Opinion
NO. 4-20-0614
05-03-2021
In re C.W., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Julius W., Respondent-Appellant).
NOTICE
This Order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Sangamon County
No. 19JA25
Honorable Karen S. Tharp, Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Turner and Holder White concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: The trial court did not err in finding respondent unfit to parent his minor child or in terminating respondent's parental rights.
¶ 2 On October 23, 2020, the trial court found respondent, Julius W., unfit to parent his minor child, C.W. (born January 30, 2019). On December 4, 2020, the court terminated respondent's parental rights. Respondent appeals, arguing the trial court erred both in finding he was an unfit person and in finding termination of his parental rights was in the best interests of C.W. We affirm.
¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 4 On February 5, 2019, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship, alleging C.W. was neglected and dependent, as those terms are defined under the Juvenile Court Act of
1987 (Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS 405/2-3 to 2-4 (West 2018)). The petition alleged C.W. was neglected because her environment was injurious to her welfare, as evidenced by her mother's and respondent's mental health issues (id. § 2-3(1)). The petition alleged C.W. was dependent because she was without proper care as a result of the mental disabilities of her mother and respondent (id. § 2-4(1)). The next day, the trial court conducted a shelter care hearing and entered an order granting the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) temporary custody of C.W.
¶ 5 In March 2019, the Family Services Center (FSC), an agency operating under contract with DCFS, instituted a family service plan. Under the service plan, respondent was required to, among other things, cooperate with FSC and DCFS, complete an integrated assessment, attend weekly visits with C.W., participate in a substance abuse assessment and any recommended services, participate in a mental health assessment and any recommended services, and maintain stable housing and legal income.
¶ 6 In May 2019, respondent entered a stipulation acknowledging C.W. was dependent, as alleged in the State's petition. The trial court accepted respondent's stipulation and entered an order finding C.W. was dependent. Subsequently, the court entered a dispositional order finding respondent unfit, unable, or unwilling to parent C.W., making C.W. a ward of the court, and granting custody and guardianship of C.W. to DCFS.
¶ 7 On July 14, 2020, the State filed a motion to terminate respondent's parental rights. (We note the State also sought to terminate the parental rights of C.W.'s mother and that, ultimately, her parental rights were terminated; however, she is not a party to this appeal, and we discuss the facts only as they relate to respondent.) In its petition, the State alleged respondent was an unfit person in that he failed to: (1) maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to C.W.'s welfare (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West 2018)), (2) make reasonable
efforts to correct the conditions which were the basis for the removal of C.W. (id. § 1(D)(m)(i)), and (3) make reasonable progress toward the return of C.W. (id. § 1(D)(m)(ii)). As an additional ground of unfitness, the State alleged that respondent was unable to discharge his parental responsibilities due to a mental impairment, mental illness, intellectual disability, or developmental disability and that the inability would continue beyond a reasonable period of time (id. § 1(D)(p)). Finally, the State alleged it was in the best interests of C.W. that respondent's parental rights be terminated.
¶ 8 On October 23, 2020, the trial court conducted a fitness hearing. During the hearing, the State first called Patricia Kaidell, the assistant foster care program director at FSC. According to Kaidell, respondent was generally cooperative with the agency and had completed an integrated assessment. However, respondent did not complete mental health services, refused to sign consents for the agency to access his medical records, and although he completed a parenting class, "had difficulty with basic parenting skills." Kaidell testified that, during the integrated assessment, respondent "acknowledged that when he used alcohol, that caused his behaviors to be erratic at times" and he acknowledged he self-medicated with marijuana. Despite these admissions, respondent refused to participate in substance abuse treatment because he "did not feel that he had a substance abuse issue." Additionally, Kaidell testified respondent had been hospitalized from July 2020 until September 2020 for mental health issues because he "had not been medication compliant." During this period of hospitalization, respondent attacked a hospital staff member. After he was released from treatment, respondent was compliant with his medication. Kaidell also testified respondent attended the majority of his visits with C.W. and "enjoyed being with the child." However, FSC never granted respondent unsupervised visits, and although respondent's parenting skills improved over the course of DCFS's involvement in the case, he still struggled
with changing C.W.'s diaper. As a result of the coronavirus pandemic, respondent's visits were eventually changed from in-person to online. Regarding C.W., Kaidell testified the child had "developmental delays." Kaidell explained C.W. had to wear braces for her legs to improve her posture and was undergoing testing to determine whether she had cerebral palsy.
