Opinion
NO. 4-20-0252 NO. 4-20-0254 cons.
05-10-2021
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CORTEZ JONES, Defendant-Appellant.
NOTICE
This Order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from Circuit Court of Coles County
Nos. 16CF420 18CF52
Honorable Brien J. O'Brien, Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE HOLDER WHITE delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Cavanagh and Harris concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, concluding the trial court did not abuse its discretion when sentencing defendant to 17 years' imprisonment for the unlawful delivery of a controlled substance.
¶ 2 In May 2018, defendant, Cortez Jones, pleaded guilty to (1) one count of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/401(d) (West 2016)) in Coles County case No. 16-CF-420 and (2) two counts of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance (id.) in Coles County case No. 18-CF-52. In September 2018, the trial court sentenced defendant to consecutive terms of (1) 7 years' imprisonment in case No. 16-CF-420 and (2) 10 years' imprisonment in case No. 18-CF-52. Defendant subsequently filed a motion to reconsider his sentence, which the court denied.
¶ 3 Defendant appeals, arguing the trial court erred by (1) imposing an excessive sentence of 17 years' imprisonment and (2) considering an inappropriate sentencing factor in aggravation. We affirm.
¶ 4 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 5 A. The State's Charges and Defendant's Guilty Plea
¶ 6 In April 2018, the trial court conducted a combined status hearing. Defendant, at that time, had five felony cases, three traffic cases, two miscellaneous-remedies cases, and one misdemeanor case pending against him. In Coles County case No. 16-CF-420 (hereinafter case No. 16-CF-420), the State charged defendant with one count of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/401(d) (West 2016)). In Coles County case No. 18-CF-52 (hereinafter case No. 18-CF-52), the State charged defendant with two counts of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance (id.). At the combined hearing, defendant's trial counsel informed the court the parties were "in discussions about resolution."
¶ 7 In May 2018, defendant entered a blind plea to the offenses in case Nos. 16-CF-420 and 18-CF-52. In exchange for defendant's guilty plea, the State agreed to dismiss the remaining felony, misdemeanor, and traffic cases pending against him. Before accepting defendant's guilty plea, the trial court admonished defendant he "could be sentenced from three to seven years in the Department of Corrections [(DOC)]," in case No. 16-CF-420. In case No. 18-CF-52, the court admonished defendant that, due to "a fentanyl enhancement," he could be sentenced from 3 to 10 years in DOC for each count, which "would be mandatorily consecutive to any sentence imposed in 16 CF 420."
¶ 8 In its factual basis for case No. 16-CF-420, the State indicated that members of the East Central Illinois Drug Task Force conducted a controlled purchase from defendant on
October 3, 2016, where defendant sold 0.4 grams of heroin to a "confidential source" for $80. In case No. 18-CF-52, the East Central Illinois Drug Task Force conducted two controlled purchases from defendant, who sold 0.4 grams of heroin to a confidential source on December 11, 2017, and again on December 19, 2017.
¶ 9 B. Sentencing Hearing
¶ 10 1. The State's Forfeiture Request
¶ 11 On September 14, 2018, the matter proceeded to sentencing. First, the trial court heard testimony regarding a forfeiture request by the State seeking to retain $2480 of United States currency seized from defendant during a traffic stop. The State called the following individuals: (1) Charleston police officer Brandon Spindler; (2) Charleston police officer Justin Peterson; and (3) Charleston police officer Chris Darimont. Defendant testified on his own behalf.
¶ 12 Officer Brandon Spindler testified that on February 15, 2017, he observed defendant driving his vehicle "westbound on Cleveland at the intersection with 9th Street," and verified defendant's driver's license was revoked at that time. Approximately 30 minutes later, Spindler again observed the same vehicle approaching defendant's residence at "2002 10th Street," whereupon Spindler observed defendant "in the passenger seat of the vehicle, and *** an unidentified white female driving." Upon departing the residence, Spindler "maintained surveillance on the vehicle until approximately 9th and Lincoln, at which point Sergeant Peterson spotted the vehicle and initiated a traffic stop." Following the traffic stop, Spindler testified he interviewed the driver, Jessica Hayes, who "provide[d] information about [defendant] bringing back large quantities of Heroin from [the] Chicago area." Spindler then recalled a previous interview with Tayza Moutray in relation to a separate investigation involving the
possession of heroin. According to Moutray, "[defendant] was present on multiple occasions at her residence while people divided Heroin up for distribution among the Charleston community." On cross-examination, Spindler added that he had information "from multiple other confidential sources advising that [defendant] was involved in selling Heroin."
