The Court: One, I do not believe that it is a cognate lesser included offense to the charge. But further, in People v Karst, 118 Mich. App. 34 [ 324 N.W.2d 526 (1982)] at page 41, an indication is that — that in order to instruct and to give accessory after the fact as a lesser charge, it says such must be charged in a separate count, and was not in this case. And cites People Bargy, 71 Mich. App. 609 [298 N.W.2d 626 (1976)].
That choice lay with the prosecutor, subject to the circuit court's right to amend the information sua sponte or on proper motion. The circuit court relied on People v. Karst, 118 Mich. App. 34; 324 N.W.2d 526 (1982), to dispose of this matter. The Court of Appeals unanimously agreed that Karst was inapposite.
Planning in advance to act as a getaway driver for a felon is sufficient to find the defendant guilty of aiding and abetting because such an act concerns the commission of the crime. People v Hartford, 159 Mich App 295, 302; 406 NW2d 276 (1987); People v Karst, 118 Mich App 34, 39; 324 NW2d 526 (1982). But mere presence at the crime scene is not sufficient, even with knowledge that an offense is being committed.
But an accessory after the fact is not an aider or abettor. People v Lucas, 402 Mich 302, 305-306; 262 NW2d 662 (1978); People v Karst, 118 Mich App 34, 39; 324 NW2d 526 (1982). Accordingly, evidence showing that Sweet was an accessory after the fact is not evidence that he was an aider and abettor or an accomplice.
In addition, to be convicted as an aider and abettor, a defendant must either possess the requisite intent to commit the underlying offense or participate while knowing that co-participants possess the requisite intent. People v Karst, 118 Mich App 34, 39; 324 NW2d 526 (1982). In this case, accepting defendant's version of the events as true, defendant accompanied Vandenberg to the house knowing Vandenberg's history of stealing personal property; in fact, defendant had attempted to help Vandenberg pawn stolen items in the past.
Further, to be convicted as an aider and abettor, the defendant must either possess the requisite intent to commit the underlying offense or participate while knowing that coparticipants possess the requisite intent. People v Karst, 118 Mich App 34, 39; 324 NW2d 526 (1982). A defendant's mere presence, even with knowledge that the underlying crime is about to be committed or is currently being committed, is insufficient to warrant a conviction under a theory of aiding and abetting.
Accessory after the fact must be charged separately. See Perry, 460 Mich at 64 n 21, citing People v Karst, 118 Mich App 34, 41; 324 NW2d 526 (1982). Defendant was charged with armed robbery and felony-firearm.
In contrast, to be convicted of aiding and abetting first-degree murder a defendant must either himself commit the first-degree murder or participate in the crime while knowing that a coparticipant possessed the requisite intent. People v Karst, 118 Mich. App. 34, 39; 324 N.W.2d 526 (1982). Aiding and abetting includes all forms of assistance rendered to the perpetrator of the crime.
To be convicted, the defendant must either himself possess the required intent or participate while knowing that the principal possessed the required intent. Turner, supra; People v Karst, 118 Mich. App. 34; 324 N.W.2d 526 (1982); People v Triplett, 105 Mich. App. 182; 306 N.W.2d 442 (1981), remanded on other grounds 414 Mich. 898; 323 N.W.2d 7 (1982). We have reviewed the record and conclude that a rational trier of fact could find that the essential elements of aiding and abetting the assault in this case were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
To be convicted, the defendant must either himself possess the required intent or participate while knowing that the principal possessed the required intent. Turner, supra; People v Karst, 118 Mich. App. 34; 324 N.W.2d 526 (1982); People v Triplett, 105 Mich. App. 182; 306 N.W.2d 442 (1981), remanded on other grounds, 414 Mich. 898; 323 N.W.2d 7 (1982). [ People v Vicuna, 141 Mich. 486, 495-496; 367 N.W.2d 887 (1985).