¶ 9 The State next called Judy Osgood, a licensed clinical psychologist, who respondent's counsel stipulated was qualified to testify as an expert in her field. Osgood testified she interviewed respondent for three hours on April 13, 2020, as part of a psychological evaluation referred to her by DCFS. Prior to meeting with respondent, Osgood reviewed "records about the DCFS case," including the integrated assessment and family service plan, as well as respondent's mental health records and hospital records. According to Osgood, during her evaluation she discussed with respondent his background, his understanding of the DCFS proceedings, and any treatment issues. Osgood also conducted numerous psychological tests with respondent during the evaluation. After the evaluation, Osgood prepared a written report, which was admitted into evidence.
¶ 10 Based upon respondent's mental health records and hospital records, Osgood determined respondent had previously been diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type, and with schizophrenia. Additionally, Osgood determined respondent had a "chronic history of psychiatric hospitalizations[,] including auditory and visual hallucinations, aggression, and violence in the context of alcohol abuse and noncompliance with medication." Osgood reported respondent was first hospitalized with psychiatric symptoms at the age of 16 after he began experiencing hallucinations. At this time, respondent's doctors diagnosed him with schizophrenia and recommended he remain in the hospital for several months, but respondent's mother secured his release from the hospital after one week. A month later, respondent's mother brought him to
the emergency room with similar mental health symptoms and again refused to agree to his admission for psychiatric care. When respondent was at the emergency room, he tested positive for marijuana. Respondent was again hospitalized at the ages of 18, 19, and 22 after experiencing more psychiatric symptoms. On each of these occasions, respondent was hospitalized for longer than 90 days. Prior to each of these three hospitalizations, respondent had either stopped taking his medication and begun to "self-medicate" with alcohol or had consumed alcohol while still on his medication. Respondent's records indicated that "[p]rior to and during his hospitalizations, [respondent] *** experienced paranoia, delusional behavior, delusions of grandeur[,] and obsessive behavior." According to Osgood, respondent's records also indicated that he "[could] go long periods of time with stable behavior, however, when he [was] not on his medication, [he] bec[ame] violent, hypersexual[,] and out of control." Respondent told Osgood that in his hallucinations he saw shadows and he heard voices, people being killed, and people screaming.
¶ 11 Osgood testified that, during her interview with respondent, he "appear[ed] to be compliant in taking psychotropic medications as prescribed," was able to interact with her appropriately, and understood her questioning. During the psychological testing portion of the interview, respondent self-reported that he had no problems with anxiety, depression, hopelessness, or anger and denied any instances of abuse, neglect, or trauma in his childhood. Osgood then administered the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, Fourth Edition, a comprehensive IQ test. The results of this test indicated respondent's "full scale IQ" was 79, which Osgood explained was "in the borderline range," meaning respondent had "some significant deficits in his intellectual functioning that put[ ] him at an overall level of intellectual functioning at a low level." Respondent's lowest score on the IQ test was in the category of working memory, which Osgood described as respondent's short-term memory and ability to exert mental acuity. Osgood testified
respondent's limited working memory would impact his participation in parenting classes and other types of treatment. Osgood also administered an adaptive behavior assessment, which measured respondent's ability to "function[ ] in the world," and which demonstrated respondent had deficits in self-care, home living, work, self-direction, and communication. Osgood attributed the deficits in respondent's adaptive behavior to his "severe and chronic mental disorder" and his borderline intellectual functioning.
¶ 12 Osgood ultimately diagnosed respondent with the following mental disorders as outlined in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition: schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type, alcohol use disorder severe by history, parent child relational problem, and borderline intellectual functioning. Osgood explained schizoaffective disorder "involves a pattern of major depressive episodes, along with episodic psychotic symptoms, delusions, hallucinations, [and] paranoia." According to Osgood, during a psychotic episode, a person with schizoaffective disorder "engages in extreme behaviors that can endanger themselves and others" and has "significant impairments in their ability to function personally [and] interpersonally." Osgood testified respondent's schizoaffective disorder was a "long-term" and a "lifelong" mental health diagnosis and opined medication was "necessary but not sufficient" to treat his disorders.
