonably long. See People v. Canizalez-Cardena, 2012 IL App (4th) 110720 (free-air sniff 7 to 8 minutes into a traffic stop did not prolong the stop, and a stop of 10 to 12 minutes to issue a warning ticket was reasonable); People v. Kats, 2012 IL App (3d) 100683 (nine-minute stop to issue a warning ticket was sufficiently brief); People v. Staley, 334 Ill.App.3d 358 (2002) (18-minute traffic stop that included confirming the status of defendant's driver's license and license plate registration and issuing two traffic citations was not unduly long). ¶ 73 Second, we conclude that Trooper Melzer diligently processed the warning.