A trial court engages in both factfinding and law application when it rules on a motion to suppress. People v. Kaiser, 32 P.3d 480, 483 (Colo. 2001). When a trial court determines whether a defendant has validly waived the Miranda rights, the court engages in both factfinding and law application.

People v. Platt, 81 P.3d 1060, 1065 (Colo. 2004); People v. Kaiser, 32 P.3d 480, 483 (Colo. 2001); People v. Gennings, 808 P.2d 839, 844 (Colo. 1991). We defer to the trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous or unsupported by the record.

(Colo. 2006) (the defendant's education is relevant); People v. Kaiser, 32 P.3d 480, 486-87 (Colo. 2001) (same).• The detective asked defendant if he understood his rights after she read each one to him and then again after she had completed the entire advisement.

The court may consider any relevant factor to make this determination. People v. Kaiser, 32 P.3d 480, 484 (Colo. 2001). Factors a court customarily considers include, but are not limited to: "the time interval between the initial Miranda advisement and any subsequent interrogation; whether and to what extent the interrogating officer reminded the defendant of his or her rights prior to the interrogation by asking if the defendant recalled his or her rights, understood them, or wanted an attorney; the clarity and form of the defendant's acknowledgement and waiver, if any; the background and experience of the defendant in connection with the criminal justice system; the defendant's age, experience, education, background, and intelligence; and whether the defendant has any language barrier in understanding the advisement."

Id. (quotations omitted). See also People v. Kaiser, 32 P.3d 480, 484 (Colo. 2001); People v. Hopkins, 774 P.2d 849, 852 (Colo. 1989).

¶ 14 In assessing the validity of a Miranda waiver, factors a court may consider include, but are not limited to, the following: the time interval between the initial Miranda advisement and any subsequent interrogation; whether and to what extent the interrogating officer reminded the defendant of his rights prior to the interrogation by asking if the defendant recalled his rights, understood them, or wanted an attorney; the clarity and form of the defendant's acknowledgement and waiver, if any; the defendant's background and experience in connection with the criminal justice system; the defendant's age, experience, education, background, and intelligence; and whether the defendant has any language barrier to understanding the advisement. People v. Kaiser, 32 P.3d 480, 484 (Colo.2001). B. Application to This Case

After finding that the statement was voluntarily given, the judge concluded that "the People have failed to sustain their burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights." The court found the evidence insufficient to support a conclusion that Al-Yousif was "fully aware of the nature of the right to remain silent . . . and the consequences of abandoning that right," as required under People v. Kaiser, 32 P.3d 480 (Colo. 2001). The People took this interlocutory appeal pursuant to C.A.R. 4.1 and section 16-12-102(2), 6 C.R.S. (2001).

The trial court framed the relevant legal standard as follows: “To find a knowing and intelligent waiver, I would have to be convinced by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant was ‘fully aware of the nature of the right to remain silent ... and the consequences of abandoning that right.’ ” [Id. at 8, 103 S.Ct. 276 (quoting People v. Kaiser, 32 P.3d 480, 484 (Colo.2001).] The trial court concluded that the State failed to show that Al–Yousif knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights, based on the following factors:

We will, however, correct on review a trial court's application of an erroneous legal standard or the court's ultimate legal conclusion if that conclusion is inconsistent with or unsupported by evidentiary findings. People v. Kaiser, 32 P.3d 480, 483 (Colo. 2001).

Id. (alteration in original) (quoting People v. Davis, 2019 CO 24, ¶ 14, 438 P.3d 266, 268); see also People v. Glick, 250 P.3d 578, 582 (Colo. 2011) ("We will not substitute our own judgment for that of the trial court unless the trial court’s findings are clearly erroneous or not supported by the record."); People v. Kaiser, 32 P.3d 480, 483 (Colo. 2001) (noting that a trial court’s application of an erroneous legal standard in resolving a suppression motion and the court’s ultimate legal conclusion of constitutional law that is inconsistent with or unsupported by evidentiary findings are subject to correction on review). [4] ¶24 "In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we look solely to the record created at the suppression hearing."