Opinion
E071649
09-19-2019
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MELVIN HUGO KAMP, Defendant and Appellant.
Rudy G. Kraft, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Tami Hennick and Collette C. Cavalier, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super.Ct.No. SCR49951) OPINION APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Lorenzo R. Balderrama, Judge. Affirmed. Rudy G. Kraft, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Tami Hennick and Collette C. Cavalier, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I.
INTRODUCTION
Defendant and appellant, Melvin Hugo Kamp, shot his neighbor in the face with a .22 caliber gun. Defendant was charged with attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 187, subd. (a)), but was found not guilty by reason of insanity (§ 1368). Defendant was then committed to the California Department of Mental Health and admitted to Patton State Hospital (Patton) in May 1991, where he remains committed.
Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references are to the Penal Code.
In May 2018, defendant filed a petition under section 1026.2 in which he requested to be transferred from Patton and placed in outpatient treatment. The trial court denied the petition, finding that outpatient treatment was not suitable for defendant because he remained a danger to others due to his ongoing mental health issues.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion by denying his section 1026.2 petition. We find no abuse of discretion and affirm.
II.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Defendant has a long history of mental illness, including schizophrenia and experiencing psychotic symptoms, such as delusions and olfactory and visual hallucinations. In May 1989, he became convinced that his neighbor was attempting to control him through a "computer type box," and tried to poison him by releasing foul-smelling poisonous fumes into his home. As a result of these delusions and hallucinations, defendant shot his neighbor in the face. Defendant was charged with attempted murder, but was found not competent to stand trial. He was then found not guilty of attempted murder by reason of insanity (NGI), and was committed to Patton. Defendant's maximum length of commitment is life plus five years.
"Delusions are fixed beliefs that are not amenable to change in light of conflicting evidence." (Diagnostic & Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th ed. 2013), p. 87.) For those suffering from schizophrenia, "[p]ersecutory delusions (i.e., belief that one is going to be harmed . . . by an individual . . .) are most common." (Ibid.)
"Hallucinations are perception-like experiences that occur without an external stimulus. They are vivid and clear, with the full force and impact of normal perceptions, and not under voluntary control." (Diagnostic & Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th ed. 2013), p. 87.)
An "NGI" is an individual who has been found not guilty of a crime by reason of insanity. (See People v. Soiu (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1191, 1198.)
In June 2012, defendant was released to the San Bernardino/Riverside County Regional Conditional Release Program (CONREP) for outpatient treatment. About six months later, in January 2013, defendant was hospitalized at Riverside Community Hospital for increased blood pressure and low sodium and potassium levels. Later that night, defendant went absent without leave. He was found two days later after someone reported that he was "wandering outside of a local church very early in the morning" and "looked disorganized and confused."
As a result, defendant's release to CONREP was revoked and he was re-hospitalized at Patton due to psychiatric decompensation, which manifested as an increase in his psychiatric symptoms. His physicians attributed his decompensation, in part, to his refusal to acknowledge his illness and his failure to take his medications. Defendant displayed agitation, confusion, disorientation, and inappropriate sexual behavior, which required one-on-one supervision. Defendant was recommitted to Patton, where he has remained since.
In May 2018, defendant filed a petition under section 1026.2 in which he sought a transfer to CONREP. Before the September 2018 hearing on the petition, the parties stipulated without objection to admitting two expert reports: one from the Department of State Hospitals (the DSH Report); and another from CONREP (the CONREP Report).
Dr. Jeffrey Weinstein and Dr. Viswanatha Reddy evaluated defendant and jointly prepared the DSH Report in July 2018. Drs. Weinstein and Reddy noted that Dr. Albert Yee had conducted a risk assessment of defendant in January 2018 and determined that "with less supervision, structure, and support, [defendant] could become dangerous to those around him, especially if he believes they are attempting to poison him or cause him some harm." Dr. Yee, however, opined that defendant's "current risk is being effectively managed through psychotropic, psychosocial treatment and being in a structured setting," which "reduce his risk level."
Drs. Weinstein and Reddy also noted that in June 2018, a social worker found defendant "'continue[d] to display psychotic symptoms that are often paranoid delusions and thought disorganization,'" and that he believed "'staff rob him of his sleep and are out to get him.'" He also "'continue[d] to believe that his rights are being violated,'" though he could not explain how or by whom they were violated.