¶ 13 Charleston police officer Justin Peterson testified that on February 15, 2017, he received a call from Officer Spindler indicating "that he had just seen the Defendant *** driving his vehicle in the area of 10th Street. Officer Spindler indicated he checked [defendant's] driver's license status, and according to Secretary of State files, his driving privileges were suspended." After getting "behind the vehicle on 9th Street right before Lincoln Avenue," Peterson activated his overhead emergency lights and initiated a traffic stop where Hayes was the driver. Defendant was the passenger. Peterson testified he spoke with defendant and "told him that Inspector Spindler had seen him driving the vehicle earlier," which defendant denied. Peterson then placed defendant under arrest and discovered "approximately $1480 in [defendant's] left front pocket, and $1000 in his right front pocket."
¶ 14 Officer Chris Darimont testified he was a "K-9 patrolman" employed by the Charleston Police Department. Darimont testified that on February 15, 2017, he responded to a call for assistance at a traffic stop involving defendant at approximately 11 a.m. When he arrived, Darimont had his canine walk around defendant's vehicle. The dog alerted on the vehicle, and Darimont subsequently conducted a search of the vehicle. Although no contraband was found, Darimont explained a canine may still alert "if the odor is still present in the vehicle, or on the person." On cross-examination, Darimont testified his canine was certified to detect "Methamphetamine, Heroin, cannabis, cocaine, and *** Ecstasy" and that each substance had a specific odor. Darimont further testified that it was impossible to determine whether his canine's
alert would be characterized as a false positive as no contraband or controlled substances were found in the vehicle.
¶ 15 Defendant testified on his own behalf. Defendant testified that, on February 15, 2017, he was on his way to pay his attorney and explained, "My brother send me a thousand, my son mother send me another thousand, and I had my job check that I cashed because I saved up my money." According to defendant, none of the money seized by police came from narcotics sales. Defendant admitted being acquainted with Tayza Moutray but denied being involved in any drug-related activity with her.
¶ 16 Ultimately, the trial court denied the State's request for forfeiture due to an insufficient nexus between the criminal activity alleged and the $2480 of United States currency seized by police. At the State's request, and without objection from defense counsel, the court took judicial notice of the above-mentioned testimony during the sentencing portion of the hearing.
¶ 17 2. The Presentence Investigation Report
¶ 18 A presentence investigation report (PSI) indicated defendant was born in 1973 and listed defendant's adult criminal history, which included: a 1996 conviction for the manufacture or delivery of a controlled substance, for which he received 1 year of probation; a 1999 conviction for driving under the influence (DUI), resulting in an unspecified sentence to DOC; a 1999 conviction for unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon, for which defendant received "Boot Camp"; a 2002 conviction for unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon, resulting in a 2-year sentence to DOC; a 2002 conviction for resisting or obstructing a peace officer, for which he received 6 months' conditional discharge; a 2003 conviction for possession of a controlled substance, resulting in 1 year of imprisonment; a 2010 conviction for driving
while license revoked or suspended, for which he received a 1-year sentence to DOC; two additional convictions in 2010 for driving while license revoked or suspended, which resulted in 15 months' imprisonment; and a 2010 conviction for aggravated DUI and driving while license revoked, for which defendant received 2 years' imprisonment.
¶ 19 According to the PSI, defendant had seven children, four of whom were adults. Three of defendant's adult children lived in the "Chicago area," while his four youngest children continued to reside in Charleston, Illinois. With respect to education, the PSI noted defendant was "expelled from school in the 12th grade," however he received his general equivalency degree (GED) in 2000 while incarcerated. Defendant held multiple jobs between 1988 and 2018, including steady employment since April 2018, where he worked "full time at Carl Buddig & Company."
