Opinion
March 7, 1988
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Queens County (Cohen, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
Prior to the presentation of the People's case, the trial court ruled, over defense counsel's objection, that the prosecutor could make reference to the fact that $745 had been found in the defendant's possession at the time of his arrest. In so ruling, the court reasoned that the probative value of admitting such evidence would outweigh the potential prejudice to the defendant.
Insofar as the first two counts of the indictment accused the defendant of criminal possession of cocaine and heroin with the intent to sell, evidence of the currency found on the defendant's person at the time of his arrest was properly found to be relevant to proof of the crime charged. Unlike the situation in the First Department case of People v. Jones ( 62 A.D.2d 356), where the crime charged was a single sale of narcotics, the defendant in the instant case was charged with an intent to sell the drugs found in his possession. The evidence adduced at trial indicated that the defendant was engaged in narcotics activity as a trade. The brown paper bag which the defendant dropped at the scene and which was retrieved by the arresting officers was found by subsequent analysis to contain 30 glassine envelopes containing heroin, 21 tinfoil envelopes containing cocaine, and 2 packets of marihuana. Moreover, a qualified police expert testified that the items recovered at the scene were packaged in a manner commonly designed for street level sales of narcotic substances. Under the circumstances, the currency found on the defendant's person was probative of the counts charging the defendant with possession with intent to sell (People v. Mayas, 137 A.D.2d 836; People v. Milom, 75 A.D.2d 68; cf., People v. Morales, 133 A.D.2d 90; People v. Brown, 71 A.D.2d 918; People v. Jones, supra).
Nor did the prosecutor's cross-examination of a defense witness who invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege constitute reversible error. The prosecutor did not call the witness in question to the stand, but merely attempted to cross-examine him in order to impeach his credibility. The limited inquiries put forth by the prosecutor which the witness refused to answer related to the witness's presence in an apartment where drugs were present on a date subsequent to the crime. The jury was adequately instructed that it was not to draw any unfavorable inferences against the defendant due to this witness's refusal to answer certain questions. Absent a conscious and flagrant attempt by the prosecutor to build a case out of the inferences arising from the use of the testimonial privilege or without some indication that the witness's refusal to testify adds critical weight to the People's case in a form not subject to cross-examination, reversal is not warranted (see, Namet v. United States, 373 U.S. 179; People v. Berg, 59 N.Y.2d 294; People v. Beaman, 122 A.D.2d 848, lv denied 68 N.Y.2d 809; People v. Malphurs, 111 A.D.2d 266, lv denied 66 N.Y.2d 616, 920). Furthermore, no prejudice will generally be presumed to flow from the refusal of a witness to answer questions concerning acts committed by him unrelated to the defendant's alleged crime (see, People v. Malphurs, supra, at 271).
We have examined the defendant's remaining contentions and find them to be either unpreserved for appellate review or without merit. Mollen, P.J., Lawrence, Weinstein and Kooper, JJ., concur.