Evidence generally is admissible if it is relevant, meaning the “fact or circumstance offered tends to prove or disprove a disputed fact or to render the matter at issue more or less probable." People v. Jones, 269 Ill.App.3d 797, 803, 200 Ill.Dec. 622, 635 N.E.2d 961 (1994) . However, evidence of other crimes defendant may have committed is not admissible if its only relevance is to show defendant's propensity to commit crime.

In order for evidence seized during a search to qualify for the plain view exception to the warrant requirement, it is necessary that: (1) the initial intrusion which afforded the authorities the plain view was lawful; (2) the discovery of the evidence was inadvertent; and (3) the incriminating nature of the evidence was immediately apparent. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 29 L.Ed.2d 564, 91 S.Ct. 2022 (1971); see also People v. Jones, 269 Ill. App.3d 797, 804 (1994). The plain view doctrine is grounded on the proposition that once police are lawfully in a position to observe an item firsthand, its owner's privacy interest in that item is lost; the owner may retain the incidents of title and possession but not privacy.

Defendant argues that the admission of that evidence was improper because there was no evidence to connect it with the crime. We disagree. Circumstantial evidence of the intent to deliver a controlled substance can include a large amount of drugs and weapons ( People v. Jones (1994), 269 Ill. App.3d 797; People v. Robinson (1992), 233 Ill. App.3d 278, 288, 598 N.E.2d 1348; People v. Brown (1992), 232 Ill. App.3d 885, 902, 598 N.E.2d 948), paraphernalia used in the sale of drugs ( People v. Rouser (1990), 199 Ill. App.3d 1062, 557 N.E.2d 928), a grinder, a scale ( People v. Schaefer (1985), 133 Ill. App.3d 697, 479 N.E.2d 428), a cellular telephone, and a programmable scanner ( People v. Bradford (1993), 239 Ill. App.3d 796, 800, 607 N.E.2d 625). Thus, we find no error in admitting this evidence, which was probative of defendant's intent to deliver a controlled substance.

The fact that, at the time of defendant's arrest, his blue Malibu contained items that could be used to falsely personate an officer, along with the BB gun that may have been used in the actual crime, helped link defendant to the offender who drove the black Malibu. See People v. Jones, 269 Ill.App.3d 797, 803 (1994) (evidence of large amounts of weapons and cash were proper circumstantial evidence to infer defendant's intent to deliver a controlled substance). This evidence was relevant to corroborate the identification of defendant as the person who picked up K.W. and told her he was a police officer before attempting to assault her. See Ill. R. Evid. 401 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011).

However, a cumulative-error argument necessarily fails where none of the separate claims amount to a reversible error and where no plain errors occur. People v. Jones, 269 Ill. App. 3d 797, 807 (1994). We address each of defendant's claims of error in turn.

We have held similarly. See People v. Jones , 269 Ill. App. 3d 797, 803, 200 Ill.Dec. 622, 635 N.E.2d 961 (1994) ("Not only is a reasonable inference of intent permitted when the amount of the controlled substance possessed could not be designed for personal consumption [citation], but the inference may be enhanced by the presence of weapons and large amounts of cash."). ¶ 66 Davis goes on to argue that even if the gun evidence was relevant, the manner in which it was introduced was prejudicial.

In this case, the defendant fails to show that a motion to suppress would have been successful. A search warrant need not specify each particular item for seizure; rather, it may describe a class of items and their characteristics (People v. McCarty, 223 Ill. 2d 109, 152 (2006)), and courts have previously held that guns are linked to drug crimes (People v. Jones, 269 Ill. App. 3d 797, 803 (1994)). Thus, the search warrant was not required to expressly list guns in order for the police to seize any weapons that they found during the search of the defendant's apartment in connection with his drug activity.

Probable cause exists where the police have knowledge of facts that would lead a reasonable person to believe that a crime has occurred and that it has been committed by the defendant ( People v. Bradford, 187 Ill.App.3d 903, 919, 135 Ill.Dec. 350, 543 N.E.2d 918 (1989)), and this belief must be objectively reasonable under the totality of the circumstances ( Long, 369 Ill.App.3d at 867, 308 Ill.Dec. 270, 861 N.E.2d 335). “The determination of probable cause to search is to be made after examining the totality of the circumstances, including the police officer's knowledge based on his prior law enforcement experience.” People v. Jones, 269 Ill.App.3d 797, 805, 200 Ill.Dec. 622, 635 N.E.2d 961 (1994). ¶ 11 Based on the circumstances of the traffic stop and objectively looking at the totality of the circumstances known to Officer Romano when she made the stop, we find that the officer did not have probable cause to seize the plastic baggie from defendant's front pants pocket.

Similar to this court's holding in People v. Begay, 377 Ill. App.3d 417, 879 N.E.2d 962 (2007), we conclude that the evidence related to the fire in this case did not, in fact, constitute inadmissible other-crimes evidence, but rather constituted circumstantial evidence relevant and probative to the issue of defendant's consciousness of guilt by destroying evidence of the charged offense. See Begay, 377 Ill. App. 3d at 421-22, 879 N.E.2d at 967 (this court held the testimony of a witness, the victim's son, that he heard a "splatter" outside moments before the defendant appeared at the victim's front door, and saw that the victim's car had been egged, was admissible as circumstantial evidence of the defendant's intent and state of mind at the time she appeared at the victim's apartment and engaged in the conduct that resulted in the charge of aggravated battery); see also People v. Jones, 269 Ill. App.3d 797, 803-04, 635 N.E.2d 961, 966-67 (1994) (the evidence that the defendant was in possession of weapons was not other-crimes evidence, but relevant circumstantial evidence of the defendant's intent to deliver a controlled substance, the charged offense). Pursuant to the State's theory of the case, defendant certainly knew that his fingerprints would be found on the grip of the bat.

Consequently, because defendant cannot prove prejudice, we find that the defendant received effective assistance of counsel. See People v. Jones, 269 Ill. App. 3d 797, 807 (1994). As to the question of whether defendant's not guilty verdict in the armed robbery charge at the first trial makes a difference, it must be remembered that it was the defendant who asked the question "[w]ho has the money[?