¶ 20 3. Evidence in Aggravation
¶ 21 In aggravation, the State called several witnesses, including Charleston police officer Brandon Spindler, who testified he had received training "involving drug investigations, interviewing people that are suspected of dealing drugs, recognizing specific drugs, and people that are under the influence of drugs." Spindler testified that, on October 3, 2016, he conducted a controlled purchase utilizing a confidential source. Spindler explained "[t]he intended target was Malcolm Kyle," however the confidential source "ended up buying from *** [defendant]." Spindler testified the confidential source arranged to purchase 0.4 grams of heroin from Kyle at his residence "located at 20 West Buchanan" and was outfitted with audio and video equipment prior to the purchase.
¶ 22 After arriving at the residence, Kyle "advised the confidential source that he didn't have any Heroin on hand, and that he would be leading the confidential source down to his
dealer's residence." Spindler followed Kyle and the confidential source to an alley "behind 2002 10th Street in Charleston," and observed defendant "leaving the back door of his residence at that location." Spindler testified that, according to the confidential source, defendant "served Heroin to the female driver of the silver car that Malcolm Kyle was in, and they departed." Defendant then entered the confidential source's vehicle and agreed to sell the source "three-tenths of a gram" of heroin for $80. After coming to an agreement, defendant "left the car *** and served another vehicle that was there," and delivered the heroin to the confidential source upon reentering the car. Defendant then "instructed the confidential source in how to cut the product *** with Benadryl to make it last longer and to get more bang for your buck," which Spindler explained was "introducing a substance to it, other than Heroin, to make it look more substantial than what it is to make it weigh heavier than the actual product." Following the controlled purchase, Spindler met with the confidential source who provided him with the heroin purchased from defendant.
¶ 23 The State also called Charleston police officer David Reed. Reed described two controlled purchases involving defendant, one conducted on December 11, 2017, and the other conducted on December 19, 2017. Both transactions involved a confidential source, who informed Reed they could purchase heroin from defendant. Reed scheduled a controlled purchase for December 11, 2017, "[i]n the parking lot of 950 Edgar Drive," and outfitted the confidential source with audio and video equipment prior to the transaction. Reed testified defendant approached the confidential source's vehicle and sold the source 0.4 grams of heroin for "approximately $80." Following the controlled purchase, the confidential source provided Reed with the heroin obtained from defendant, which subsequently lab-tested positive for the presence of fentanyl, "a synthetic opioid."
¶ 24 Reed next testified that, on December 19, 2017, he organized another controlled purchase from defendant "[i]n the parking lot of 1012 Roosevelt Avenue." Reed provided the confidential source with $80 and testified the source's vehicle was outfitted with audio and video equipment. According to Reed, the confidential source handed defendant the money in exchange for the suspected heroin after defendant entered the vehicle. Reed again met with the confidential source following the transaction who provided Reed with the heroin purchased from defendant, which later lab-tested positive for the presence of fentanyl.
¶ 25 Officer Chris Darimont testified that, on May 11, 2017, he initiated a traffic stop at the intersection of 18th Street and Garfield Avenue in Charleston, Illinois, where defendant was the driver of the vehicle stopped. Prior to stopping defendant's vehicle, Darimont testified he "had the dispatch center check the status of [defendant's] license" and confirmed defendant's driver's license was revoked.
¶ 26 Andrew Shick, a pretrial officer employed by Coles County Probation Court Services, testified he began supervising defendant "in early 2017." Shick testified that between February 2017 and February 2018, defendant violated the conditions of his pretrial release multiple times, including testing positive for the presence of alcohol and cannabis on several occasions. On cross-examination, Shick testified defendant "[had] been reporting after court as directed" and had not violated the terms of his pretrial release since moving out of the county in April 2018.
¶ 27 4. Evidence in Mitigation
¶ 28 Following the State's evidence in aggravation, defendant presented a certificate from the South Suburban Council on Alcoholism and Substance Abuse for his successful completion of its intensive outpatient program. Defendant also submitted multiple letters in
mitigation, including a letter from his daughter, Tanisha Jones, who described defendant as a "vital part" of the family when it came to taking care of his daughters and grandson. Jones praised defendant for ensuring his grandson's medical bills and schooling were paid for and for "working full-time every[ ]day *** on top of taking care of [her] 3 little sisters and 2 brothers with no help from either [mother]."
