Opinion
338 KA 17–02055
04-24-2020
THE LEGAL AID BUREAU OF BUFFALO, INC., BUFFALO (BARBARA J. DAVIES OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT–APPELLANT. JOHN J. FLYNN, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, BUFFALO (MATTHEW B. POWERS OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
THE LEGAL AID BUREAU OF BUFFALO, INC., BUFFALO (BARBARA J. DAVIES OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT–APPELLANT.
JOHN J. FLYNN, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, BUFFALO (MATTHEW B. POWERS OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., CARNI, NEMOYER, CURRAN, AND BANNISTER, JJ.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.
Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of manslaughter in the first degree ( Penal Law § 125.20[1] ), defendant contends that Supreme Court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea on the ground that defense counsel coerced him into pleading guilty (see generally People v. Gast, 114 A.D.3d 1270, 1271, 980 N.Y.S.2d 221 [4th Dept. 2014], lv denied 22 N.Y.3d 1198, 986 N.Y.S.2d 419, 9 N.E.3d 914 [2014] ). We disagree.
" ‘In the absence of some evidence of innocence, fraud, or mistake in the inducement of the plea, the decision whether to permit a defendant to withdraw a plea of guilty rests solely within the court's discretion’ " ( People v. Anderson, 63 A.D.3d 1617, 1618, 879 N.Y.S.2d 784 [4th Dept. 2009], lv denied 13 N.Y.3d 858, 891 N.Y.S.2d 692, 920 N.E.2d 97 [2009] ). Additionally, " ‘the nature and extent of the fact-finding inquiry rest[s] largely in the discretion of the Judge to whom the motion is made and a hearing will be granted only in rare instances’ " ( People v. Manor, 27 N.Y.3d 1012, 1013, 35 N.Y.S.3d 272, 54 N.E.3d 1143 [2016] ). Here, the court granted defendant a hearing on his motion, and thus the court was entitled to decide the motion by resolving any issues of credibility that arose therein (see People v. Henderson, 148 A.D.3d 1779, 1780, 50 N.Y.S.3d 768 [4th Dept. 2017] ). We conclude that, based on the testimony adduced at the hearing, the court did not abuse its discretion in determining that defense counsel had not coerced defendant into entering his guilty plea such that the plea was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered (see generally Gast, 114 A.D.3d at 1271, 980 N.Y.S.2d 221 ).
Although we agree with defendant that his purported waiver of the right to appeal is invalid (see People v. Thomas, 34 N.Y.3d 545, 567-68, 122 N.Y.S.3d 226, 144 N.E.3d 970, 2019 N.Y. Slip Op. 08545, *6-7 [2019] ), we reject defendant's contentions that the court abused its discretion in denying him youthful offender status (see generally People v. Randleman, 60 A.D.3d 1358, 1358, 876 N.Y.S.2d 586 [4th Dept. 2009], lv denied 12 N.Y.3d 919, 884 N.Y.S.2d 700, 912 N.E.2d 1081 [2009] ), and that his sentence is unduly harsh and severe.