¶ 13 In her report, Osgood concluded that "[t]he combination of [respondent's] chronic mental disorder ([s]chizoaffective [d]isorder, [b]ipolar [t]ype) combined with his [b]orderline [i]ntellectual [f]unctioning (especially, his deficits in working memory) impede[d] his ability to parent his daughter." Osgood opined that her "prognosis of [respondent] being able to discharge minimal parental responsibilities" for C.W. was "extremely poor and guarded" and that respondent needed to be considered "a high risk of harm" to C.W., especially in light of her "developmental
delays and special needs." Osgood's opinion was predicated upon respondent's "chronic pattern of going off his medications, using alcohol, having severe psychotic episodes, engaging in violence, hypersexuality, [and] out-of-control behavior." She explained, even if respondent were consistent in taking his medication, it was still possible that he would experience additional psychotic episodes and if respondent used alcohol or a controlled substance while on his medication, it could also "precipitate psychotic episodes." Finally, Osgood explained that if respondent again stopped taking his medication, he could experience another "psychotic state" where he would be unable to understand the needs of a young child.
¶ 14 The State's final witness was Alyssa Williams, C.W.'s caseworker at CFS. Williams testified respondent never completed mental health or substance abuse services. Williams additionally testified that, after respondent was released from the hospital, she met him at his apartment and he explained that he had been hospitalized because he "was outside preaching to people" and his mother called the police. According to Williams, respondent spent most of the time during his video visits with C.W. telling her foster parents about what he was doing rather than talking to C.W. or inquiring about her welfare.
¶ 15 Respondent testified on his own behalf. Respondent disagreed with Osgood's opinion that he had difficulty functioning normally, explaining that he lived on his own, earned a 3.8 grade point average in college, and had babysat his two nephews while their parents worked. According to respondent, he declined to participate in substance abuse treatment because he "wanted to find a facility that wasn't a substance abuse facility." Respondent denied that he ever smoked marijuana, although he testified that when he was 16 years old, somebody put "some dope" in his food or drink, which led to his first hospitalization. Respondent also testified that he did not consume alcohol often and no longer drank "to excess." Additionally, respondent testified that
when he consumed alcohol in the past, it "ha[d] an effect on [his] mood." Respondent admitted that he last consumed alcohol the week before the hearing but only drank one beer. Regarding his mental health, respondent testified he was first diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder when he was 16 years old. Respondent acknowledged that he had previously gone off his medication, explaining those instances occurred when he "thought [he] was cured" or when he forgot to take it. One time, respondent stopped taking his medication after he read online that the "the medicine that they [were] giving people for mental illness [was] killing them slowly." Respondent knew it was "very important to take the medicine" because, when he failed to take it, "the episodes happen[ed]" and, if he did take it, he could "sustain a normal life." After his most recent hospitalization, respondent resolved to stay on his medicine.
¶ 16 After both parties and the guardian ad litem presented argument, the trial court found respondent was an unfit person on each ground alleged by the State.
¶ 17 Immediately after the fitness hearing, the trial court conducted the best interest hearing. During the best interest hearing, Williams testified on behalf of the State that C.W. was placed in a foster home with fictive kin and had been in that home since she was two days old. The foster family had previously adopted C.W.'s half-brother, a child who had been removed from C.W.'s mother, and the family was willing to adopt C.W. as well. According to Williams, C.W. was "doing very well" in the foster home; C.W.'s foster family was meeting her needs, including her medical needs, and she had bonded with her foster family. C.W. no long required leg braces, and her foster family was in the process of getting her tested for cerebral palsy, but the screening had been delayed due to the coronavirus pandemic. Although the foster family was not a "specialized placement," Williams was confident the family would be able to care for C.W. even if she were diagnosed with cerebral palsy. Williams was also confident the foster parents, who
were Caucasian, would be able to appropriately address any cultural issues that arose in raising C.W., who was African-American, noting the foster parents had not had any trouble raising C.W.'s half-brother, who was also African-American. Williams also testified the foster parents had indicated they would allow respondent to have video visits with C.W. if his parental rights were terminated. Williams concluded that placement with her foster family was in the best interests of C.W.