¶ 29 Defendant then made a statement in allocution and requested probation, stating, "I took a whole 360 of my life now. I got my kids, and I need to be out there helping them out. I'm not trying to go to jail. I got a good job, a family, I'm just trying to get a second chance."
¶ 30 5. Imposition of Sentence
¶ 31 In case No. 16-CF-420, the State requested a sentence of seven years' imprisonment. In case No. 18-CF-52, the State requested consecutive 10-year prison sentences for each count, noting the offenses involved "Heroin laced with Fentanyl" and arguing defendant's extensive criminal history, "as well as the behavior on pretrial," demonstrated defendant would continue to sell heroin if given the opportunity. Defense counsel requested probation, arguing, in part, defendant was employed, had completed some substance abuse treatment, and was "a paid distributor of Heroin, not some large-scale distributor."
¶ 32 Before pronouncing sentence, the trial court stated it considered (1) the evidence presented at the sentencing hearing, (2) the PSI, (3) the financial impact of a sentence to DOC, (4) the evidence and arguments offered in aggravation, mitigation, and with respect to sentencing alternatives, (5) defendant's statement in allocution, and (6) "the history character and attitude of the Defendant as reflected by that statement and by his past criminal history." In mitigation, the court found "that the imprisonment of the Defendant may entail hardship to his dependents,"
however the court noted it was difficult to determine from the evidence "whether there really [was] much support being provided."
¶ 33 As to factors in aggravation, the trial court considered defendant's "substantial history of prior criminal activity," noting defendant had "eight prior felonies" and had previously received multiple prison sentences. The court found the need for deterrence was "certainly present" and determined a substantial sentence was necessary to deter others from committing the same crime. The court also noted defendant had "multiple felonies pending at the time he committed the offenses in 18-CF-52" while out on bail or his own recognizance. Next, the court found defendant's conduct caused or threatened serious harm. However, due to the sentencing enhancement already present in case No. 18-CF-52, the court could not consider it as an additional factor in aggravation, "because it is inherent in the charge itself." The court further noted "that even while a controlled purchase was going on back in October of 2016, the Defendant engaged in two additional transactions for which he hasn't even been charged." The court found defendant demonstrated an inability "to comport his behavior to the law and to societal norms," and "clearly demonstrated by his actions that he's going to do whatever he cares to do without regard to the repercussions or the consequences." As a result, the court determined "that a sentence of probation or any other community-based sentence would deprecate or minimize the seriousness of the crimes committed and would be inconsistent with the ends of justice" and found that "a prison sentence [was] necessary to protect the public from [defendant] and his conduct."
¶ 34 The court concluded by imposing consecutive sentences of (1) seven years' imprisonment in case No. 16-CF-420 and (2) concurrent seven-year prison sentences for each
offense in case No. 18-CF-52, "plus the three-year Fentanyl enhancement, for a total of ten years."
¶ 35 C. Defendant's Posttrial Motion
¶ 36 On September 21, 2018, defendant filed a motion to reconsider his sentence, arguing, in part, the sentence was excessive and "not in keeping with alternatives available to the Court to assist the Defendant in his rehabilitation."
¶ 37 In October 2018, the trial court conducted a hearing on defendant's motion to reconsider his sentence. In denying defendant's motion, the court recalled that "there was arguably one factor in mitigation" and reiterated its determination "that with the multiple factors in aggravation that existed, under the circumstances of this case, anything less than a sentence to the maximum would deprecate the seriousness of the crimes committed and would be inconsistent with the ends of justice."
¶ 38 This appeal followed.
¶ 39 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 40 On appeal, defendant argues his 17-year prison sentence is excessive. Specifically, defendant contends the trial court failed to properly consider evidence in mitigation and the court erred by considering a factor inherent in the offenses to which he pleaded guilty—that his conduct caused or threatened serious harm.
