We disagree. In People v Jones, 394 Mich. 434; 231 N.W.2d 649 (1975), our Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding in People v Pickett, 391 Mich. 305; 215 N.W.2d 695 (1974), that where an appellate court remands for some limited purpose following an appeal as of right in a criminal case, a second appeal as of right, limited to the scope of the remand, lies from the decision on remand. From the second appeal under those circumstances, a defendant is entitled to the full panoply of ancillary rights, such as the right to the assistance of appointed counsel if indigent.
"[T]he scope of the second appeal is limited by the scope of the remand." People v Jones, 394 Mich 434, 435-436; 231 NW2d 649 (1975). In this case, the opinion by this Court regarding defendant's initial appeal explicitly provided that the trial court's only issue on remand was whether it would have imposed a materially different sentence based on the advisory nature of the guidelines.
When an appellate court remands for a limited purpose following an appeal as of right in a criminal case, a second appeal as of right, limited to the scope of the remand, lies from the decision on remand. People v Jones, 394 Mich. 434, 435-436; 231 N.W.2d 649 (1975). Because the scope of the second appeal is limited by the scope of the remand, challenges on appeal are limited to matters that arose during the remand proceedings.
However, "where an appellate court remands for some limited purpose following an appeal as of right in a criminal case, a second appeal as of right, limited to the scope of the remand, lies from the decision on remand." People v Kincade (On Remand), 206 Mich App 477, 481; 522 NW2d 880 (1994); see also People v Jones, 394 Mich 434, 435-436; 231 NW2d 649 (1975) (holding that "the scope of the second appeal is limited by the scope of the remand," and in the case of resentencing, a "second appeal shall be concerned only with matters which arose at resentencing"). Because this Court remanded the case solely for the purpose of resentencing, the only issues that we will address and that are properly before us on second appeal are those pertaining to resentencing.
People v Jones, 394 Mich. 434, 436; 231 N.W.2d 649 (1975).
"[T]he scope of the second appeal is limited by the scope of the remand." People v Jones, 394 Mich. 434, 435-436; 231 N.W.2d 649 (1975). Following a resentencing, our jurisdiction is limited to issues arising from the resentencing itself.
Thus, defendant's remaining claims, which are outside the scope of the resentencing proceeding, were not properly before the trial court and we decline to review them. See, e.g., People v Jones, 394 Mich. 434, 435; 231 N.W.2d 649 (1975) (indicating that an appeal from a resentencing is limited to the resentencing proceedings). Defendant has not offered an explanation or supporting authority for how, contrary to the parties' stipulated agreement, this Court could properly consider issues that are unrelated to his resentencing (and not based on newly-discovered evidence).
However, the scope of this appeal "is limited by the scope of the remand." People v Jones, 394 Mich 434, 435; 231 NW2d 649 (1975). Therefore, the scope of this appeal is limited to examining the trial court's compliance with the ministerial task of correcting and amending the judgment of sentence.
See also People v Gauntlett, 152 Mich App 397, 400; 394 NW2d 437 (1986) ("An appeal from a resentencing is limited to the resentencing proceeding."), citing People v Jones, 394 Mich 434, 435-436; 231 NW2d 649 (1975). In our order for resentencing, we stated that the trial court was to address the issues relating to application of the sentencing enhancement for Counts I, II, and IV; Count III, i.e., assault by strangulation, was not included, and his original sentence remained in place.
Therefore, "the scope of the second appeal is limited by the scope of the remand." People v Jones, 394 Mich 434, 435-436; 231 NW2d 649 (1975). In this case, this Court affirmed defendant's convictions in his prior appeal and remanded to the trial court solely for the limited purpose of resentencing.