Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Sup. Ct. No. 06F06141
MORRISON, J.
Defendant Felecion Jones was arrested and charged by complaint with possession of cocaine base for sale, possession of a firearm by a felon, and possession of cocaine while armed with a loaded firearm. On February 13, 2007, a preliminary hearing and Penal Code section 1538.5 suppression hearing were held before the Honorable Gary S. Mullen. Defendant’s motion to suppress was denied, and the matter was held over.
Two weeks later, the complaint was deemed an information and filed with the superior court. Shortly thereafter, defendant entered a negotiated plea of no contest to possessing cocaine while armed with a loaded firearm in exchange for dismissal of the remaining charges. Defendant was immediately sentenced to three years in state prison.
I
DISCUSSION
A. Defendant Failed to Preserve His Claim
Defendant appeals, claiming the court below erred in denying his motion to suppress. As defendant concedes, however, he failed to renew his motion to suppress before the superior court. This failure is fatal to his claim on appeal.
In order to preserve his claim for appeal, defendant was required to renew his motion to suppress in the superior court, after the case was held over. (People v. Hinds (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 897, 900 (Hinds); People v. Garrido (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 359, 364-365.) Defendant’s assertion that such a requirement is “an archaic holdover from an old, hierarchical system” does not absolve him of that requirement.
Defendant also claims he was not required to renew his motion to suppress because the preliminary hearing and the motion to suppress “all took place in one court -- the Sacramento County Superior Court.” Defendant relies on People v. Callahan (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1419 (Callahan), to support his position and asks that we do the same. However, as noted by defendant, this court has already refused to follow Callahan. (Hinds, supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at p. 900.)
Defendant further contends he was not required to renew his motion to suppress because at the end of the preliminary hearing, Judge Mullen stated he was “‘acting in [his] capacity as a judge’” and did not direct defendant to renew his motion. Moreover, he argues that because the complaint itself was deemed the information and there was no “reference in the holding order to the case being ‘certified to the superior court[,]’” he is exempt from having to renew his motion to suppress. Defendant cites no authority to support these “exceptions” to the well- established requirement that he renew his motion to suppress and we have found none. Accordingly, defendant’s failure to renew his motion precludes him from raising the issue on appeal.
B. Defendant’s Claim Fails In Any Event
On July 13, 2006, at approximately 7:45 p.m., approximately 10 Sacramento police officers arrived at an apartment complex, known to the officers to be a high drug trafficking area, with the primary intent to locate a witness to a murder. Dressed in “modified tactical police uniforms[,]” with the words “police and/or parole” emblazoned on the front and back of their vests in bright yellow lettering, the officers “secured” the area and began searching for the witness.
Immediately after securing the area, one of the officers notified the others of an individual, later identified as the defendant, running from behind the apartment complex. One officer yelled, “‘Police, stop’” but the defendant continued to run, so several of the officers pursued the defendant on foot.
After running approximately one and one-half blocks, the defendant “barricaded” himself in another apartment. The police repeatedly ordered the defendant to come out of the apartment but the defendant ignored their orders. Ultimately, the police forced their way into the apartment and arrested the defendant for resisting, delaying, and obstructing an officer in the performance of his duties in violation of Penal Code section 148.
After arresting the defendant, the officers performed a records check and discovered that he was on searchable probation. The officers learned in which of the apartments the defendant lived and conducted a probation search of that apartment. During their search, the officers found cocaine base, a gun, and evidence of drug trafficking. On appeal, defendant argues the police lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him. Defendant is wrong.
“The standard of appellate review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress is well established. We defer to the trial court’s factual findings, express or implied, where supported by substantial evidence. In determining whether, on the facts so found, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, we exercise our independent judgment. [Citations.]” (People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 362.)
Defendant contends the police lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him because he was not the only individual running, there was no evidence he was engaged in illegal activity prior to running, and he was never observed “in concert with other persons” engaged in a criminal conspiracy. However, defendant ignores that after the police arrived at the complex, he began to run without any apparent provocation; he continued running after the police commanded him to stop; he barricaded himself in an apartment when the police gave chase; and he refused to comply when the police ordered him to come out.
Defendant’s presence in a high drug trafficking area, coupled with his unprovoked flight and repeated refusal to comply with the officers’ commands, provided reasonable suspicion to detain him for investigation. (Cf. Illinois v. Wardlow (2000) 528 U.S. 119, 124-125 [145 L.Ed.2d 570, 576-577].)
Furthermore, defendant’s efforts to evade the officers during their murder investigation was a violation of Penal Code section 148, which provides that, “Every person who willfully resists, delays, or obstructs any . . . peace officer . . . in the discharge or attempt to discharge any duty of his or her office or employment, . . . shall be punished . . . .” (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1).) Thus, the officers had ample reason to detain defendant as they had probable cause to arrest him. (Cf. O’Toole v. Superior Court (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 488, 511 [police officers attempted to stop defendant from distributing pamphlets without a permit, defendant refused to comply with their directions, probable cause to arrest defendant for violation of Penal Code section 148].)
Accordingly, were this issue properly before us, we would find no error.
DISPOSITION
The trial court judgment is affirmed.
We concur: SCOTLAND, P.J., SIMS, J.