¶ 41 A. Excessive Sentence
¶ 42 The trial court has discretion when sentencing, and we will not reverse the court's decision absent an abuse of that discretion. People v. Snyder, 2011 IL 111382, ¶ 36, 959 N.E.2d 656. The court is granted such discretion in sentencing because "the trial court is in a better position to judge the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence at the sentencing
hearing." People v. Ramos, 353 Ill. App. 3d 133, 137, 817 N.E.2d 1110, 1115 (2004). The trial court errs where the sentence is "greatly at variance with the spirit and purpose of the law, or manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense." People v. Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d 203, 210, 737 N.E.2d 626, 629 (2000). We presume the sentencing court considered all relevant factors in aggravation and mitigation unless the record affirmatively reveals otherwise. People v. Chirchirillo, 393 Ill. App. 3d 916, 927, 913 N.E.2d 635, 645 (2009). When determining what constitutes an appropriate sentence, "a defendant's history, character, and rehabilitative potential, along with the seriousness of the offense, the need to protect society, and the need for deterrence and punishment" are all considered. People v. Hernandez, 319 Ill. App. 3d 520, 529, 745 N.E.2d 673, 681 (2001).
¶ 43 Unlawful delivery of a controlled substance is a Class 2 felony, which carries a non-extended term sentencing range of three to seven years in prison. 720 ILCS 570/401(d) (West 2016); 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-35(a) (West 2016). However, defendant was eligible for a three-year sentencing enhancement based on the presence of fentanyl in the heroin in case No. 18-CF-52. 720 ILCS 570/401(b-1) (West 2016). Because the trial court's 17-year sentence fell within the permissible sentencing range, it is presumed to be proper, and we will not disturb the sentence absent an abuse of discretion. People v. Knox, 2014 IL App (1st) 120349, ¶ 46, 19 N.E.3d 1070.
¶ 44 Defendant argues his sentence was excessive because the trial court did not properly weigh certain factors in mitigation such as defendant's "familial support, and the hardship his family would experience." "Where mitigating evidence has been presented, it is presumed that the trial court considered it." People v. Lundy, 2018 IL App (1st) 162304, ¶ 24, 118 N.E.3d 1246. "However, the existence of mitigating factors does not obligate the trial court
to reduce a sentence from the maximum allowable." People v. Williams, 317 Ill. App. 3d 945, 955-56, 742 N.E.2d 774, 783 (2000). "A defendant's rehabilitative potential and other mitigating factors are not entitled to greater weight than the seriousness of the offense." People v. Pippen, 324 Ill. App. 3d 649, 652, 756 N.E.2d 474, 477 (2001). "The seriousness of the offense is the most important sentencing factor." People v. Watt, 2013 IL App (2d) 120183, ¶ 50, 1 N.E.3d 1145. "The defendant bears the burden to affirmatively establish that the sentence was based on improper considerations, and we will not reverse a sentence *** unless it is clearly evident the sentence was improper." People v. Etherton, 2017 IL App (5th) 140427, ¶ 29, 82 N.E.3d 693. "The balance to be struck amongst the aggravating and mitigating factors is a matter of judicial discretion that should not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion." People v. Crenshaw, 2011 IL App (4th) 090908, ¶ 24, 959 N.E.2d 703. "In considering the propriety of a sentence, the reviewing court must proceed with great caution and must not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court merely because it would have weighed the factors differently." People v. Fern, 189 Ill. 2d 48, 53, 723 N.E.2d 207, 209 (1999).
¶ 45 Here, the trial court considered (1) the evidence presented at the sentencing hearing, (2) the PSI, (3) the financial impact of a sentence to DOC, (4) the evidence and arguments offered in aggravation, mitigation, and with respect to sentencing alternatives, (5) defendant's statement in allocution, and (6) "the history character and attitude of the Defendant as reflected by that statement and by his past criminal history." As an adult, defendant had a criminal history that spanned at least 25 years—over half of his life—to 1996. The court emphasized defendant's extensive criminal history and flagrant disregard for the law, as evidenced by his "eight prior felonies." Having previously received one year of probation, six months' conditional discharge, and multiple sentences to DOC, defendant was undeterred from
participating in the unlawful delivery of a controlled substance, and the court determined that a substantial sentence was necessary to deter others from committing the same crime.
