A legislative body has the power to articulate reasonable definitions of terms within a statute and may broaden or narrow the meaning that terms otherwise would have. People v. Johnson, 231 Ill. App. 3d 412, 419-22, 595 N.E.2d 1381, 1387-88 (1992). When the General Assembly has defined the terms relating to fraud, a court cannot look beyond the statute to determine what it means to "inten[d] to defraud" or for a document to be "capable of defrauding."
It is "the well-established rule in Illinois that, in testing the sufficiency of a multicount indictment, elements missing from one count may be supplied by another count." People v. Johnson, 231 Ill. App.3d 412, 423 (1992). Here, count I supplies the missing element, stating that defendant "drove a motor vehicle into a motor vehicle occupied by Cozette D. Jones and Albert L. Weems, knowing such act created a strong probability of death to [the victims], thereby causing the death of Cozette D. Jones."
It did not matter that the jurors could have found that Hallowell had committed the uncharged felony of first-degree assault. See Cordovi v. State , 63 Md. App. 455, 471, 492 A.2d 1328 (1985) (multicount indictment "must be read in its entirety, not as a series of unconnected counts"; indictment was sufficient because overlapping factual allegations in the lead count of second-degree rape and the lower count of second-degree sexual offense compelled the conclusion that the mode of commission of the crimes was the same, even though not specified); see also Rudder v. State , 181 Md. App. 426, 453, 956 A.2d 791 (2008) (with multicount indictment, in the event of doubt as to which substantive count a single conspiracy count relates, there is a rebuttable presumption that it relates to the flagship, most serious, count); People v. Johnson , 231 Ill.App.3d 412, 172 Ill.Dec. 711, 595 N.E.2d 1381, 1390 (1992) (upholding multicount indictment because lead counts of physical aggravated battery against individual nursing home residents were sufficient to inform defendant that subsequent count for statutory crime of abuse of a long-term facility resident was predicated on acts of physical, not mental or sexual, abuse). We conclude from these cases that, when, by multicount indictment, the State charges a defendant with a lead felony/crime of violence count (or counts) and with use of a firearm in the commission of a felony/crime of violence, and it is not facially evident that the use of a firearm crime stemmed from an entirely separate incident, the indictment operates as a whole, and the predicate crime for the compound crime of use of a firearm takes its meaning from the lead counts.
Moreover, we find no reversible error in this comment, as this court reviews the trial court's judgment, not its reasoning; the trial court's judgment may be sustained for any appropriate reason, regardless of whether the trial court relied on those grounds and regardless of whether the trial court's reasoning was correct. See People v. Johnson, 231 Ill. App. 3d 412, 419 (1992). As noted, there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the trial court's ultimate determination. Based on the evidence, we cannot say that the opposite conclusion—that defendant was insane at the time of the offenses—was clearly evident.
¶ 108 Defendant also makes a brief argument suggesting the State needed to charge him with three different counts of threatening a police official if it intended to present its three alternative theories to the jury. In support of this argument, defendant provides a parenthetical citation to People v. Johnson, 231 Ill. App. 3d 412, 424, 595 N.E.2d 1381, 1390 (1992), for the proposition duplicity occurs when two or more offenses are charged in the same count. Defendant fails to explain why the charge in this case would amount to two or more offenses being charged in the same count as opposed to a single offense that could be established in more than one way.
" 'It is a well-established rule in Illinois that all counts of a multiple-count indictment should be read as a whole and that elements missing from one count of an indictment may be supplied by another count.' " Carey, 2018 IL 121371, ¶ 25 (quoting People v. Morris, 135 Ill. 2d 540, 544 (1990)); see People v. Johnson, 231 Ill. App. 3d 412, 424 (1992) (finding that separate counts of a multi-count indictment apprised the defendant of the type of conduct charged by an allegedly ambiguous count of the indictment).¶ 14 Defendant contends that the charging instrument did not advise him as to the nature of the resisting or obstructing charge because it was couched in the language of the statute and did not specify the type of conduct for which he was being charged.
Even if we accept defendant's contention that the trial court misread his pro se petition and applied the wrong standard, we review the judgment, not the reasoning of the trial court; we may affirm the trial court's judgment "for any appropriate reason regardless of whether the trial court relied on those grounds." People v. Johnson, 231 Ill. App. 3d 412, 419 (1992). As previously discussed, defendant's petition failed to set forth the gist of a constitutional claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, and therefore the dismissal was proper.
See Morris, 236 Ill. 2d at 366 (" [An] admonition is sufficient if an ordinary person in the circumstances of the accused would understand it to convey the required warning.") Finally, we review the judgment, not the reasoning of the trial court; we may affirm the trial court's judgment "for any appropriate reason regardless of whether the trial court relied on those grounds." People v. Johnson, 231 Ill. App. 3d 412, 419 (1992). Even taking all of defendant's assertions to be true, the court's admonishment as to MSR substantially complied with Rule 402.
¶ 37 " 'Duplicity' occurs when two or more offenses are charged in the same count, not from charging a single offense in more than one way or where different acts contribute to the same offense." People v. Johnson, 231 Ill. App. 3d 412, 424, 595 N.E.2d 1381, 1390 (1992). A duplicitous indictment does not set forth the nature and elements of the charge with certainty, thereby rendering the complaint void.
The TIF images met this criterion, but the original images and lost files did not. Our review, however, “is of the trial court's judgment, not its reasoning,” and so “the trial court's judgment may be sustained for any appropriate reason regardless of whether the trial court relied on those grounds and regardless of whether the trial court's reasoning was correct.” People v. Johnson, 231 Ill.App.3d 412, 419, 172 Ill.Dec. 711, 595 N.E.2d 1381 (1992). As our preceding discussion makes clear, the trial court's view of possession was too narrow, as TIF images can serve as evidence of past possession of original images that were no longer accessible to the defendant at the time of his arrest.