Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
San Luis Obispo County Super. Ct. No. F262070, Michael L. Duffy, Judge
Gerald J. Miller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, E. Carlos Dominguez, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
COFFEE, J.
Melvin Andrew Jones was committed to a state hospital after being found not guilty of a felony offense by reason of insanity. (Pen. Code, § 1026, subd. (a).) He appeals the judgment and order extending his commitment, contending that there was insufficient evidence to support the required finding that he has serious difficulty controlling his dangerous behavior because of a mental disorder. (§ 1026.5, subd. (b).) We affirm.
All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 1995, appellant was convicted of assault on a firefighter with the intent to cause great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (c)) and sentenced to serve five years in prison. While serving that sentence in 1997, he was arrested in prison for committing a battery on a non-confined person and resisting an officer. (§§ 4501.5; 69.) In 1998, appellant was found not guilty by reason of insanity of battery by a prisoner and resisting an officer. (§§ 1026, 4501.5, 69.) The court committed him to a state mental hospital. On August 5, 2008, the district attorney filed a petition to extend the commitment under section 1026.5, subdivision (b), alleging that, by reason of a mental disease, defect or disorder, appellant "represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others." The matter was tried on December 10, 2008.
At trial, treating psychiatrist George Proctor testified that appellant suffered from antisocial personality disorder, polysubstance dependence, and schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type. Proctor and his partner, psychiatrist Charles Ma, had treated appellant. Proctor opined that appellant represented a substantial danger of physical harm to others based on his past behavior.
Proctor testified that appellant continued to suffer from schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type, at the time of the December recommitment hearing. Appellant last exhibited outward symptoms of that disorder in June 2008. Appellant then had a paranoid belief that Dr. Ma, a psychiatrist, was part of a conspiracy to make his mental illness worse.
Proctor could not conclude that appellant's schizoaffective disorder was in remission at the time of the December 2008 recommitment hearing although he had shown no psychotic symptoms of that disorder since June 2008. Proctor testified that there is not a definitive time frame of asymptomatic behavior after which a doctor concludes that a patient is in remission. A doctor must also "take into account the severity of the symptoms." Proctor explained further that appellant has had alternating periods with and without schizoaffective disorder symptoms, but that when he does have such symptoms, they are very severe, and he has "very complicated, convoluted, paranoid conspiracy theories." Proctor also stated that appellant's symptoms "influence his behavior to such a substantial degree that he's willing to violate any rules or any laws." In such a case, Proctor needs to observe that the symptoms have been under control for a period closer to a year before he can conclude that the disorder is in remission.
Proctor further testified that appellant's antisocial personality disorder caused him to lack empathy toward others, and to have difficulty controlling his impulses and projecting the consequences of his actions. Appellant also had difficulty with social norms, and exhibited verbal and physical aggressiveness with peers and staff.
Appellant displayed symptoms of his antisocial disorder in July and August of 2008. For example, in July, a male peer tried to take something from appellant's food tray. Appellant struck his peer with a food tray and later told staff that he did that with the intention of "bust [ing] his peer's head open." In August 2008, while arguing with his girlfriend, a patient in the hospital, appellant slapped her for being disrespectful. Appellant then fought with a male peer who tried to intervene.
Proctor explained that appellant had a history of not taking medication, relapsing into mental illness, and consequently engaging in violent behavior. Appellant seemed to believe that he did not need medication and could do well without it. Proctor testified that appellant had not required an order for involuntary administration of medication since May 2008. However, on November 4, 2008, another state hospital psychiatrist signed a letter petition for authority to administer medication to appellant involuntarily.
Proctor testified that appellant's lack of insight reduced the likelihood that he would continue to take medication outside a controlled facility where he is encouraged to do so. Proctor described appellant's experience upon his 1999 release to the Conditional Release Program (CONREP). Appellant's release was revoked for leaving without permission.