¶ 46 The trial court also emphasized defendant's failure to conform to a law-abiding lifestyle and found "that even while a controlled purchase was going on back in October of 2016, the Defendant engaged in two additional transactions for which he hasn't even been charged." The court further found defendant had "multiple felonies pending at the time he committed the offenses in 18-CF-52" and that defendant demonstrated "by his actions that he's going to do whatever he cares to do without regard to the repercussions or the consequences." Ultimately, the court found a period of probation or any other community-based sentence would deprecate the seriousness of the offenses and "a prison sentence [was] necessary to protect the public from [defendant] and his conduct." See 730 ILCS 5/5-6-1(a) (West 2016) (a trial court is not required to impose a sentence of probation where the evidence demonstrates it would deprecate the seriousness of the offense and be inconsistent with the ends of justice).
¶ 47 Contrary to defendant's assertions on appeal, the trial court recognized the existence of mitigating evidence, finding "the imprisonment of the Defendant may entail hardship to his dependents." See 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.1(a)(11) (West 2016). In his brief, defendant cites People v. Markiewicz, 246 Ill. App. 3d 31, 56, 615 N.E.2d 869, 886 (1993), where the reviewing court found the sentencing judge abused its discretion by failing to consider mitigating evidence in sentencing. There, on more than one occasion, the sentencing judge indicated it would not consider the defendant's mitigating evidence because it did not fit into any of the categories enumerated in section 5-5-3.1 of the Unified Code of Corrections. Id. at 55. The appellate court determined this was error. Id. Here, the record demonstrates the court did
consider the mitigating evidence. However, it found the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating evidence. Thus, the court did not disregard the mitigating evidence as in Markiewicz.
¶ 48 B. Aggravating Factor
¶ 49 Defendant further asserts the trial court's consideration "that [his] conduct in selling 0.4 grams of heroin caused or threatened serious harm" as an aggravating factor at sentencing was improper because the threat of serious harm is inherent in the offense of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance. The State argues the court's statements reflect that it recognized the threat of serious harm was inherent in the offenses and not that it found that factor applied in aggravation.
¶ 50 "It is well established that a factor inherent in the offense should not be considered as a factor in aggravation at sentencing." People v. Canizalez-Cardena, 2012 IL App (4th) 110720, ¶ 22, 979 N.E.2d 1014. "There is a strong presumption that the trial court based its sentencing determination on proper legal reasoning, and a court of review should consider the record as a whole, rather than focusing on a few words or statements by the trial court." Id. (citing People v. Dowding, 388 Ill. App. 3d 936, 942-43, 904 N.E.2d 1022, 1028 (2009)). "A court is not required to refrain from any mention of sentencing factors that constitute elements of the offense." People v. Sherman, 2020 IL App (1st) 172162, ¶ 52.
¶ 51 In this instance, defendant fails to show the trial court improperly considered the cause or threat of serious harm when imposing sentence. Upon considering the record as a whole, we note the court specifically mentioned that it could not consider the threat of serious harm as a factor in aggravation in case No. 18-CF-52 "because of the enhancement that is already in place." The court then went on not to indicate it was considering the cause or threat of serious harm as to the other case but instead to point out defendant's prolific work as a drug
dealer. We note, factors inherent in an offense can sometimes be considered as part of the nature and circumstances of the offense. People v. McGath, 2017 IL App. (4th) 150608, ¶ 73, 93 N.E.3d 671. The court's comments directly addressed defense counsel's argument seeking leniency where defense counsel pointed out that defendant only sold small amounts of drugs during the controlled buys arranged by police. Significant to the trial court, defendant "served" multiple other customers while participating in a controlled buy, procured heroin from Chicago, and assisted others in dividing up heroin for distribution in Charleston. Hence, the court's statement indicating "the damage that can be caused, even by a small quantity." In imposing sentence, the court also relied upon defendant's criminal history, the need for deterrence, and defendant's demonstrated inability "to comport his behavior to the law and to societal norms."
¶ 52 Ultimately, the trial court had discretion, within the applicable sentencing range, to determine defendant's sentence. See People v. Nussbaum, 251 Ill. App. 3d 779, 783, 623 N.E.2d 755, 758 (1993) ("counsel's [sentencing] recommendations are deserving of whatever weight the sentencing court wishes to accord them and nothing more"). Defendant's 17-year sentence fell within statutory limits, and nothing in the record indicates the court gave improper consideration to any factor in sentencing defendant. Thus, we conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant.
¶ 53 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 54 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
¶ 55 Affirmed.