Opinion
A147835
10-15-2019
In re J.R.-D., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. J.R.-D., Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (San Mateo County Super. Ct. No. 84914)
This case—which challenges the validity of various probation conditions—returns to us following a grant of review and transfer by the California Supreme Court. We complied with our high court's order directing us to vacate our prior opinion and reconsider the cause in light of In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113 (Ricardo P.). We now dismiss the appeal as moot.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2016, J.R.-D. admitted misdemeanor resisting a police officer (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1)), and the juvenile court adjudged him a ward of the court (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602). The court committed J.R.-D. to the Youth Services Center for 30 days and placed him on probation with various terms and conditions, including an electronic search condition, and conditions relating to Internet and social media use.
J.R.-D. appealed, challenging several conditions under People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 (Lent) and constitutional principles of vagueness and overbreadth. We struck certain conditions and remanded the matter to the juvenile court for modification. In all other respects, we affirmed.
The California Supreme Court granted review (Apr. 12, 2017, S240385) and deferred further action pending consideration and disposition of a related issue in Ricardo P., S230923. In August 2019, our high court decided Ricardo P. As relevant here, the court held an electronic search condition was invalid under the third prong of Lent where there was no evidence the defendant had used or would "use electronic devices in connection with . . . illegal activity." (Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 1116, 1119-1120.) Ricardo P. did "not 'categorically invalidate electronic search conditions' in juvenile delinquency cases. [Citation.] . . . . The court held only that the broad search condition, as written and imposed by the juvenile court, was invalid under Lent because it was not reasonably related to [the defendant's] future criminality." (In re Alonzo M. (Sept. 20, 2019, A154923) ___Cal.App.5th___ .)
After issuing its decision in Ricardo P., the California Supreme Court transferred this case back to this court, directing us to vacate our decision and to reconsider the cause in light of Ricardo P. We vacated our opinion and received supplemental briefing. According to that supplemental briefing, J.R.-D.'s probation terminated in February 2019.
DISCUSSION
"As a general rule, ' " 'the duty of this court, as of every other judicial tribunal, is to decide actual controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it.' " ' [Citation.] Thus, an ' "action that originally was based on a justiciable controversy cannot be maintained on appeal if all the questions have become moot by subsequent acts or events." ' [Citations.] Put another way, ' "[a]n appeal should be dismissed as moot when the occurrence of events renders it impossible for the appellate court to grant appellant any effective relief." ' " (People v. Pipkin (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 1146, 1149-1150.)
According to the parties, the appeal is moot because J.R.-D.'s probation has terminated. They are correct. The termination of a defendant's probationary period moots an appeal challenging probation conditions. (People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1120, fn. 5; In re Charles G. (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 608, 611 [termination of probation mooted complaints regarding probation conditions]; see also People v. DeLeon (2017) 3 Cal.5th 640, 645 [appeal moot where defendant completed custodial term and had been discharged from parole].) Because J.R.-D. is no longer on probation, a ruling on the validity of the challenged probation conditions would have no practical effect and would not provide him with effective relief.
We decline to exercise our discretion to consider the merits of this moot appeal. Because our high court has spoken on the validity of a similar probation condition, this appeal does not present such "a novel question of continuing public interest" (In re Stevens (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1232), "capable of repetition, yet evading review" (Ogunsalu v. Superior Court (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 107, 111), that we should review the issues notwithstanding mootness. No other exceptions to the mootness doctrine apply.
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed as moot.
/s/_________
Jones, P. J. WE CONCUR: /s/_________
Simons, J. /s/_________
Burns, J.