Opinion
4-22-0915
11-07-2023
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROGER JOYNER, Defendant-Appellant.
This Order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Tazewell County No. 90CF223 Honorable Christopher R. Doscotch, Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE DOHERTY delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Lannerd and Knecht concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
DOHERTY JUSTICE
¶ 1 Held: The circuit court did not err in denying defendant's motion for forensic testing.
¶ 2 Defendant Roger Joyner was convicted of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1 (West 1990)) following a jury trial, and the trial court sentenced him to imprisonment for the remainder of his natural life. Following a direct appeal and collateral proceedings, defendant filed a motion for forensic testing, seeking to test certain evidence containing deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA). The circuit court denied the motion and defendant appeals, arguing he was entitled to the requested testing because it has the potential to produce new, noncumulative evidence that could materially advance his claim of actual innocence. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 4 Evidence at defendant's trial established that Rica Tonkin had been married to Jack Tonkin for 15 years. Defendant met Rica in early 1990 and a very public affair between the two ensued, though Rica was seeing yet another man. Rica had spoken to her husband about divorce and defendant was aware of this; still, she testified that defendant spoke of killing Jack and then marrying her. Police were called to the Tonkin residence on July 23, 1990, and found Jack deceased, having been shot twice. Police were unable to find the cartridge cases of the two shots fired at the scene. Questioned by police, Rica initially denied involvement in Jack's murder, but she eventually told officers that she left defendant at her home knowing he intended to kill Jack.
¶ 5 Rica agreed to a deal with the prosecution pursuant to which she would plead guilty to first degree murder and testify against defendant in exchange for a reduced sentence; she would also forfeit any right to receive any inheritance or insurance money as a result of Jack's death. Once on the witness stand, Rica explained that she met defendant for breakfast on July 23, 1990, and informed him what time her husband would be home from work. She also spoke to defendant a number of times on the phone. In the final call, defendant instructed her to take the children to a park and meet him at a nearby mall around 1:30 p.m. She traveled with her children and one of their friends to a park in Peoria, Illinois. After dropping everyone off at the park, she rendezvoused with defendant at Northwoods Mall. Defendant showed her a pair of gloves and a firearm while discussing the plan to kill Jack. The description of the gun was consistent with the Llama .357-caliber handgun owned by defendant. Additional testimony would establish that defendant recently purchased the Llama. Rica drove defendant to the house she shared with Jack and opened the garage door so defendant could wait for Jack to return from work. Defendant told Rica to meet him back at the mall around 3 p.m.
¶ 6 After leaving defendant at her house, Rica picked up the children and went back to the mall. Defendant appeared at the mall sometime later, took Rica aside, and described in detail how he had killed her husband. Defendant showed Rica the garage door opener from her house, Jack's keys, and the .38-caliber Smith &Wesson handgun that was in the glove compartment of Jack's car. He also told her how to handle the report to the police. Rica then drove home, walked into the house, walked back out, and called the police.
¶ 7 Rica's children and their friend largely corroborated this sequence of events, including the fact that defendant met them at the mall. One of the children testified that when defendant met them at the mall, he had a police scanner attached to his belt with an earpiece. A neighbor testified he heard two gunshots around 3:30 p.m. on the day in question.
¶ 8 Police discovered Jack's vehicle parked at the same mall where defendant met up with Rica. The vehicle was abandoned, with the door unlatched and the key in the ignition.
¶ 9 Police located defendant, and he consented to a search of his hotel room and car. Numerous items relevant to the crime were found in defendant's possession. Specifically, police recovered a .357 Llama, a .38 Smith &Wesson, a police scanner with an earpiece tuned to the East Peoria Police Department, and two cartridge cases. Police also recovered items from defendant's car, including a bloodstained plastic shopping bag that contained a pair of latex gloves, keys that operated the trunk of Jack's car, and the garage door opener that operated the Tonkins' garage. Defendant's fingerprints matched those on the Llama and the plastic bag.
¶ 10 Both firearms were subjected to ballistics testing. An expert in ballistics testified that the Llama could have fired the shots that killed Tonkin, while the Smith &Wesson could not. The Llama fired bullets in a tumbling manner where the projectiles would enter a target sideways instead of straight on. This was a unique and unusual characteristic. There was testimony that the bullets that killed Jack entered his body sideways rather than straight on. The bullets recovered from the scene that killed Jack and the cartridge cases recovered from defendant were both matched as being specific to a unique manufacturer. The latex gloves recovered from the bag had two areas of residue that were consistent with gunshot particles.
