Opinion
D075164
07-12-2019
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JOSEPH L., Defendant and Appellant.
Christian C. Buckley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Thomas E. Montgomery, County Counsel, and Raquel Young, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. HC23568) APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Howard H. Shore, Judge. Reversed. Christian C. Buckley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Thomas E. Montgomery, County Counsel, and Raquel Young, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant Joseph L. appealed from the trial court's order granting a petition for 180 days of postcertification treatment of a dangerous person, pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 5300. The parties have filed a motion for stipulated reversal. We conclude the motion has merit, and reverse the order.
Further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise noted. --------
BACKGROUND
In October 2018, Joseph was admitted to the hospital on a section 5150 hold, and then placed on a section 5250 hold. Subsequently, the physician in charge of the hospital filed a section 5300 petition for 180 days of postcertification treatment. On November 7, 2018, the trial court held a hearing, at which the County of San Diego (County) appeared as petitioner. The trial court granted the petition, but did not advise Joseph of his right to a jury trial under section 5302 or obtain a waiver of that right. Joseph appealed, contending in part that the lack of advisement and waiver compelled reversal.
In June 2019, Joseph and the County filed a motion for stipulated reversal under Code of Civil Procedure section 128, subdivision (a)(8), indicating they had agreed to settle the action and seeking reversal of the judgment (as a condition of settlement). The parties jointly acknowledged the trial court erred by holding the hearing without admonishing Joseph of his right to a jury trial and obtaining a waiver of that right. They also indicated the County believed this court was likely to reverse the trial court's ruling, citing, inter alia, Welfare and Institutions Code section 5302 and People v. Blackburn (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1113 (Blackburn). They contended a stipulated reversal would have no adverse effect on the public, and that the settlement recognized Joseph's right to a jury trial and "promote[d] the integrity of the judicial branch and legal profession . . . ."
DISCUSSION
We may not reverse a judgment upon stipulation of the parties unless we make two findings: (1) "There is no reasonable possibility that the interests of nonparties or the public will be adversely affected by the reversal"; and (2) "The reasons of the parties for requesting reversal outweigh the erosion of public trust that may result from the nullification of a judgment and the risk that the availability of stipulated reversal will reduce the incentive for pretrial settlement." (Code Civ. Proc., § 128, subd. (a)(8)(A), (B).) We conclude these factors are satisfied.
First, there is no reasonable probability the interests of nonparties or the public will be adversely affected by the reversal. The case impacts only Joseph's confinement. Further, the 180-day confinement period expired in May 2019, and his appeal is arguably moot. (MHC Operating Limited Partnership v. City of San Jose (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 204, 214; see Eye Dog Foundation v. State Board of Guide Dogs for the Blind (1967) 67 Cal.2d 536, 541.)
Second, the parties' reasons for reversal outweigh any risk of erosion of public trust or reduced incentive to settle before trial. The parties seek reversal because they agree the trial court erred, and the County thinks we are likely to reverse. Party stipulations on legal questions do not bind us (Leonard v. City of Los Angeles (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 473, 476), but the parties have provided statutory and decisional authority for their position. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5302 [at time of petition for postcertification treatment, court shall advise person of right to attorney and "right to demand a jury trial"]; cf. Blackburn, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1116 [in Pen. Code, § 2972 hearing on petition for continued treatment of mentally disordered offender, trial court must give personal advisement of right to jury trial and obtain waiver before holding bench trial].) This showing reflects a good faith effort to expedite resolution of possible legal error. We also see little risk of negative impact on public trust or incentives to settle. Public trust is advanced, not eroded, by stipulated reversals to resolve judicial error. (See In re Rashad H. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 376, 381.) Public trust is also advanced by preservation of judicial resources. Although it is unclear why the parties did not recognize and address the agreed-upon error sooner, there is nothing to suggest dilatory conduct. To the extent this issue raises any concerns, they are outweighed by the parties' reasons for reversal.
DISPOSITION
The order is reversed. The remittitur shall issue immediately.
McCONNELL, P. J. WE CONCUR: O'ROURKE, J. IRION, J.