At the time of their July 2018 report, Drs. Weinstein and Reddy observed defendant "continue[d] to present with active signs and symptoms of psychosis." They concluded defendant "would be at risk of harming others if presently released to the community," and recommended that he "be retained at [Patton] for continued treatment."
In August 2018, Dr. Kathryn Peck prepared the CONREP Report, and Dr. Daniel Lance reviewed it. Dr. Peck first outlined defendant's extensive medical history. Dr. Peck noted, among other things, that in January 2018, defendant experienced "some paranoia about someone following him while he was on [CONREP] and believe[d] this person may have been involved in the shooting of his neighbor." Defendant also reported that "he was somehow altered by a CONREP staff and that may have been what led to his decompensation and revocation" of his release to CONREP in January 2013. In April 2018, defendant reported continued "paranoia of staff and peers." And, in July 2018, defendant reported he believed "his patients' rights and rights as a citizen are violated" and that "'they' do not leave him alone," though he could not identify anyone in particular or how his rights had been violated.
When Dr. Peck evaluated defendant, he "continue[d] to experience symptoms of psychosis including religious and persecutory delusions, olfactory hallucinations, and disorganization." Defendant was "in denial of his mental illness and [did] not recognize his ongoing symptoms." He complained of smelling "'poison fumes,'" the same delusion that led to his shooting his neighbor. As before, defendant "remain[ed] paranoid about staff and peers." He also continued to deny that he was prescribed psychotropic medication, denied that he needed any, and denied that he was mentally ill.
In Dr. Peck's view, defendant was "greatly minimizing the severity of his mental disorder" and his ongoing symptoms. Based on these and other considerations, Dr. Peck opined that defendant "cannot safely and effectively be treated in community outpatient treatment at this time," and recommended that "he be retained at [Patton] for continued treatment, as he has not met his discharge goals."
In September 2018, a hearing on defendant's section 1026.2 petition was held. At that time, the trial court heard testimony from defendant. Defendant testified, in relevant part, that he had been "mentally stable" and off psychotropics since 1990, and that his mental illness was "[i]n remission" for the past 29 years. He also stated he could "get by" without any medications and that he would follow his physicians' orders if they convinced him that their recommended treatment was necessary and not a waste of money.
In October 2018, the trial court held another hearing on defendant's petition. At that time, the trial court denied defendant's petition, finding defendant was not suited for outpatient treatment. The trial court noted the DSH Report and the CONREP Report concluded defendant would pose a danger to others if released back into outpatient treatment. The trial court noted defendant continued to suffer from the same delusions and hallucinations that caused him to shoot his neighbor, such as smelling "poison fumes" and believing people wanted to harm him or violate his rights in some undefined way. The trial court stated that, according to the DSH Report and the CONREP Report, defendant "does not recognize his own symptoms," denies having any mental illness, and believes he "could get by without medications." The trial court also noted defendant testified at the hearing on his section 1026.2 petition that not taking his medications lowers their side effects and that he could make decisions about his medications by himself.
The trial court concluded that, because of his reluctance to take his medications and to comply with his physicians' directives, defendant likely would "find himself back in the same frame of mind" that caused him to shoot his neighbor. The trial court therefore denied defendant's petition. Defendant timely appealed.
III.
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion in denying his section 1026.2 petition. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review
We review an order denying a section 1026.2 petition for an abuse of discretion. (People v. Cross (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 63, 73.) "Under that standard, it is not sufficient to show facts affording an opportunity for a difference of opinion. [Citation.] . . . [D]iscretion is abused only if the court exceeds the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances being considered." (Ibid.) Applying that standard requires us to determine whether the trial court relied on proper factors and whether those factors find some support in the record. (People v. Henderson (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 1263, 1269.)
B. Section 1026.2 Principles
NGIs are individuals "who initially have been found to have committed a criminal act, but whose mental condition warrants a period of confinement for treatment in a state institution, in lieu of criminal punishment." (In re Moye (1978) 22 Cal.3d 457, 463.) Their involuntary civil confinement is "for purposes of treatment, not punishment." (Id. at p. 466, original italics.)
