Opinion
A160930
04-29-2021
In re J.T., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. J.T., Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. J20-00441)
Appellant J.T., while still a minor, conspired with an accomplice to rob a man at gunpoint. J.T. admitted to attempted robbery, was adjudicated a ward of the court, and was placed on probation with terms that include a condition allowing search of his electronics. J.T. contests the condition as unreasonable under Lent and constitutionally overbroad. Because J.T. used a cell phone to plan the crime, the search condition is both reasonable and tailored to J.T.'s rehabilitative needs. Accordingly, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
On March 24, 2020, J.T. and three other young men followed a man (the victim) driving home from a grocery store in Oakland. Once the man parked, J.T.'s car parked next to him, and J.T. and another young man stepped out to approach the victim. They pointed handguns at the victim and demanded money, which the victim said he did not have. They demanded the victim's wallet and took the $15 they found inside. One of the perpetrators searched the victim's pockets, and afterwards tossed the victim's wallet and cell phone over a nearby fence. The two then returned to their car, where the other young men had been waiting, and drove away.
The District Attorney filed a juvenile wardship petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) charging J.T. with second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211), with a firearm enhancement (Pen. Code, § 12022.53 subd. (b)). On August 6, 2020, J.T. admitted to an amended felony allegation of attempted robbery in the second degree, (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 211) and the prosecution dismissed the firearm enhancement. Alameda County transferred the case to Contra Costa County for disposition, where the juvenile court found J.T. to be a ward of the court and placed him on probation.
At the disposition hearing, all parties agreed the best way to prevent J.T. from engaging further in criminal activity was to separate him from negative peer influences. His grandmother lived in another county, in a safer area, and agreed to take him for home supervision. The court ordered J.T. to serve 90 days' home supervision under the custody of his grandmother in Solano County, subject to several probation conditions. Of relevance here is the electronic search condition, which reads: "[s]ubmit your cell phone and any other electronic device under your control to a search of any medium of communication reasonably likely to reveal whether you are complying with the terms of your probation, with or without a search warrant, at any time of the day or night. Such medium of communication [sic] includes text messages, voicemail messages, call logs, photographs, email accounts and other social media accounts and applications such as Snapchat, Instagram, Facebook and Kik[]. You shall provide access codes to the Probation Officer or any other peace officer upon request to effectuate such search."
The juvenile court transferred the matter to Solano County, and J.T. filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
J.T. challenges the electronic search condition imposed at disposition as overbroad, and therefore unreasonable under People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 (Lent). We disagree and hold the condition is reasonable under Lent as articulated in In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113 (Ricardo P.), and it is sufficiently tailored to J.T.'s rehabilitative needs to pass constitutional muster. I. Reasonableness under Lent and Ricardo P.
Under Welfare and Institutions Code section 730, a juvenile court may impose any reasonable condition that is "fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward enhanced." (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 730, subd. (b).) " 'The reasonableness and propriety of the imposed condition is measured not just by the circumstances of the current offense, but by the minor's entire social history.' " (In re Alonzo M. (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 156, 164 (Alonzo M.).)
A court's discretion is not unlimited however, and a probation condition will be considered invalid if it " '(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality.' " (Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d. at p. 486.) "This test is conjunctive—all three prongs must be satisfied before a reviewing court will invalidate a probation term." (In re P.O. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 288, 294, quoting People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 379.) Juvenile probation conditions are reviewed under the three-part standard in Lent. (Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1119.)
The California Supreme Court in Ricardo P. described application of Lent's third prong—whether the condition is reasonably related to future criminality—to an electronic search condition. For a search condition to survive scrutiny the record must establish a connection between the search condition and the probationer's criminal conduct or personal history, one that is more than "just . . . abstract or hypothetical." (Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 1121-1122.) "For example, courts may properly base probation conditions upon information in a probation report that raises concerns about future criminality unrelated to a prior offense." (Id. at p. 1122.) There must be, however, "a degree of proportionality between the burden imposed by a probation condition and the legitimate interests served by the condition." (Ibid.)
We review a trial court's decision to impose a probation condition for abuse of discretion. " 'The abuse of discretion standard is not a unified standard . . . [t]he trial court's findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, and its application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary and capricious.' " (People v. Asghedom (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 718, 724.) When reviewing the reasonableness of a probation condition we also, "tak[e] into account 'the sentencing court's stated purpose in imposing it.' " (In re P.O., supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at p. 294.)
