Opinion
H046495
09-11-2019
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Monterey County Super. Ct. No. 18JV000645)
J.S. was declared a ward of the Monterey County Superior Court following a contested jurisdictional hearing during which he was found to have driven a vehicle under the influence of marijuana. (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (f).) J.S. argues that there is insufficient evidence that he drove a vehicle while he was impaired. We disagree and affirm the judgment.
I. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE
At around 4:30 a.m. on May 14, 2018, California Highway Patrol Officer Perez responded to a report of a car stuck in a ditch on 17-Mile Drive and Sloat Road. When he arrived, Officer Perez found the car was partially in the roadway, but there were no signs of a crash. J.S. was sitting in the left rear seat of his car and Officer Perez smelled marijuana. J.S. was lethargic, disoriented and was mumbling when he spoke. J.S. told Officer Perez that his car may have had a mechanical problem that caused the clutch to malfunction. J.S. said that he smoked a gram of marijuana in a "blunt" between 2:20 a.m. and 2:25 a.m., and he had driven his car into the ditch around 2:30 a.m. He stated that he had been driving from Huckleberry Hill in Pebble Beach, about one mile from the location of his car, and that he had smoked the marijuana at Huckleberry Hill. Officer Perez asked J.S. to perform field sobriety tests and found that J.S.'s performance on the tests was consistent with impairment. Officer Perez arrested J.S. for driving under the influence.
J.S. submitted to a blood test at the hospital. The results of the test showed that he had three compounds commonly found in marijuana in his bloodstream.
After his blood was drawn, J.S. was taken to the California Highway Patrol Office. At around 7:00 a.m., Officer Baenziger conducted a Drug Recognition Expert exam on J.S. J.S. said that he ate a marijuana cookie when he left work around 2:00 a.m. Based on his observations of J.S., and J.S.'s admissions, Officer Baenziger concluded that J.S. was under the influence of marijuana and opiates; however, there were no opiates detected in the blood exam.
On June 26, 2018, a juvenile wardship petition was filed alleging that J.S. committed misdemeanor driving a vehicle while under the influence of a drug. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602(a); Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (f)).
At a contested jurisdictional hearing, Officer Perez testified as an expert in DUI investigations, and the recognition of the signs and symptoms of marijuana intoxication. Officer Perez testified that a person who smokes marijuana will feel the peak effects within 10 to 30 minutes. He also testified that a person who smokes marijuana will feel the effect of the drug within 10 minutes. Officer Perez stated that a person who smokes marijuana within 5 to 10 minutes of crashing a car would likely have been under the influence of marijuana while driving the car. Officer Perez opined based on J.S.'s statements, the condition of the vehicle in the ditch, the results of the field sobriety tests, the signs of J.S.'s marijuana intoxication, and J.S.'s admissions that he had used marijuana and had driven his car, that J.S. had driven under the influence of a drug.
Officer Baenziger testified at the hearing and was qualified as a Drug Recognition Expert. Officer Baenziger testified that the effects of marijuana can be felt 10 to 15 minutes after smoking, and 2 to 6 hours after ingesting the drug. At the California Highway Patrol Office on the night of the incident, Officer Baenziger asked J.S. to perform balance tests and to estimate how much time had passed. J.S. was unable to stand on one leg, and could not touch his finger to his nose. His sense of time was inaccurate. J.S. was shaking and his pupils were not responsive to light, both of which are consistent with being impaired by marijuana use. J.S. told Officer Baenziger that his clutch had malfunctioned, causing him to lose control of the car. J.S. said that he had called a tow truck, but that police arrived before the tow truck had arrived.
To be classified as a Drug Recognition Expert, an officer must complete 100 hours of training in drug use. --------
The parties stipulated that J.S.'s car was towed from the ditch to his home, and from there to an auto shop. A mechanic from the shop stated that the car needed to be pushed into the bay because the clutch disk was inoperable and needed to be replaced.
