People v. Jones

5 Citing cases

  1. People v. Jones

    15 N.Y.3d 775 (N.Y. 2010)

    July 20, 2010. Appeal from the 4th Dept: 71 AD3d 1573 (Onondaga). Read, J.

  2. People v. McVay

    2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 4963 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016)

    lea of guilty (see People v Seeber, 4 NY3d 780; People v Dazzo, 92 AD3d 796; People v Caruso, 88 AD3d 809). "When a defendant moves to withdraw a guilty plea, the nature and extent of the fact-finding inquiry rest[s] largely in the discretion of the Judge to whom the motion is made' and a hearing will be granted only in rare instances" (People v Brown, 14 NY3d 113, 116, quoting People v Tinsley, 35 NY2d 926, 927; see People v Smith, 54 AD3d 879). Here, the record supports the County Court's determination that the defendant's plea was entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently (see People v Fiumefreddo, 82 NY2d 536, 543; see also People v Baker, 104 AD3d 783). The defendant's postplea assertion that he pleaded guilty "because of duress" is belied by his statements under oath at his plea allocution, and is insufficient to warrant withdrawal of his plea or a hearing (see People v Innocent, 132 AD3d 696; People v Dazzo, 92 AD3d at 796-797; People v Caruso, 88 AD3d at 810; see also People v Jones, 71 AD3d 1573). Finally, there is no merit to the defendant's contention that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel (see People v McGuire, 122 AD3d 947, 948; People v Haywood, 122 AD3d 769, 770). LEVENTHAL, J.P., DICKERSON, SGROI and COHEN, JJ., concur.

  3. People v. McVay

    140 A.D.3d 1090 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016)   Cited 16 times

    Here, the record supports the County Court's determination that the defendant's plea was entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently (see People v. Fiumefreddo, 82 N.Y.2d 536, 543, 605 N.Y.S.2d 671, 626 N.E.2d 646 ; see also People v. Baker, 104 A.D.3d 783, 960 N.Y.S.2d 511 ). The defendant's postplea assertion that he pleaded guilty “because of duress” is belied by his statements under oath at his plea allocution, and is insufficient to warrant withdrawal of his plea or a hearing (see People v. Innocent, 132 A.D.3d 696, 17 N.Y.S.3d 505 ; People v. Dazzo, 92 A.D.3d at 796–797, 938 N.Y.S.2d 446 ; People v. Caruso, 88 A.D.3d at 810, 930 N.Y.S.2d 668 ; see also People v. Jones, 71 A.D.3d 1573, 896 N.Y.S.2d 787 ). Finally, there is no merit to the defendant's contention that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel (see People v. McGuire, 122 A.D.3d 947, 948, 997 N.Y.S.2d 468 ; People v. Haywood, 122 A.D.3d 769, 770, 996 N.Y.S.2d 137 ).LEVENTHAL, J.P., DICKERSON, SGROI and COHEN, JJ., concur.

  4. People v. Gumpton

    81 A.D.3d 1441 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011)   Cited 5 times

    To the extent that the contention of defendant that she was denied effective assistance of counsel is not forfeited by the plea ( see People v Santos, 37 AD3d 1141, lv denied 8 NY3d 950), it is lacking in merit ( see generally People v Ford, 86 NY2d 397, 404). Defendant's assertion that defense counsel was ineffective is contradicted by her statements during the plea colloquy ( see People v Harris, 63 AD3d 1653, lv denied 13 NY3d 744). Moreover, we note that "[d]efense counsel negotiated `an advantageous plea and nothing in the record casts doubt on the apparent effectiveness of counsel'" ( People v Gross, 50 AD3d 1577, quoting Ford, 86 NY2d at 404). Defendant failed to preserve for our review her contention that the People failed to place on the record at the time of the plea the proof they intended to offer at trial inasmuch as she did not move to withdraw her plea or to vacate the judgment of conviction on that ground ( see generally People v Jones, 71 AD3d 1573, 1574, lv denied 15 NY3d 775). In any event, during the plea proceeding defendant unequivocally admitted the elements of the crimes to which she pleaded guilty, and "the court's inquiry was sufficient to demonstrate that [her] plea was knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily entered" ( People v Pane, 292 AD2d 850, 850, lv denied 98 NY2d 653). Finally, the sentence is not unduly harsh or severe.

  5. People v. Dozier

    74 A.D.3d 1808 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010)   Cited 5 times

    Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him, upon his guilty plea, of two counts of attempted murder in the second degree (Penal Law §§ 110.00, 125.25). We reject the contention of defendant that Supreme Court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea inasmuch as the record does not support his assertion that the plea was the product of coercion ( see People v Jones, 71 AD3d 1573; People v Spikes, 28 AD3d 1101, 1102, lv denied 7 NY3d 818). Furthermore, the record "establish [es] that the defendant understood that the right to appeal is separate and distinct from those rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty," and we thus reject defendant's challenge to the validity of the waiver of the right to appeal ( People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256). That valid waiver encompasses defendant's challenge to the severity of the sentence ( see id.).