Id. at 241. This presumption does not apply, however, where it is "flatly contradicted by the record." Id.; People v. Waldrop, 353 Ill.App.3d 244, 250 (2004); People v. Johnson, 2022 IL App (1st) 190258-U, ¶ 37. In this case, the record shows that the phone records at issue existed at the time of trial, and were in trial counsel's possession.

¶ 40 Likewise, in People v. Johnson, 2022 IL App (1st) 190258-U, ¶ 38 and People v. Atkins, 2022 IL App (1st) 200302-U,

¶ 61 While the State is correct that ordinarily we "may reasonably presume that post-conviction counsel made a concerted effort to obtain affidavits [or other documentary evidence] in support of the post-conviction claims but was unable to do so," this presumption does not apply where it is "flatly contradicted by the record." Johnson, 154 Ill.2d at 241; People v. Waldrop, 353 Ill.App.3d 244, 250 (2004); People v. Johnson, 2022 IL App (1st) 190258-U, ¶ 37; People v. Atkins, 2022 IL App (1st) 200302-U, ¶ 27; People v. Patterson, 2022 IL App (3d) 200099-U, ¶ 11.

As a result, defendant must show how he was prejudiced by the claimed errors of counsel. See Zareski, 2017 IL App (1st) 150836, ¶ 61 (finding if a potential claim had no merit, the defendant could not receive postconviction relief on that claim, regardless of whether postconviction counsel should have presented it earlier, better, or at all). ¶ 65 We note defendant also asks that we adopt the view from People v. Williams, 2023 IL App (5th) 220185-U, ¶ 21, and People v. Johnson, 2022 IL App (1st) 190258-U, ¶¶ 33-43, which departed from Zareski and remanded when a lack of prejudice could not be determined from the record due to postconviction counsel's failure to properly shape the defendant's claims or include proper support for the claims

People v. Zareski, 2017 IL App (1st) 150836, ¶ 59; People v. Johnson, 2022 IL App (1st) 190258-U, ¶ 34. The primary inquiry when evaluating counsel's performance is whether the petitioner was prejudiced.

¶ 21 After careful consideration of the Illinois decisions relevant to this issue, we conclude that we need not decide whether to follow Zareski, because we conclude that even if we were to assume, arguendo, that Zareski was correctly decided and should govern this appeal, the reasoning put forward in an unpublished decision by our colleagues in the First District persuades us that in certain rare and limited circumstances-the overall validity of Zareski notwithstanding-it is appropriate to depart from the Zareski requirement that a defendant must establish prejudice as a result of the allegedly unreasonable performance of retained counsel. In People v. Johnson, 2022 IL App (1st) 190258-U, ¶¶ 33-43, our colleagues in the First District concluded that, the well-reasoned analysis of Zareski notwithstanding, if it is clear from the record that the defendant did not receive reasonable assistance of postconviction counsel, and it is equally clear that, because of a paucity of the record caused by postconviction counsel's lack of reasonable assistance, the appellate court cannot tell whether the defendant was prejudiced thereby, the appropriate remedy is for the appellate court to reverse the order dismissing the petition, and to remand for further second-stage proceedings with new counsel. The Johnson court concluded that remand was required in that case because (1) no affidavits or other documents were attached to the petition, and no explanation was given for their absence, as well as because (2) "counsel's pleadings, statements, unreasonable delays, and general performance throughout" the proceedings amounted to "a multitude of errors."