¶ 18 Respondent again testified on his own behalf. Respondent testified that he had experience babysitting children, having cared for his nephews while their parents were at work, and had experience with caring for infants as a result of his visits with C.W. Respondent further testified that he had family who could help him raise C.W. Respondent believed it was in C.W.'s best interests to be placed with him because, having grown up without a father, he knew it would "hurt [C.W.] mentally" to grow up without him in her life. On cross-examination, respondent testified he was "real spiritual" and explained that just before his most recent hospitalization, he had been in "[t]he spiritual zone." According to respondent, although he knew he could experience psychotic episodes if he stopped taking his medication, "[i]f God told [him] to get off [his] medicine," he would.
¶ 19 Bonnie Sutton, respondent's mother, also testified on his behalf. Sutton testified that, despite respondent's mental health condition, he was able to parent C.W. with help and that she and the rest of his family would be willing to assist him in raising C.W. According to Sutton, as a result of his recent hospitalization, respondent had "come to accept that he [was] going to have to take [his] medication to maintain himself." Specifically, Sutton testified that respondent had called her and said: "Mom, I'm going to have to take my medication, and I'm going to make sure and do what I have to do." Sutton also testified that she attended some of respondent's visits with
C.W. and had observed C.W. call him "Da-Da."
¶ 20 After reviewing the evidence and the statutory factors, the trial court ultimately found that it was in C.W.'s best interests to terminate respondent's parental rights.
¶ 21 This appeal followed.
¶ 22 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 23 The Juvenile Court Act sets forth a two-step adjudicative process for the involuntary termination of a parent's rights to his minor child. 705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West 2018). The State must first prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the parent is an "unfit person" as defined in section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2018)). 705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West 2018); In re J.H., 2020 IL App (4th) 200150, ¶ 67, 162 N.E.3d 454. If the State satisfies this burden, the trial court conducts a subsequent and separate hearing at which the State must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that termination of the parent's rights to his minor child would be in the child's best interests. J.H., 2020 IL App (4th) 200150, ¶ 67.
¶ 24 "When a parent appeals the circuit court's findings that he or she is an 'unfit person' and that terminating parental rights is in the best interests of the child, we do not retry the case but, instead, limit ourselves to deciding whether the court's findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence." Id. ¶ 68. "A court's decision regarding a parent's fitness is against the manifest weight of the evidence only where the opposite conclusion is clearly apparent." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re M.I., 2016 IL 120232, ¶ 21, 77 N.E.3d 69.
¶ 25 In the present case, the trial court found respondent was an unfit person on each ground alleged by the State. However, "[a] parent's rights may be terminated if even a single alleged ground for unfitness is supported by clear and convincing evidence." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 43. Here, we find the State adequately demonstrated respondent was an unfit
person under section 1(D)(p) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(p) (West 2018)).
¶ 26 Section 1(D)(p) of the Adoption Act provides, in relevant part, as follows:
"D. 'Unfit person' means any person whom the court shall find to be unfit to have a child, without regard to the likelihood that the child will be placed for adoption. The grounds of unfitness are any one or more of the following ***:
* * *
(p) Inability to discharge parental responsibilities supported by competent evidence from a psychiatrist, licensed clinical social worker, or clinical psychologist of mental impairment, mental illness or an intellectual disability as defined in Section 1-116 of the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code, or development disability as defined in Section 1-106 of that Code, and there is sufficient justification to believe that the inability to discharge parental responsibilities shall extend beyond a reasonable time period." Id.
Under this definition, it is not enough for the State to prove that the parent has a mental illness; the State must additionally prove that: "(1) the mental illness makes the parent unable to discharge his or her parental responsibilities and (2) such inability will persist for an unreasonably long time." In re K.B., 2019 IL App (4th) 190496, ¶¶ 67-68, 145 N.E.3d 661.