Appellant felt that counseling groups concerning his mental illness and substance abuse were not useful. Proctor opined that appellant's inability to comply with treatment, including group counseling, interfered with his gaining enough insight regarding his disorders to reduce the risk that he would endanger others.
Appellant testified on his own behalf. He admitted that he had a mental disorder. He testified that he needed medication, took medication, and would continue taking medication if released because he did not want to hurt anyone.
Appellant further testified that in "all [his] altercations through the whole... 12 years [he had been locked up, he didn't hurt anyone and that he was] the one that [got] hurt." He also testified that "when [he] refused the medication from the hospital," he was the only one "with the three stitches, the black eyes, the bruised ribs." Appellant said that he was "the victim on all of the altercations [and that he] never hurt no one[,]" and he "did no violence."
DISCUSSION
When the trial court determines that a defendant is not guilty by reason of insanity at the time of the offense, it may commit the defendant to a state hospital or certain other treatment facilities. (§ 1026, subd. (a).) A patient so committed may be recommitted for an additional period after trial (§ 1026.5, subd. (b)(8)), if the court or jury finds the patient "by reason of a mental disease, defect, or disorder represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others." (§ 1026.5, subd. (b)(1).) To make this finding, there must be proof that the patient has a "'serious difficulty in controlling [his] dangerous behavior.'" (People v. Galindo (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 531, 537.) Appellant contends that because he was in remission at the time of the recommitment hearing, there was no substantial evidence to support such a finding. We disagree.
In interpreting another civil commitment statute that required a finding of dangerousness, our Supreme Court held that, to satisfy due process, the commitment could be extended only if there was evidence that "the mental deficiency, disorder, or abnormality causes [the person] to have serious difficulty controlling his dangerous behavior." (In re Howard N. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 117, 135; see Welf. & Inst. Code, § 1800.) Subsequently, cases have interpreted the "substantial danger of physical harm to others" standard in section 1026.5, subdivision (b)(1) in a similar fashion to require evidence that the person subject to recommitment has "serious difficulty in controlling dangerous behavior." (People v. Galindo, supra, 142 Cal.App.4th at p. 537; accord, People v. Bowers (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 870, 878-879; People v. Zapisek (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1151, 1159, 1164.) Evidence is required to establish not only that a person has exhibited dangerous behavior due to a mental disorder, but also that the mental disorder, as opposed to a volitional decision, prevents the person from controlling his or her dangerous behavior. (Galindo, at p. 539.) The person must be unable to control dangerous behavior because of a mental disorder, not merely because the person concludes there is no need to do so under the circumstances. (Ibid.)
An order extending a section 1026 commitment will be upheld if there is substantial evidence supporting a finding, express or implied, that the person has a serious difficulty in controlling dangerous behavior. (People v. Bowers, supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at pp. 878-879; People v. Zapisek, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1159, 1165.) Under the substantial evidence test, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the order to determine whether there is any substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could have found each essential element of the recommitment beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Rowland (1992) 4 Cal.4th 238, 269; Bowers, at pp. 878-879.) Here, we conclude that substantial evidence supports a finding that, due to his mental illness, appellant has serious difficulty controlling his dangerous behavior.
Proctor testified that appellant suffered from antisocial personality disorder, polysubstance dependence, and schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type. His antisocial disorder caused two violent episodes in July and August 2008. In July, when one of his peers tried to take his food, appellant struck him in the head with a food tray. Appellant later explained that he did so to "bust this peer's head open." In August, appellant slapped another peer, his girlfriend, for disrespecting him. He then fought with a male peer who tried to intervene. Appellant also had a history of intermittently taking and refusing to take his medication, and lacked interest in counseling groups. These factors raised the risk of his engaging in violent behavior as a result of his disorders if he were released from a controlled environment. The trial court reasonably found that due to his mental illness, appellant has a serious difficulty controlling his dangerous behavior.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: GILBERT, P.J., YEGAN, J.