Opinion
May 23, 1988
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Demakos, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant contends that the trial court committed reversible error in omitting the words "moral certainty" from its circumstantial evidence charge to the jury. However, those words are not necessarily required so long as the jury is instructed in substance that it must appear that the inference of guilt is the only one that can fairly and reasonably be drawn from the facts, and that the evidence excludes beyond a reasonable doubt every reasonable hypothesis of innocence (see, People v Sanchez, 61 N.Y.2d 1022, 1023). In the case at bar, the court's charge followed the sample charge contained in New York Criminal Jury Instructions (see, 1 CJI[NY] 9.10) and adequately informed the jury of its responsibility in a circumstantial evidence case.
Since the defendant did not raise the issue of justification, the trial court correctly precluded the defendant's father from testifying as to the deceased's reputation for violence (cf., People v Miller, 39 N.Y.2d 543). Nor did the court unfairly marshal the evidence. Here, nearly all the testimony adduced at trial pointed to the defendant's guilt while few facts emerged that could be considered exculpatory (see, People v Moore, 129 A.D.2d 590, lv denied 70 N.Y.2d 651). Thus, the court's recitation of the evidence was accurate and fair.
Finally, we conclude that there was no reasonable view of the evidence to justify a charge of manslaughter in the second degree. There was not sufficient evidence of intoxication in the record on which a reasonable person could entertain a doubt as to defendant's intent (see, People v Perry, 61 N.Y.2d 849; People v Iturrino, 117 A.D.2d 502, lv denied 67 N.Y.2d 885). Weinstein, J.P., Rubin, Spatt and Sullivan, JJ., concur.