Opinion
June 1, 1992
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Queens County (Clabby, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The decision as to whether to permit a defendant to withdraw his or her guilty plea rests within the sound discretion of the sentencing court (see, CPL 220.60; People v. Brown, 142 A.D.2d 683; People v. Melendez, 135 A.D.2d 660). In the present case, the defendant voluntarily and knowingly entered into the guilty plea with the assistance of competent counsel and only after the court had apprised him of the consequences. Further, the defendant made no claims of innocence at the plea proceeding. Rather, he freely admitted the acts constituting the crime to which he was pleading guilty. The defendant's assertion that he pleaded guilty because he feared that he would be convicted of the remaining counts of the indictment and that he only realized after he pleaded guilty that the People's case was weaker than he had thought was insufficient to warrant withdrawal of the guilty plea (see, People v. Lesesne, 173 A.D.2d 407). Thus, under the circumstances of this case, it was not an improvident exercise of discretion to deny the defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea without first holding a hearing (see, People v. Frederick, 45 N.Y.2d 520; People v. Tinsley, 35 N.Y.2d 926; People v. Lesesne, supra; People v. Fuller, 156 A.D.2d 377). Balletta, J.P., Rosenblatt, Miller and Pizzuto, JJ., concur.