Taylor, supra at ___, 566 A.2d at 176. In People v. Kappas, 120 Ill. App.3d 123, 458 N.E.2d 140 (1983), the defendant appealed his conviction by a jury of "driving while his blood alcohol concentration was at or in excess of .10%." Id. at 125, 458 N.E.2d at 141.

Evidence that an open alcohol container was found in a defendant's car is circumstantial evidence that the defendant had been drinking. See People v. Moore, 279 Ill.App.3d 152, 159-60, 215 Ill.Dec. 479, 663 N.E.2d 490 (1996); People v. Kappas,People v. Ostrand, 120 Ill.App.3d 123, 128, 76 Ill.Dec. 1, 458 N.E.2d 140 (1983). Accordingly, evidence that an open bottle of vodka was found in the passenger compartment of defendant's car was relevant to prove that he recently had been drinking.

• 6 Illinois law is well settled that any delay between the time of the incident and the breathalyzer test goes to the weight given the results, viewed in light of the totality of the circumstances. ( People v. Kappas (1983), 120 Ill. App.3d 123, 129, 458 N.E.2d 140.) Results of tests administered two hours after the incident ( People v. Frantz (1986), 150 Ill. App.3d 296, 302, 501 N.E.2d 966; People v. Borst (1987), 162 Ill. App.3d 830, 836, 516 N.E.2d 854), 1 1/2 hours after the incident ( People v. Johnigk (1982), 111 Ill. App.3d 941, 944, 444 N.E.2d 739), one hour after driving ( People v. Schuld (1988), 175 Ill. App.3d 272, 279, 529 N.E.2d 800), and 38 minutes after driving ( Kappas, 120 Ill. App.3d at 128) are all admissible. As to the expert's testimony, the jury can either accept or reject his testimony. People v. Romano (1985), 139 Ill. App.3d 999, 1006, 487 N.E.2d 785.

We find that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had at least a .10 concentration of alcohol in his breath at the time of his driving. An argument similar to the one Newman makes regarding the validity of the breathalyzer results was considered in People v. Kappas (1983), 120 Ill. App.3d 123. In Kappas, the defendant argued that because breathalyzer results vary as the body absorbs ingested alcohol, there is no assurance that his blood-alcohol level, measured 38 minutes after his arrest, was the same as it was at the time of driving.

Our appellate court has long held that matters of delay between driving and BAC testing go to the weight of the evidence and must be viewed in light of the surrounding circumstances. People v. Newman, 163 Ill.App.3d 865, 868 (1987) (citing People v. Kappas, 120 Ill.App.3d 123, 128-29 (1983)). Given the facts of a particular case, the jury may reasonably infer that a defendant's BAC at the time of driving was "similar to, if not higher than," the level when it was subsequently tested.

See also Miller v. State, 597 So. 2d 767, 770 (Fla. 1991) (State need not present "relate back" evidence for court to admit evidence of blood test, and delay between driving and testing goes to weight of results only); People v. Kappas, 120 Ill. App. 3d 123, 129 (1983) (results of test administered thirty-eight minutes after driving properly admitted without further evidence because delay reasonable and passage of time affects weight of test results); State v. Kubik, 235 Neb. 612, 634 (1990) (no need to provide foundation relating back test results to time of driving; delay affects weight, not admissibility, of breath test results). Contrast State v. Ladwig, 434 N.W.2d 594 (S.D. 1989) (retrograde extrapolation testimony necessary to convict defendant of per se violation); State v. Dumont, 146 Vt. 252 (1985) (in prosecution for driving while under influence of alcohol, results of a blood alcohol content test admissible only with "relation back" testimony establishing defendant's blood alcohol content at time of actual operation).

Several states have held that the introduction of blood-alcohol level tests without extrapolation are sufficient along with other evidence of the defendant's driving to convict of driving with a blood-alcohol level in excess of a prescribed limit. People v. Kappas, 120 Ill. App.3d 123, 76 Ill.Dec. 1, 458 N.E.2d 140 (1983); Sullivan v. State, 517 N.E.2d 1251 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988); People v. Mertz, 68 N.Y.2d 136, 497 N.E.2d 657, 506 N.Y.S.2d 290 (1986); Commonwealth v. Slingerland, 358 Pa. Super. 531, 518 A.2d 266 (1986); State v. Keller, 36 Wn. App. 110, 672 P.2d 412 (1983). In these cases, the courts did not address the question of whether the results of the test standing alone would be sufficient to convict.

Cf. State v. Mulcahy, 107 N.J. 467, 527 A.2d 368 (1987) (in DWI case, circumstances of defendant's prior behavior evidencing intoxication relevant when defendant is arrested attempting to drive automobile). The Legislature has thus made it clear that once drivers become intoxicated and operate a motor vehicle, it does not matter how they became intoxicated or whether they realized they were intoxicated or believed they could overcome the effects of intoxication. SeePeople v. Kappas, 120 Ill. App.3d 123, 76 Ill.Dec. 1, 6, 458 N.E.2d 140, 145 (1983) (defendant's awareness of his intoxication "simply does not matter since the liability is absolute. . . . The violation is in the doing, not the knowing."). It is apparent that if the affirmative defense of involuntary intoxication under N.J.S.A. 2C:2-8 were applied to N.J.S.A. 39:4-50, it would negate or derogate from the standard of objective intoxication. It would allow proof that simply because intoxication is "involuntary," a motorist unable to refrain from driving or to appreciate that it was wrong to drive while so intoxicated could be excused. Yet, it is precisely those conditions — the inability to stop driving or to evaluate the wrongfulness of driving while drunk — that the statute seeks to punish.

s sufficient for purposes of the present case to note that whereas prior versions of the section were phrased in terms of the prima facie effect of various BAC levels, the present subdivision, enacted by New York and, in varying versions, by some 28 other jurisdictions under congressional impetus, does not contain similar language. Some confusion has resulted from the fact that although section 1192 (2) proscribes operation while the driver has a BAC of .10 or more, Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 (1) permits the chemical test to be made "within two hours after such person has been placed under arrest for any such violation," for, as Dr. Zimmerman's testimony indicates and as other cases and commentators have noted, while blood alcohol content declines over time, the decline does not begin until sometime after the last drink, variously estimated as from 45 minutes to an hour and a half (Fuenning v Superior Ct., 139 Ariz. 590, 680 P.2d 121; State v Sutliff, 97 Idaho 523, 547 P.2d 1128; People v Kappas, 120 Ill. App.3d 123, 458 N.E.2d 140; State v Gallant, 108 N.H. 72, 227 A.2d 597; Commonwealth v Hartman, 383 Pa. 461, 119 A.2d 211; 1 Erwin, Defense of Drunk Driving Cases § 15.03 [3d ed]; Brent Stiller, Handling Drunk Driving Cases § 2.4; McCormick, Evidence § 205, at 615 [3d ed]; Fitzgerald Hume, Single Chemical Test for Intoxication: A Challenge to Admissibility, 66 Mass. L Rev 23; Hume Fitzgerald, Chemical Tests For Intoxication: What Do The Numbers Really Mean?, 57 Analytical Chemistry 876A). A test reading taken within two hours after arrest may, therefore, be higher or lower than the actual BAC while driving.

Just as one may not argue that a stop sign which was violated was not seen by or known to the violator, so may not a person whose * * * [blood alcohol] registers .10% or above on an appropriately calibrated breathalyzer argue that he did not know it was so." People v. Kappas (1983), 120 Ill. App.3d 123, 76 Ill. Dec. 1, 458 N.E.2d 140, 145. The second rationale is also easily resolved.