At the end of the hearing, the court found that J.S. had driven under the influence of a drug based on his admissions that he had driven his car after he had smoked and ingested marijuana. The court relied on the fact that Officers Perez and Baenziger observed J.S.'s symptoms and behavior, and concluded that he was under the influence of marijuana. The court also considered the officers' testimony that a person would feel the effects of smoking marijuana within 10 minutes.
After finding the allegations in the petition true, the court declared J.S. a ward of the court and ordered him to reside with his parents and remain under the supervision of the probation department for 12 months. The court also ordered J.S. to pay fines and fees totaling $780, and suspended his driver's license for one year. J.S. filed a timely notice of appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
The standard of proof for juvenile proceedings involving criminal acts is the same as that in adult criminal trials. (In re Cesar V. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 989, 994.) The prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the minor committed the offense alleged in the Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition. (People v. Trujeque (2015) 61 Cal.4th 227, 247; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 701.)
On appeal, we must determine " 'whether there is substantial evidence to support the conclusion of the trier of fact; it is not whether guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.]' " (In re Ryan N. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1372.) "[T]he critical inquiry is 'whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.' [Citation.]" (Id. at p. 1371.) "We presume every fact in support of the judgment the trier of fact could have reasonably deduced from the evidence. [Citation.] If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact's findings, reversal of the judgment is not warranted simply because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding. [Citation.] 'A reviewing court neither reweighs evidence nor reevaluates a witness's credibility.' [Citation.]" (People v. Albillar (2010) 51 Cal.4th 47, 60.)
Evidence to support each of the essential elements of a criminal offense must be substantial. (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 577.) To be substantial, evidence "must be 'of ponderable legal significance . . . reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value.' [Citations.]" (Id. at p. 576.) While we review the record in the light most favorable to the judgment, " 'we must resolve the issue in the light of the whole record . . . and may not limit our appraisal to isolated bits of evidence.' " (Id. at p. 577.)
B. Driving Under the Influence of Marijuana
Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivision (f), provides: "It is unlawful for any person who is under the influence of any drug to drive a vehicle." The Vehicle Code does not specify a legal limit for marijuana at which a person is subject to arrest for driving under the influence. (See, generally, Veh. Code, § 23152.) Instead, " '. . . "under the influence" within the meaning of the Vehicle Code, [means] the . . . drug[ ] must have so far affected the nervous system, the brain, or muscles as to impair to an appreciable degree the ability to operate a vehicle in a manner like that of an ordinarily prudent and cautious person in full possession of his [or her] faculties. [Citations.]' " (People v. Enriquez (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 661, 665.)
Here, J.S. does not dispute the fact that he was under the influence of marijuana when he encountered the officers, nor does he dispute the fact that he smoked and ate marijuana before he drove his car. Rather, J.S. argues that there is no evidence that he was impaired by marijuana when he drove the car between 2:20 and 2:30 a.m. J.S. notes that two and half hours had passed before he was contacted by Officer Perez, and that the officers' observations, or the results of the field sobriety tests do not demonstrate that he was impaired while driving.
In support of his arguments, J.S. cites People v. Davis (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 197 (Davis), wherein Division Four of the Second District Court of Appeal reversed the conviction of a defendant for driving under the influence of a drug. While there was sufficient evidence that the defendant was under the influence of a narcotic, the reviewing court concluded that there was insufficient evidence that the defendant was driving while impaired by the narcotic. (Id. at p. 200.) The officers in Davis saw a car drive and stop at the end of a dead-end street; two men walked briskly away from the car, leaving both doors open and acting in a manner that the officers found furtive. When the police identified themselves, one suspect ran. On detention, the defendant displayed the pinpoint pupils and injection marks commonly associated with use of an injectable opiate. However, he walked normally and spoke normally. There was no evidence that the defendant's driving was erratic or unusual. The Davis court noted: "In the case at bench the defect is not lack of proof that defendant had used a narcotic, but the total lack of any evidence that defendant's ability to drive was impaired. There was neither expert opinion nor the observation of anyone that defendant lacked the alertness, judgment and coordination which are needed to operate a motor vehicle in a prudent and cautious manner." (Ibid.)
