Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. 08F03643
BLEASE, Acting P. J.
Defendant Sherman Johnson was convicted after pleading no contest to failing to register as a sex offender within five days of his birthday (Pen. Code, § 290.018, subd. (b)). He now appeals, claiming the trial court erred in including in the abstract of judgment a $242.29 booking fee and a $27.22 classification fee that were not orally pronounced by the court in defendant’s presence. The People concede the error and seek remand.
We agree the court erred, but disagree that remand is necessary; instead, we shall strike the fees not imposed at sentencing and otherwise affirm the judgment.
The facts of defendant’s offense are not relevant to this appeal.
Before defendant entered his no contest plea, the court explained the consequences of doing so, including that defendant would receive a stipulated prison term of three years and dismissal of a strike allegation, “[i]n terms of the further consequences, there would be a restitution fine of not less than [$]200 nor more than $10,000, a potential fine of $10,000.”
In pronouncing judgment and imposing sentence, the trial court ordered defendant to pay a restitution fine of $600 (Pen. Code, § 1202.4) and a parole revocation fine of $600, stayed pending successful completion of parole. (Pen. Code, § 1202.45.) The court then stated: “There will be other inclusions having to do with fees from being processed through the justice system which will be part of the commitment order to state prison.”
The record contains no minute order of defendant’s sentencing proceeding. However, the abstract of judgment indicates that, in addition to the two $600 fines imposed orally from the bench, defendant must also pay a $242.29 booking fee, a $27.22 classification fee, and a $20 court security fee.
On appeal, defendant asks us to strike the booking and classification fees.
Generally, where there is a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of judgment and the minute order or the abstract of judgment, the oral pronouncement controls. (People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185–186; People v. Mesa (1975) 14 Cal.3d 466, 471.) “‘Rendition of judgment is an oral pronouncement.’ Entering the judgment in the minutes being a clerical function [citation], a discrepancy between the judgment as orally pronounced and as entered in the minutes is presumably the result of clerical error. Nor is the abstract of judgment controlling. ‘The abstract of judgment is not the judgment of conviction. By its very nature, definition and terms [citation] it cannot add to or modify the judgment which it purports to digest or summarize.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Mesa, supra, 14 Cal.3d at p. 471.)
“The reason for requiring a minute entry of the judgment in a criminal case is to furnish a concise record showing the crime of which the defendant has been convicted and the punishment imposed, which will protect him against a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. [Citations.]” (People v. Blackman (1963) 223 Cal.App.2d 303, 307; see also People v. Wilshire Ins. Co. (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 521, 532.) Here, the clerk’s minutes contain no record of what occurred at the change of plea hearing.
Because the $242.29 booking fee and $27.22 classification fee were not orally pronounced, they are not part of the judgment and should not have been included in the abstract of judgment. (People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 387-388.) Nor was the court’s oblique reference at sentencing to “other inclusions having to do with fees from being processed through the justice system” adequate to justify their inclusion. (People v. High (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1192, 1200 [“Although we recognize that a detailed recitation of all the fees, fines and penalties on the record may be tedious, California law does not authorize shortcuts”].)
Accordingly, we shall direct the trial court to correct the abstract of judgment. (People v. Mitchell, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 185 [appellate courts may order correction of abstract of judgment that does not accurately reflect the oral judgment of the sentencing court].)
The People’s request that we remand this case and allow the trial court another opportunity to impose the booking and classification fees is not well taken. The People forfeited their right to argue on appeal that these fines should be imposed when the prosecutor failed to ask the trial court to clarify what fees or fines it intended to impose. (See People v. Tillman (2000) 22 Cal.4th 300, 302-303 [“‘Although the court is required to impose sentence in a lawful manner, counsel is charged with understanding, advocating, and clarifying permissible sentencing choices at the hearing’”], quoting People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331.) Nor does People v. Zackery compel us to remand the matter, as the People suggest. Unlike the restitution fine at issue in People v. Zackery, the administrative fees for booking and classification of inmates are not mandatory. (Compare Gov. Code, § 29550.2 with People v. Zackery, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 389.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The trial court is directed to correct the abstract of judgment by deleting the $242.29 booking fee and the $27.22 classification fee. The court shall forward a certified copy of the corrected abstract of judgment to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
We concur: NICHOLSON, J., CANTIL-SAKAUYE, J.