¶ 27 The trial court's finding that respondent was unfit to parent C.W. was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The State presented testimony from Osgood, a licensed clinical psychologist, that respondent suffered from schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type, a mental illness, and from a mental impairment, reflected in his low IQ. Osgood additionally testified respondent's mental disorder and impairment rendered him unable to discharge his parental responsibilities, explaining respondent's conditions "impede[d] his ability to parent [C.W.]" and
that, as a result of his conditions, respondent presented "a high risk of harm" to C.W., especially in light of her special needs. Finally, Osgood described respondent's conditions as "long-term" and "lifelong," indicating they would persist for a significant period of time. Although respondent testified his mental illness did not render him unable to parent C.W., the trial court obviously credited Osgood's testimony over respondent's, and we find no reason to disagree with that determination. See In re M.C., 2018 IL App (4th) 180144, ¶ 22, 110 N.E.3d 346 (noting the trial court is in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses).
¶ 28 Nonetheless, respondent argues Osgood's testimony was insufficient to support the trial court's finding that he was an unfit person because her conclusions that he would stop taking his medication in the future and have another psychotic episode was "purely speculative." We disagree. Osgood's testimony and the report she prepared were informed not only by her interview with respondent but also by her review of his mental health records, hospital records, and DCFS records. Those records indicated that respondent had been hospitalized for mental health issues on four occasions, three of which were precipitated by his failure to take his medicine, his consumption of alcohol, or both. Therefore, the evidence supported Osgood's testimony that respondent had a "chronic pattern of going off his medications, using alcohol, [and] having severe psychotic episodes." Notably, just three months after Osgood completed her evaluation, she was proven correct when respondent again stopped taking his medication and was hospitalized for an extended period of time. Therefore, Osgood's prognosis of respondent's mental illness cannot be considered speculative. Moreover, we note Osgood not only testified respondent would be unfit to parent C.W. if he stopped taking his medication but also testified that, as a result of his mental illness, he would be unfit and presented a "high risk of harm" to C.W. even if he took his medication as prescribed. Osgood testified respondent's medication could not totally prevent
another psychotic episode. She additionally testified that if respondent consumed alcohol while medicated, it could "precipitate psychotic episodes."
¶ 29 Respondent also contends the trial court erred in finding termination of his parental rights was in the best interests of C.W. As stated above, we will not reverse the trial court's best interest determination unless it was against the manifest weight of the evidence. J.H., 2020 IL App (4th) 200150, ¶ 68. A court's best interest determination is against the manifest weight of the evidence "only if the facts clearly demonstrate that the court should have reached the opposite result." In re Jay H., 395 Ill. App. 3d 1063, 1071, 918 N.E.2d 284, 291 (2009).
¶ 30 Section 1-3 of the Juvenile Court Act lists several factors the trial court must consider in determining whether termination of a parent's rights is in the minor's best interests. 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2018). Those factors, which must be considered in the context of the child's age and developmental needs, are: (1) the child's physical safety and welfare; (2) the development of the child's identity; (3) the child's background and ties; (4) the child's sense of attachments; (5) the child's wishes and long-term goals; (6) the child's community ties; (7) the child's need for permanence; (8) the uniqueness of every family and child; (9) the risks associated with substitute care; and (10) the preferences of the persons available to care for the child. Id.
¶ 31 The evidence presented at the best interest hearing was sufficient for the trial court to determine that termination of respondent's parental rights was in the best interests of C.W. The State's evidence demonstrated that C.W. was "doing very well" in her foster home, where she had lived since she was two days old. C.W. was placed with her half-brother and was bonded not only with him but also with her foster parents. The foster family was managing C.W.'s health issues, and C.W.'s caseworker, Williams, was confident the foster family would be able to address any health issues that arose in the future. Williams was also confident that the foster parents would
appropriately address any cultural issues that arose in the future. Finally, Williams testified the foster family was willing to facilitate video visits between C.W. and respondent if his rights were terminated. By contrast, the evidence showed there was a risk that respondent would again stop taking his medication, which could result in another psychotic episode. Specifically, respondent testified that, although he knew the importance of taking his medication, he would stop doing so, "[i]f God told [him] to." Because of the care and love C.W. was receiving in her foster home, and because of the ongoing risk that respondent would suffer psychotic episodes, it cannot be said that the evidence presented at the hearing clearly demonstrated termination of respondent's parental rights was not in C.W.'s best interests.
¶ 32 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 33 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
¶ 34 Affirmed.