People v. Jones-Beard

29 Citing cases

  1. People v. Walker

    2021 Ill. App. 4th 190073 (Ill. App. Ct. 2021)   Cited 20 times

    ¶ 65 How did we get to the point where, in reviewing the highly deferential decision of a trial court's sentence, a claimed "disparity" between an earlier plea offer by the State (especially one in which the court was not involved) and the court's ultimate sentence, with no comment or other evidence in the record, suggests we find not simply an abuse of discretion but evil, retributive intent on the part of the trial court? ¶ 66 In People v. Jones-Beard, 2019 IL App (1st) 162005, ¶ 26, 139 N.E.3d 1027, the First District told us it must be "clearly evident" that a harsher sentence resulted from a defendant's demand for trial. However, the court in Jones-Beard went on to say that "[t]his evidence can come when a trial court makes explicit remarks concerning the harsher sentence [citations], or where the actual sentence is outrageously higher than the one offered during plea negotiations."

  2. People v. Aquisto

    2022 Ill. App. 4th 200081 (Ill. App. Ct. 2022)   Cited 35 times
    In People v. Aquisto, 2022 IL App (4th) 200081, ¶¶ 25, 53, the defendant failed to object to the admission of a prosecution exhibit and then attempted to advance the forfeited argument on appeal as ineffective assistance of counsel.

    He observes that "[a] defendant may not be punished for exercising his right to trial." See People v. Jones-Beard, 2019 IL App (1st) 162005, ¶ 26; People v. Johnson, 2018 IL App (1st) 153634, ¶ 18. He criticizes his defense counsel for failing to object to the alleged trial tax.

  3. People v. Musgrave

    2019 Ill. App. 4th 170106 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019)   Cited 39 times
    Holding that the mere fact that the trial court sentenced the defendant to a longer prison term than the one offered during plea negotiations does not show that it was " ‘clearly evident’ that the trial court punished defendant for rejecting a plea agreement and proceeding to trial"

    However, it must be "clearly evident" that a harsher sentence resulted from a defendant's demand for a trial. People v. Jones-Beard , 2019 IL App (1st) 162005, ¶ 26, 435 Ill.Dec. 647, 139 N.E.3d 1027. "This evidence can come when a trial court makes explicit remarks concerning the harsher sentence [citations], or where the actual sentence is outrageously higher than the one offered during plea negotiations [citation]." Id.

  4. People v. Sturgeon

    2019 Ill. App. 4th 170035 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019)   Cited 120 times
    In People v. Sturgeon, 2019 IL App (4th) 170035, ¶ 97, the court found the defendant's claim of prejudice (in the context of an ineffectiveness claim) speculative where the defendant asserted that defense counsel did not appropriately cross examine two witness.

    It must be "clearly evident" that a harsher sentence resulted from a defendant's demand for a trial. People v. Jones-Beard , 2019 IL App (1st) 162005, ¶ 26, ––– Ill.Dec. ––––, ––– N.E.3d ––––. "This evidence can come when a trial court makes explicit remarks concerning the harsher sentence [citations], or where the actual sentence is outrageously higher than the one offered during plea negotiations [citation]." Id.

  5. People v. Benson

    2019 Ill. App. 162832 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019)

    The trial court is presumed to have properly considered all relevant mitigating factors, and this presumption is rebutted only by affirmative evidence to the contrary, other than the sentence itself. People v. Jones-Beard, 2019 IL App (1st) 162005, ¶ 21. A sentence will not be disturbed absent an abuse of the trial court's discretion, such as when the 18 sentence is " 'greatly at variance with the spirit and purpose of the law, or manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense.' "

  6. People v. Fenner

    2024 Ill. App. 230645 (Ill. App. Ct. 2024)

    ¶ 81 A trial court may not penalize a defendant for choosing to exercise his right to stand trial. People v. Jones-Beard, 2019 IL App (1st) 162005, ¶ 26. The" 'mere fact that the trial court imposed a greater sentence than was offered during plea negotiations does not, in and of itself, support an inference that the greater sentence was imposed as a punishment for demanding trial.'"

  7. People v. Moore

    2023 Ill. App. 211421 (Ill. App. Ct. 2023)   Cited 13 times

    (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Jones-Beard, 2019 IL App (1st) 162005, ¶ 26. Instead, the record must clearly show that the harsher sentence resulted from defendant's trial demand.

  8. People v. Stevenson

    2023 Ill. App. 192462 (Ill. App. Ct. 2023)

    Ward, 113 Ill.2d at 526. This may occur where the trial court makes explicit remarks regarding a harsher sentence, or where the actual sentence is outrageously higher than the one offered during plea negotiations. People v. Beard-Jones, 2019 IL App (1st) 162005, ¶ 26. The reviewing court must consider the entire record and not merely a select few statements of the trial court.

  9. People v. Harvey

    2022 Ill. App. 201177 (Ill. App. Ct. 2022)

    ¶ 34 With respect to factors in mitigation, we presume the circuit court properly considered all relevant mitigating factors presented, absent some indication to the contrary other than the sentence itself. See People v. Jones-Beard, 2019 IL App (1st) 162005, ¶ 21; People v. Madura, 257 Ill.App.3d 735, 740 (1994). The trial court is not required to articulate each and every factor that it considers in rendering a sentence (People v. Villalobos, 2020 IL App (1st) 171512, ¶ 74), nor is it required to assign a value to every mitigating factor upon which it relies (People v. Madura, 257 Ill.App.3d 735, 740-41 (1994)).

  10. People v. Castillo

    2021 Ill. App. 4th 190633 (Ill. App. Ct. 2021)   Cited 1 times

    When mitigating evidence is before the court, we presume the court considered it in the absence of some indication to the contrary, other than the sentence itself. People v. Jones-Beard, 2019 IL App (1st) 162005, ¶ 21, 139 N.E.3d 1027; see also People v. Johnson, 2020 IL App (1st) 162332, ¶ 91, 148 N.E.3d 126 ("In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we presume that the sentencing court considered all mitigating evidence presented.").