Opinion
9152 Ind. 3708/12
04-30-2019
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Davon JONES, Defendant–Appellant.
Justine M. Luongo, The Legal Aid Society, New York (Alan S. Axelrod of counsel), for appellant. Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York (Brent Ferguson of counsel), for respondent.
Justine M. Luongo, The Legal Aid Society, New York (Alan S. Axelrod of counsel), for appellant.
Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York (Brent Ferguson of counsel), for respondent.
Renwick, J.P., Richter, Gesmer, Kern, Singh, JJ.
Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Renee A. White, J.), rendered March 5, 2013, as amended March 6, 2013, convicting defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of attempted criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree, and sentencing him, as a second felony offender, to a term of 1½ years, unanimously affirmed.
The court correctly adjudicated defendant a second felony offender based on a conviction under a South Carolina robbery statute that is facially the equivalent of a felony in New York. Defendant has not demonstrated that under South Carolina case law, unlike the rule in New York (see People v. Gordon, 23 N.Y.3d 643, 650, 992 N.Y.S.2d 700, 16 N.E.3d 1178 [2014] ), a person can commit robbery where the only force used is to facilitate an escape after a nonforcible larceny, even after abandoning the stolen property and making no effort to retain it. Defendant cites only to isolated phrases of dictum referring to escape (see State v. Mitchell, 382 S.C. 1, 6–7, 675 S.E.2d 435, 438 [2009] ; State v. Moore, 374 S.C. 468, 478–479, 649 S.E.2d 84, 89 [2007] ; State v. Keith, 283 S.C. 597, 599, 325 S.E.2d 325, 326 [1985] ), that, when read in context, do not support his position.