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People v. Johnson

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE
Sep 5, 2012
G045918 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 5, 2012)

Opinion

G045918

09-05-2012

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. RAYMOND ANTHONY JOHNSON, Defendant and Appellant.

Gerald J. Miller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, William M. Wood and Bradley A. Weinreb, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.


NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

(Super. Ct. No. 11HF2248)


OPINION

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Stephanie George, Judge. Affirmed.

Gerald J. Miller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, William M. Wood and Bradley A. Weinreb, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

This is an appeal from a judgment based on a guilty plea. Appellant contends he was denied equal protection because he was not given the benefit of a statutory amendment that increases the rate at which defendants can earn conduct credit while they are in jail prior to sentencing. Finding no equal protection violation, we affirm the judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In September 2011, appellant possessed morphine and Oxycontin and was charged with two counts of possessing a controlled substance. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a).) He initially pleaded not guilty, but on October 12, he changed his plea to guilty pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement. Per that agreement, the court suspended imposition of sentence and placed appellant on formal probation. The court also ordered appellant to serve 120 days in jail. It awarded him 60 days of presentence credit, based on 40 days of actual custody, plus 20 days of conduct credit.

DISCUSSION

In 2011, the Legislature amended Penal Code section 4019 to allow jail inmates to receive conduct credit (for work and good behavior) at a rate of two days for every two days spent in actual custody. (Pen. Code, § 4019, subds. (b), (c) & (f), as amended by Stats. 2011, ch. 15, § 482.) Using that formula, appellant would have been entitled to 40 days conduct credit, instead of 20. However, the 2011 amendment did not become operative until October 1, 2011, and by its terms, it only applies "prospectively" to jail inmates who are confined for a crime that was committed on or after that date. (Pen. Code, § 4019, subd. (h), as amended by Stats. 2011, ch. 39, § 53.) Appellant acknowledges that, because he committed his crimes in September 2011, he does not come within the ambit of the 2011 amendment. But, he insists it would be a violation of equal protection if he were denied the benefit of that amendment. We disagree.

As our Supreme Court recently explained, in order to establish a violation of equal protection, it must be shown "'"that the state has adopted a classification that affects two or more similarly situated groups in an unequal manner."' [Citation.] 'This initial inquiry is not whether persons are similarly situated for all purposes, but "whether they are similarly situated for purposes of the law challenged."' [Citation.]" (People v. Brown (2012) 54 Cal.4th 314, 328 (Brown).)

Brown addressed a 2009 amendment to Penal Code section 4019 that, like the 2011 amendment at issue here, prospectively increased the rate at which jail inmates may receive presentence conduct credits. (Brown, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 318.) Recognizing the purpose of conduct credits is to provide inmates with an incentive for good behavior, Brown ruled that purpose is "not served by rewarding prisoners who served time before the incentives took effect and thus could not have modified their behavior in response. That prisoners who served time before and after [the 2009 amendment] took effect are not similarly situated necessarily follows." (Id. at pp. 328-329.)

In so ruling, Brown distinguished the two cases appellant relies on here, People v. Sage (1980) 26 Cal.3d 498 and In re Kapperman (1974) 11 Cal.3d 542, on the basis Kapperman involved custody credits, not conduct credits, and Sage failed to consider the fact "that conduct credits, by their nature, must apply prospectively to motivate good behavior." (Brown, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 330.) Given that fact, it is abundantly clear that appellant is not similarly situated to persons who committed crimes after the 2011 amendment to Penal Code section 4019 became operative. Therefore, he is not entitled to the benefit of that amendment as a matter of equal protection. (People v. Lara (2012) 54 Cal.4th 896, 906, fn. 9; People v. Ellis (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1546.)

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

BEDSWORTH, J. WE CONCUR: O'LEARY, P. J. MOORE, J.


Summaries of

People v. Johnson

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE
Sep 5, 2012
G045918 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 5, 2012)
Case details for

People v. Johnson

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. RAYMOND ANTHONY JOHNSON…

Court:COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE

Date published: Sep 5, 2012

Citations

G045918 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 5, 2012)