Consequently, while we have applied many of the basic protections traditionally associated with a criminal prosecution to juvenile justice proceedings, S.G.W. v. People, 752 P.2d 86, 88 (Colo.1988), alleged juvenile offenders are not entitled to the full complement of constitutional protections owed criminal defendants.See, e.g., People v. Juvenile Ct., City & Cnty. of Denver, 893 P.2d 81, 91 (Colo.1995). For example, the U.S. Supreme Court has not extended the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial where an alleged criminal offender faces the potential loss of freedom for more than six months to the juvenile justice system.
"Absent constitutional concerns, the General Assembly may amend or repeal prior legislation as the result of the adoption of policies that differ from those previously embraced by that governmental institution." People v. Juvenile Court, City County of Denver, 893 P.2d 81, 89 (Colo. 1995). Exercising this authority, SB 216 amended the Water Right Determination and Administration Act of 1969, sections 37-92-101 to -602, C.R.S. (2004), in several important respects.
In fact, the juvenile code states that its purpose is "to serve the welfare of children and the best interests of society," expressly recognizing that the legislature's intent is to balance both interests and that striking that balance is not inconsistent with the provisions of the juvenile code. § 19-1-102, C.R.S. 2018; see People v. Juvenile Court , 893 P.2d 81, 91 (Colo. 1995) (noting that the juvenile code reflects a balance between concern for juveniles and concern for the community at large). ¶15 The legislature has, therefore, chosen to require juveniles to pay restitution where they have damaged property through their criminal conduct even if they cannot immediately pay the full amount.
¶16 Generally, the party against whom a presumption is directed bears the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut it. CRE 301 ("[A] presumption imposes upon the party against whom it is directed the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption . . . ."); People v. Juvenile Ct., 893 P.2d 81, 93 (Colo. 1995) (applying the premise of CRE 301 in a criminal context). ¶17 Here, because the presumption favors defendants by allowing them to use authorized medical marijuana while on probation, the burden of rebutting it falls on the prosecution.
A statute is facially unconstitutional only if no conceivable set of circumstances exists under which it may be applied in a constitutionally permissible manner. People v. Juvenile Court, 893 P.2d 81, 93 (Colo. 1995). Because we respect the roles of the legislative and executive branches, we presume that statutes are constitutional; but we, not they, ultimately decide a statute's constitutionality.
However, the overriding purposes of the Children's Code have remained unchanged: to preserve and strengthen family ties while securing a child's welfare, to draw a distinction between adults and children who violate the law, and to protect and rehabilitate juveniles who violate the law. See People v. Juvenile Court, 893 P.2d 81, 90 (Colo. 1995); People in the Interest of B.M.C., 32 Colo. App. 79, 82, 506 P.2d 409, 410 (1973). By express legislative declaration, the General Assembly stated its purposes regarding treatment of children:
Guidance in this regard is found in CRE 301 which states, with respect to civil actions, "a presumption imposes upon the party against whom it is directed the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, but does not shift to such party the burden of proof in the sense of the risk of non-persuasion, which remains throughout the trial upon the party on whom it was originally cast." We recently came to a similar conclusion in the criminal law context when we considered the presumptions contained in the juvenile bond provisions for gun law violations in People v. Juvenile Court, No. 93SA325, slip op. (Colo. Mar. 13, 1995). There, we held that the presumption did not shift the burden of proof away from the state, but rather required introduction of some evidence to overcome its effect.
As our supreme court explained over two decades ago, "the General Assembly acknowledged its authority to adopt different processes to effectuate various policies . . . ." People v. Juvenile Court, 893 P.2d 81, 89 (Colo. 1995). Therefore,
And "[t]he purposes of the Criminal Code are quite different from the purposes of the Children's Code." People v. Juvenile Court, 893 P.2d 81, 88 (Colo. 1995). This principle looms large over our analysis. Had the General Assembly intended otherwise by making section 19-1-103(2) applicable to section 18-12-108(3), it could have cross-referenced it.
And "[t]he purposes of the Criminal Code are quite different from the purposes of the Children's Code." People v. Juvenile Court , 893 P.2d 81, 88 (Colo. 1995). This principle looms large over our analysis. Had the General Assembly intended otherwise by making section 19–1–103(2) applicable to section 18–12–108(3), it could have cross-referenced it.