NGIs may be released from commitment in one of two ways: (1) upon expiration of "the longest term of imprisonment which could have been imposed for the offense or offenses of which the person was convicted" (§ 1026.5, subd. (a)(1)); or (2) upon a finding their sanity has been "restored," meaning they "no longer [pose] a danger to the health and safety of others, due to mental defect, disease, or disorder." (§ 1026.2, subd. (e).)
Here, defendant's restoration of his sanity is his only option because he is committed to Patton for life plus five years. Release under this option "is a two-step process: conditional release to an outpatient treatment program for a trial period and, if successful, unconditional release into the community." (People v. Endsley (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 110, 114.)
"The first step in the release process requires the defendant . . . to demonstrate at a hearing that he or she will not 'be a danger to the health and safety of others, due to mental defect, disease, or disorder, while under supervision and treatment in the community.' (§ 1026.2, subdivision (e).)" (People v. Soiu, supra, 106 Cal.App.4th at p. 1196, italics omitted.) The petitioner bears the burden of making this showing by a preponderance of the evidence. (§ 1026.2, subd. (k).)
C. Analysis
Defendant contends the trial court erred in two respects in denying his petition. First, he asserts the trial court improperly required him to show that he would take the medications CONREP prescribed because section 1026.2 does not contain such a requirement. As such, he believes the court did not comply with section 1026.2 by imposing an additional requirement that section 1026.2 does not mandate. Second, he contends the court abused its discretion because there was "no evidence" that he is currently dangerous or would become dangerous if placed into the community. We reject both contentions.
First, the trial court properly stated at the October 2018 hearing that section 1026.2 required the court to determine at the outset whether defendant would pose a danger to others if released into CONREP. (§ 1026.2, subd. (e).) The medical professionals that treated defendant uniformly stated defendant posed a threat to others if released into CONREP because he likely would not follow his prescription schedule, which would increase his symptoms that caused him to shoot his neighbor. Indeed, defendant's evaluators believed his condition would deteriorate without the structure and supervision that Patton afforded him because he likely would not follow his physicians' directives. As defendant acknowledges, "[i]f the evidence shows that the patient needs to comply with the medications in order to not be dangerous, that is a factor that can be taken into account." The trial court therefore permissibly considered whether defendant would take his medications as prescribed in determining whether he met his burden under section 1026.2. Defendant provides no authority that suggests otherwise.
Defendant's second contention also lacks merit. Defendant suggests the trial court abused its discretion because its ruling was unsupported by substantial evidence because there was "no evidence" he was or would become dangerous. "As noted, the proper standard of review is abuse of discretion." (People v. Cross, supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at p. 73; People v. Sword (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 614, 619 fn.2 [same].) But even if the substantial evidence standard applied (cf. People v. DeGuzman (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 414, 420 [reviewing order revoking outpatient status for substantial evidence]), we would conclude the trial court's decision is supported by substantial evidence.
Contrary to defendant's position there is "no evidence" defendant was or would become dangerous, Drs. Weinstein, Reddy, and Peck opined defendant likely would pose a danger to the community if released into CONREP, and all three of them recommended that defendant remain committed at Patton for continued treatment for that reason. As noted, defendant testified that he did not believe he was mentally ill, did not need any kind of medication, and would selectively follow his physicians' directives, if at all, if released into outpatient treatment. Defendant's evaluators believed his failure to follow his physicians' orders when previously released into CONREP led to his psychiatric decompensation and an increase in his symptoms—the same ones that caused him to shoot his neighbor and ultimately resulted in his re-commitment at Patton in 2013. Defendant's evaluators unanimously believed defendant may commit another crime of violence if released from the structured environment that Patton provided.
In addition, Dr. Lance reviewed Dr. Peck's CONREP Report and seemingly concurred in its findings and conclusions, as he did not voice any disagreement. --------
In short, there is substantial evidence in the record to support the trial court's order denying defendant's section 1026.2 petition. The trial court reasonably found that if defendant were released from Patton, he likely would not follow his medication schedule, which would cause him to suffer a psychiatric decline and an increase in the hallucinations and delusions that led him to shoot his neighbor in the face. The trial court therefore reasonably concluded defendant would pose a danger to society if released into outpatient treatment. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of defendant's section 1026.2 petition.
IV.
DISPOSITION
The order denying defendant's section 1026.2 petition for outpatient release is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
CODRINGTON
J. We concur: McKINSTER
Acting P. J. SLOUGH
J.