¶ 11 Kevin Zeeb, an expert in forensic serology, testified regarding several exhibits and possible bloodstains contained on them. Specifically, Zeeb opined about the results of testing stains from defendant's blue jeans, shirt, and right boot and a plastic Kroger shopping bag and the items it contained. Zeeb was able to conclude that the stains on defendant's clothing were human blood but was unable to narrow down the classification any further. On the items contained in the plastic bag, he tested four stains, and all four returned as human blood. Further testing revealed an erythrocyte acid phosphate (EAP) profile that matched that of "Jack Tonkin, and could not have originated from Rica Tonkin or [defendant]." On cross-examination, Zeeb clarified that approximately 10 million other individuals in the United States had the same EAP profile as Jack. As for the bloodstains that were unable to be categorized by EAP on defendant's clothing and in the plastic bag, Zeeb testified that they "could be anybody's" blood.
¶ 12 There was also testimony from two jailhouse informants and one individual who came forward following his release from incarceration after he had spent time in custody with defendant. All three testified with varying degrees of credibility that defendant stated in effect he killed Jack because of his involvement with Rica.
¶ 13 During closing arguments, the prosecutor commented on all of the evidence presented. In commenting on the blood evidence the prosecutor opined, "His jeans, ladies and gentlemen, have human blood on them. His shirt had human blood. His right boot, the only set of footwear that that man had that day had blood on it." The prosecutor then made an inferential argument that based on the photos of the crime scene and the way Jack died, one would expect "to find human blood on that shooter."
¶ 14 In disputing the defense theory that it could have been another of Rica's boyfriends that killed Jack, the prosecutor argued:
"It wasn't another boyfriend that committed this crime, because what do we know? Rica met with that man before the murder. That man, that boyfriend called her. That boyfriend met her at the mall where the victim's car is found. That boyfriend had the scanner, that boyfriend has the jeans and the clothes with the blood, that boyfriend has the garage door opener, the trunk key."
Further, the prosecutor stated that in order to frame defendant, one would have to place the blood on his clothes and the only pair of shoes that he owns.
¶ 15 Defense counsel argued, among other things, in his closing argument:
"What about the Defendant's clothes? The State is correct, apparently there were small bloodstains on them. Whose bloodstains? Well, I don't know that. And it's interesting that those bloodstains are not ones that rule out anyone. Those are not anything that [the State] can address with reference to Mr. Zeeb and the suggestions that that is one of those types that we were able to split out.
If you recall, the only thing he could conclude from that is that there was some human blood, not that it was not [defendant's], not that it was consistent with [Jack's] and not consistent with [defendant] or anything else. Merely that it was there.
And the State is going to tell you, I'm sure, well that proves it. Circumstantial evidence, that permits you to believe that and that permits you to believe that [defendant] is guilty.
If you want to jump through that hoop, I am sure I cannot stop you. But, again, it calls for speculation and conjecture. [Two] small stains on the shirt, a small one on the jeans, and [two] specks on the boot, all of which could have come from any human being. And the State presented no evidence of the age of those. How likely it was that they were recent, old, or anything else? But they want you to jump through that hoop."
¶ 16 In the surrebuttal argument, the prosecutor again mentioned the blood on defendant's clothing:
"When [defendant is] arrested he has human blood on his shirt, his blue jeans and his boot. Human blood. And [defense counsel] tells you, well it could be anybody's blood. And, indeed, there is no proof whose blood that is. But there is proof in this case that we know one person was bleeding that day and that was Jack Tonkin, who was bleeding to death.
We didn't hear any other evidence about anybody else bleeding. Only one person do we know of who was bleeding. More coincidences on the boots, the jeans, the shirt."
¶ 17 When discussing the defense theory that defendant was framed, the prosecutor noted the amount of evidence that would have had to be planted:
"They had to get into his car and plant the bag and its contents and then somehow; although I am sure you realize that is impossible, they had to get ahold of the Defendant's only pair of shoes and his clothing that he was wearing that day and by the descriptions, had been wearing for some time, and get blood on them unless those were all a part of the coincidences."
¶ 18 The jury returned guilty verdicts on five counts of murder. The jury found defendant eligible for the death penalty but at further proceedings declined to impose death as the punishment. The trial court then sentenced defendant to life imprisonment.
¶ 19 On direct appeal, the court affirmed defendant's conviction on one count of first degree murder, finding that the evidence against him was "overwhelming." People v. Joyner, No. 3-91-0844 (1993) (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23). Defendant also engaged in collateral attacks on his conviction, which are not relevant here.
¶ 20 In August 2019, defendant filed an amended motion for forensic testing, asking that the blood spots on his shirt collar and the right leg of his jeans (but not the blood on his boot or the plastic shopping bag) be tested for DNA and compared to Jack's DNA profile. The State filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that defendant had failed to establish aprimafacie case for testing in that the evidence was overwhelming, defendant made inculpatory statements to Rica, and regardless of the result of testing the evidence, it would not significantly advance defendant's actual innocence claim or affirmatively harm the State's case.
