Opinion
744 KA 14-01624
10-01-2021
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT, v. RONDELL JOHNSON, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
TIMOTHY P. DONAHER, PUBLIC DEFENDER, ROCHESTER (BENJAMIN L. NELSON OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. RONDELL JOHNSON, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT PRO SE. SANDRA DOORLEY, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (LISA GRAY OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
TIMOTHY P. DONAHER, PUBLIC DEFENDER, ROCHESTER (BENJAMIN L. NELSON OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
RONDELL JOHNSON, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT PRO SE.
SANDRA DOORLEY, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (LISA GRAY OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., PERADOTTO, CURRAN, BANNISTER, AND DEJOSEPH, JJ.
Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Monroe County (Thomas E. Moran, J.), rendered June 16, 2014. The judgment convicted defendant upon a jury verdict of robbery in the first degree, robbery in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (two counts).
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously reversed on the law and a new trial is granted in accordance with the following memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon a jury verdict of robbery in the first degree (Penal Law § 160.15 [4]), robbery in the second degree (§ 160.10 [1]), and two counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (§ 265.03 [1] [b]; [3]). In his pro se supplemental brief, defendant contends that the police lacked reasonable suspicion to stop, detain and frisk him, and thus Supreme Court erred in refusing to suppress tangible evidence obtained as a result of that police conduct. We reject that contention. A police officer testified at the suppression hearing that he received a radio dispatch reporting a robbery, providing a description of two suspects who were armed with handguns, and providing the global position system tracking location of a cellular phone taken from a victim during the robbery. Within seconds of the radio dispatch, the officer arrived at that location and stopped defendant, who matched the general description from the dispatch call. Under these circumstances, the stop and ensuing detention and frisk of defendant were supported by the requisite reasonable suspicion of criminal activity (see People v Hicks, 68 N.Y.2d 234, 240-242 [1986]; People v Thomas, 167 A.D.3d 1519, 1520 [4th Dept 2018], lv denied 32 N.Y.3d 1210 [2019]; see generally People v De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210, 223 [1976]). In addition, we reject the further contention of defendant in his pro se supplemental brief that the showup identification procedure was unduly suggestive. Defendant was apprehended near the crime scene within minutes of the crime and the showup procedure took place shortly thereafter (see People v Duuvon, 77 N.Y.2d 541, 543 [1991]; People v Wilson, 104 A.D.3d 1231, 1232 [4th Dept 2013], lv denied 21 N.Y.3d 1011 [2013], reconsideration denied 21 N.Y.3d 1078 [2013]). Furthermore, the fact that defendant was handcuffed and accompanied by a uniformed officer did not render the showup procedure unduly suggestive (see People v Newton, 24 A.D.3d 1287, 1288 [4th Dept 2005], lv denied 6 N.Y.3d 836 [2006]; People v Ponder, 19 A.D.3d 1041, 1043 [4th Dept 2005], lv denied 5 N.Y.3d 809 [2005]).
However, we agree with defendant's contention in his main brief, as the People correctly concede, that the court committed reversible error when it "negotiated and entered into a [plea] agreement with a codefendant[, ] requiring that individual to testify against defendant in exchange for a more favorable sentence" (People v Towns, 33 N.Y.3d 326, 328 [2019]). We conclude that, "by assuming the function of an interested party and deviating from its own role as a neutral arbiter, the trial court denied defendant his due process right to '[a] fair trial in a fair tribunal'" (id. at 333). We therefore reverse the judgment and grant a new trial before a different justice (see People v Lawhorn, 178 A.D.3d 1466, 1467 [4th Dept 2019]).
Defendant's remaining contention in his main brief is academic in light of our determination.