Moreover, if one member of a private law firm has a per se conflict of interest, that conflict is imputed to all other members of the law firm, regardless of whether any of those other members had any personal involvement in the conflicting representation. See, e.g., People v. Free, 112 Ill.2d 154, 167, 97 Ill.Dec. 396, 492 N.E.2d 1269 (1986); People v. Fife, 76 Ill.2d 418, 425, 30 Ill.Dec. 300, 392 N.E.2d 1345 (1979); People v. Dace, 153 Ill.App.3d 891, 896, 106 Ill.Dec. 625, 506 N.E.2d 332 (1987); People v. Arreguin, 92 Ill.App.3d 899, 902, 48 Ill.Dec. 371, 416 N.E.2d 402 (1981); People v. Karas, 81 Ill.App.3d 990, 995, 36 Ill.Dec. 888, 401 N.E.2d 1026 (1980). Applying these principles, our appellate court has reversed convictions due to a per se conflict where defense counsel or his law firm represented the alleged victim in a related or an unrelated matter, regardless of whether the conflicting representation was ongoing at the time counsel represented the defendant.
( People v. Cunningham (1985), 107 Ill.2d 143, 149-50.) As the State points out, the defendant's reliance on People v. Robinson (1979), 79 Ill.2d 147, and People v. Karas (1980), 81 Ill. App.3d 990, is misplaced. In Robinson, the court found that a professional relationship between the defendant's attorney and another client was ongoing and active in that at the time of the defendant's trial, the prosecution witness still owed legal fees to the defendant's attorney.
Where the interests of a defendant and the complaining witness are identical, the State contends, no conflict of interest exists. It would be extremely difficult for a defendant to show what subtle influences or subliminal reluctance affected the decisions of his defense counsel when advising and representing him. ( People v. Kester (1977), 66 Ill.2d 162, 167, 361 N.E.2d 569, 572; People v. Karas (1980), 81 Ill. App.3d 990, 994, 401 N.E.2d 1026, 1029.) Because a defendant cannot identify them with certainty, we must concern ourselves with the potential conflict of interest.
In general a party does not waive an issue if raised at the first opportunity. See People v. Janes, 168 Ill.2d 382, 387 (1995); People v. Karas, 81 Ill. App.3d 990, 996 (1980); People v. Knutson, 17 Ill. App.2d 251, 259 (1958). We note that the trial judge recalled the first venire panel and asked members of the panel supplemental questions relating to other matters.
It is well settled that the knowledge of one member of a law firm is imputed to other members of the firm. ( People v. Karas (1980), 81 Ill. App.3d 990, 401 N.E.2d 1026.) A conflict of interest for one member of a firm extends to all members of a firm.
This is immaterial, for knowledge of one member of a law firm is imputed to all of its members. ( People v. Karas (1980), 81 Ill. App.3d 990, 995, 401 N.E.2d 1026, 1030; People v. Grigsby (1977), 47 Ill. App.3d 812, 820, 365 N.E.2d 481, 486.) An attorney is responsible for the negligence of others in the firm, and a client can be held accountable for his or her attorney's neglect.