¶ 21 The circuit court heard oral argument on the matter before taking it under advisement and issuing a written order. The court found that when considered in the context of the evidence adduced at trial, the evidence sought to be tested would not significantly advance defendant's claim of actual innocence. The court reasoned that the State had introduced defendant's inculpatory statements made to Rica and the jailhouse informants, and "[e]ven without the blood testimony and evidence, the [S]tate produced overwhelming physical evidence and inculpatory evidence in support of conviction." The evidence sought to be tested was not the" 'lynch pin'" or central to the conviction.
¶ 22 This appeal followed.
¶ 23 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 24 Defendant argues the circuit court erred by denying his motion for testing where he did not confess to the offense and identity is at issue.
¶ 25 This state's legislature has promulgated the statutory right to postconviction forensic testing by enacting section 116-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/116-3 (West 2018)), which allows postconviction forensic testing when certain conditions are met. People v. Grant, 2022 IL 126824, ¶ 26 (citing 725 ILCS 5/116-3 (West 2012)). While section 116-3 of the Code does not provide a general means to discover evidence (People v. Barrow, 2011 IL App (3d) 100086, ¶ 30), it does provide for testing when a defendant shows that there is scientific potential to produce new, noncumulative evidence that is materially relevant. People v. Savory, 197 Ill.2d 203, 213 (2001). "[T]he determination of whether the forensic evidence is 'materially relevant' to the defendant's actual-innocence claim requires an evaluation of the evidence introduced at trial, as well as the evidence the defendant seeks to test." People v. Johnson, 205 Ill.2d 381, 396 (2002), as modified on denial of reh 'g (May 29, 2002). The potential results of the requested testing need not completely exonerate a defendant but must "significantly advance" the claim of actual innocence. People v. Shum, 207 Ill.2d 47, 65-66 (2003).
¶ 26 In addition to proving that the evidence sought to be tested is materially relevant to an actual innocence claim, a defendant must also present aprimafacie case that (1) "identity was the issue in the trial" and (2) "the evidence to be tested has been subject to a chain of custody sufficient to establish that it has not been substituted, tampered with, replaced, or altered in any material aspect." 725 ILCS 5/116-3(b) (West 2018). We review the circuit court's denial of a motion for testing pursuant to section 116-3 de novo. People v. Gawlak, 2019 IL 123182, ¶ 25.
¶ 27 Defendant seeks to have two bloodstains-one on the shirt collar and another from the right knee of his blue jeans-tested to confirm the blood does not belong to Jack Tonkin. The parties agree that defendant has met all the requirements needed to establish aprima facie case for testing except for whether the forensic evidence is materially relevant. The State argues that "in considering the overwhelming evidence presented at trial, the blood evidence requested is minor when compared to the other significant evidence." Defendant claims the overwhelming nature of the evidence is irrelevant, arguing that even where the evidence is overwhelming, testing should be allowed when the potential results could significantly advance a claim of actual innocence.
¶ 28 We agree with defendant that the overwhelming nature of the evidence is not in and of itself sufficient to defeat the request for testing. See Barrow, 2011 IL App (3d) 100086, ¶ 27. Indeed, if that were the case, defendant's arguments would be baseless, as the Third District already found on direct appeal that the evidence at defendant's trial was overwhelming. See Joyner, No. 3-91-0844 (1993) (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23). Nonetheless, an evaluation of the evidence introduced at trial, as well as the evidence defendant seeks to test, leads us to the conclusion that the testing requested would not significantly advance his claim of actual innocence.
¶ 29 Although not dispositive, we agree with the reviewing court's assessment on direct appeal that the evidence against defendant is overwhelming. Further, there is a nuance in the blood evidence that was presented at trial that is not captured in the briefing. Zeeb testified that the bloodstains from the clothing that defendant now seeks to test could have belonged to anyone holding membership in the human race. There was no testimony that the stains on the clothes belonged to Jack Tonkin. Rather, the blood with an EAP profile that matched Jack's was found on the plastic shopping bag and items therein and that blood could not have been contributed by defendant or Rica. Certainly based on this testimony, the evidence presented at trial does not support the contention that the bloodstained clothes were a central part of the State's case.
¶ 30 Defendant instead points to the State's closing argument contending that "finding only [defendant's] DNA on the clothing found in his hotel room would undermine the State's repeated assertions in closing that the blood belonged to Jack Tonkin, and had landed on [defendant] after he shot Jack Tonkin in his house at close range." In making this assertion, defendant points to three excerpts from the State's closing argument: two in its initial closing statement and one in its surrebuttal.