The present case is distinguishable from Davis. Here, there is not a "total lack of any evidence" that J.S.'s ability to drive was impaired. (Davis, supra, 270 Cal.App.2d at p. 200.) Officer Perez encountered a scene entirely different from that in Davis, as he found a lethargic, disoriented teen mumbling in the back seat of a car that was located in a ditch and obstructing the roadway. J.S.'s performance on field sobriety tests demonstrated that he was under the influence of the marijuana he admitted to smoking and eaten in a cookie. Further, to prove that J.S. was under the influence of marijuana as required by the charged offense, the prosecutor presented expert testimony that J.S was under the influence and impaired by marijuana when he drove the car. Specifically, Officers Perez and Baenziger testified that a person will feel the peak effects of marijuana within 10 minutes of smoking it. In Davis, on the other hand, the court received no expert testimony that the defendant was impaired when driving.
J.S. argues that he admitted he ate a cookie with marijuana in it at about 2:00 a.m. and smoked a cigarette with a gram of marijuana in it between 2:20 and 2:25 a.m., and thus, based on the testimony of the experts themselves, "would not have been feeling the effects of smoked or ingested marijuana during the time that he was driving" because less than 10 minutes had passed before the car "became inoperable at 2:30 a.m." J.S. further asserts that the officers' expert testimony was unclear regarding the effect of marijuana on an individual who had smoked it within 10 minutes. As a result, J.S. contends there is not substantial evidence to support the conclusion that he was under the influence of marijuana when operating the car. J.S. argues that even if he was affected in some way by the marijuana, there is insufficient evidence to support the conclusion that he drove in an impaired manner.
We are not persuaded by J.S.'s arguments as they do not consider the entire record. J.S. admitted to smoking a gram of marijuana between 2:20 a.m. and 2:25 a.m., and told the police he then drove his car into a ditch "around 2:30 a.m." Officer Perez testified that where a person has smoked marijuana between five and ten minutes before crashing a vehicle, that conduct is consistent with driving under the influence. J.S. argues that he was not involved in an accident and did not crash his car, but that the car was rendered inoperable by mechanical failure. However, it is reasonable to infer that J.S. was unable to effectively maneuver the disabled car to the side of the road, and instead, by virtue of smoking a gram of marijuana, drove into the ditch when the clutch failed, partially obstructing the roadway. Officer Perez stated that a person who smokes marijuana will feel the effects within 10 minutes, and will experience the peak effect between 10 and 30 minutes. He opined that J.S.'s admission regarding "when he smoked the blunt and when he ended up in the ditch was consistent with somebody who would have been high due to the blunt as they were driving." Officer Perez also testified based on the knowledge he had obtained through his training, coupled with J.S.'s admissions that J.S. had driven while under the influence of marijuana,
A person is "under the influence" within the meaning of the Vehicle Code if his or her ability to operate a vehicle is impaired "to an appreciable degree." (Enriquez, supra, 42 Cal.App.4th at p. 665.) Officer Perez's and Baenziger's testimony, along with J.S.'s admissions that he drove the car and used marijuana within certain timeframes, the officers' description of their encounters with the teen, his objective signs of marijuana intoxication, his performance on the field sobriety tests, and the location of his car in the ditch, are sufficient in total to demonstrate that J.S.'s ability to operate a vehicle was impaired by use of marijuana at the time he drove his car. Therefore, we find that there is substantial evidence to support the juvenile court's finding that J.S. committed the offense of driving a vehicle while under the influence of a drug. (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (f).)
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/_________
Greenwood, P.J. WE CONCUR: /s/_________
Premo, J. /s/_________
Elia, J.