We reject J.T.'s contention that the probation condition here is not reasonably related to the offense, as required under Lent's first prong. The trial court found, and substantial evidence supports the finding, that J.T. used a cell phone to plan the crime. Police found on J.T.'s phone text messages between him and his coresponsible discussing "money" and "goin wit the stain" which, according to the police report, is slang for committing robberies or thefts. J.T. and his coresponsible texted each other about meeting up an hour before the robbery. Thus, the court's conclusion during the dispositional hearing that the search condition was sufficiently related to the crime was not an abuse of discretion under Lent.
This case is distinguishable from Ricardo P. because J.T.'s crime involved the use of electronics, namely his cell phone. In Ricardo P., the minor committed two burglaries, but there was no evidence to suggest he used a cell phone or other electronic device in planning or committing the crimes. (Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1119.) Since the first two prongs of Lent were already satisfied, the only question before the Supreme Court in Ricardo P. was whether the search condition was reasonably related to future criminality. Here, by contrast, we uphold the electronic search condition under Lent's first prong since the search condition is reasonably related to the crime J.T. committed. Other cases J.T. cites in support of his argument can be distinguished on the same grounds. Like Ricardo P., they involve crimes that did not involve the use of an electronic device. (See Alonzo M., supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at p. 165; In re J.B. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 749, 754.)
J.T. also challenges under Lent's third prong the scope of the electronic search condition, but because we are upholding the condition as reasonably related to the offense, we need not engage in further analysis under Lent and Ricardo P. Instead, we consider these arguments in addressing J.T.'s related contention, that his electronic search condition is unconstitutionally overbroad.
II. Constitutional Overbreadth
J.T. argues his electronic search condition is unconstitutionally overbroad, but because J.T. used a cell phone to coordinate the robbery we disagree.
" ' "A juvenile court enjoys broad discretion to fashion conditions of probation . . . and may even impose a condition of probation that would be unconstitutional or otherwise improper so long as it is tailored to specifically meet the needs of the juvenile." ' " (Alonzo M., supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at p. 164.) "The essential question in an overbreadth challenge is the closeness of the fit between the legitimate purpose of the restriction and the burden it imposes on the defendant's constitutional rights—bearing in mind, of course, that perfection in such matters is impossible, and that practical necessity will justify some infringement." (In re E.O. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1153.) We review constitutional challenges to probation conditions de novo. (In re Q.R. (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 696, 700-701.)
We hold that the challenged condition is appropriately tailored to J.T.'s rehabilitative needs. "As drafted, the condition is directed at preventing [the ward] from engaging in the very conduct that brought him under the court's supervision, while providing probation officers with flexibility in dealing with technological capabilities." (In re Q.R., supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 702.) It is important for J.T.'s successful rehabilitation that he not "continue to use electronic devices to commit crimes." (Ibid.) Therefore, probation's interest in broadly monitoring J.T.'s cell phone is justified. (See also People v. Castellanos (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 267, 276.)
J.T. submits that the electronic search condition must be tailored to allow only a search of any media of communication that would reasonably reveal whether J.T. is associating with prohibited persons. In support, J.T. points to a nearly identical condition this court struck down as overbroad in Alonzo M., but that case is distinguishable. (Alonzo M., supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at p. 168.) There, Alonzo admitted to grand theft of a person, but the record revealed "no evidence Alonzo used an electronic device during the crime." (Id. at p. 166) Even though this court held an electronic search condition would be appropriate given Alonzo's susceptibility to peer influence and heavy use of electronics, we struck the condition in that case because it was not proportionate to probation's "legitimate interest" in ensuring Alonzo stayed away from peers who exerted a negative influence. (Id. at pp. 166, 168.)
J.T., by contrast, coordinated his crime via text, which warrants a broader search condition than in Alonzo M. because it serves a wider purpose than merely monitoring J.T.'s compliance with stay away orders. This search condition appropriately enables the probation department to monitor whether J.T. is continuing to use his cellphone to plan criminal activity.
DISPOSITION
The disposition order is affirmed.
TUCHER, J. WE CONCUR: STREETER, Acting P. J.
BROWN, J.