¶ 31 Before addressing the comments made in the State's closing argument, we must note that in both the opening and reply brief, certain of defendant's cites to the record direct this court's attention to argument in the surrebuttal that focused on the plastic shopping bag and the blood linked to Jack through EAP profiling, not the blood evidence defendant asks to test. Turning to the relevant comments by the prosecutor in closing, a review of the entirety of the State's closing argument shows the complained-of evidence was only mentioned in nine short paragraphs in a closing argument that spans approximately 59 pages of the transcript. Some of the mentions in the nine paragraphs amount to only a brief reference to blood, while the central focus was on the remaining evidence. The strongest use of the evidence defendant seeks to test was when the State made an inferential argument asserting that one would expect to find human blood on the clothing of the shooter given the way Jack was killed.
¶ 32 Defendant's trial counsel seized on Zeeb's testimony and highlighted for the jury the testimony was that the blood could have belonged to anyone. In surrebuttal, the State admitted there was no evidence identifying whom the blood belonged to. Thus, the jury was aware it was possible the blood on defendant's clothing did not belong to Jack.
¶ 33 Defendant cites, among others, Shum, Johnson, People v. Smith, 2014 IL App (1st) 113265, and People v. Hockenberry, 316 Ill.App.3d 752 (2000), for the proposition that "where identification is at issue, and absent an admission, a defendant should be given the opportunity to have DNA evidence tested even if other inculpatory evidence would still exist." Our review of the cases reveals they are distinguishable on the facts and do not reveal an edict as broad as defendant proposes. Particularly unhelpful to defendant is People v. Grant, 2016 IL App (3d) 140211, which he relies on to argue the significance of the testing potentially proving that the blood on his clothing matched not the victim, but some unknown person. However, the material being tested in Grant was found on the victim, so it would have been highly probative of a different offender being involved. Id. ¶ 11. The blood defendant asked to be tested was found in his own possession, not anywhere near the crime scene.
¶ 34 Rather than the cases relied on by defendant, we find Savory informative in this matter. In Savory, the defendant was convicted of two counts of murder for stabbing a brother and sister to death. Savory, 197 Ill.2d at 205. Evidence at trial established that the defendant made inculpatory statements to three of his friends, had knowledge of the crime scene that only the offender would possess, and had been wearing a pair of pants stained with blood that matched the same blood type as one of the victims. Id. at 206-08. The circuit court subsequently denied the defendant's request to perform DNA testing on the bloodstained pants pursuant to section 116-3. Id. at 208-09. The supreme court affirmed, finding that subjecting the bloodstained pants to DNA testing would not significantly advance the defendant's claim of actual innocence. Id. at 214. The court reasoned that the testimony regarding the source of the blood was not central to the State's case against the defendant and was instead a minor piece of evidence. Id. at 214-15. The central theme of the State's case was the defendant's inculpatory statements to others and knowledge of the crime scene. Id. at 215. Further, the State concentrated on those aspects of the case during closing argument and did not mention the evidence regarding the bloodstained pants until the surrebuttal closing argument. Id. Moreover, even a test result in the defendant's favor would only exclude a single minor piece of evidence and would not significantly advance a claim of innocence. Id.
¶ 35 Similar to Savory, the bloodstains on defendant's clothing were not central to the State's case. Instead, the State relied on the testimony of Rica and the jailhouse informants, in which they all testified that defendant made numerous inculpatory statements, as well as a plethora of other evidence. The other evidence of defendant's guilt included ballistics testing and testimony linking the unique characteristics of the Llama handgun-owned by defendant-to the shots that killed Jack and testimony linking the spent cartridge cases found at defendant's hotel room and the bullets fired at Jack to the same manufacturer. There were also latex gloves with gunshot residue; Jack's keys, garage door opener, and .38 Smith &Wesson found in defendant's possession; and the plastic bag with blood on it that matched the EAP profile of Jack and that had defendant's fingerprints on it found in defendant's car. There was also testimony by Jack and Rica's children and their friend that corroborated the approximate sequence of events described by Rica, including defendant's appearance at the mall after Jack was killed and at the location where Jack's car was found.
¶ 36 When placed in context of the evidence introduced at trial, the inferential argument during closing argument that the blood on defendant's clothing belonged to Jack was not central to the State's case. Even assuming a result favorable to defendant in testing the bloodstained clothing, such a result would only eliminate a minor piece of evidence that only supplied an inference of defendant's guilt and would not significantly advance his claim of actual innocence.
¶ 37 Accordingly, the circuit court did not err in denying defendant's motion to conduct DNA testing on the bloodstained clothing.
¶ 38 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 39 For the reasons stated, we affirm the circuit court's judgment.
¶ 40 Affirmed.