People v. Johnson

16 Citing cases

  1. People v. Polito

    315 N.E.2d 84 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974)   Cited 4 times
    In Polito, the court found that the defendant, who had previously been adjudicated incompetent, had an absolute statutory right under section 104-2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 38, par. 104-2) (repealed by Pub. Act 77-2097, effective Jan. 1, 1973) to a trial by jury on the issue of restoration.

    He argues the adjudication of competency was invalid because he could not waive a jury trial while under an incompetency judgment and his counsel could not do it for him. In support of his contention the defendant relies on the decision in People v. Johnson (1973), 15 Ill. App.3d 680, wherein the appellate court reversed a conviction for armed robbery on the ground that no valid restoration hearing adjudging the defendant competent to stand trial was held subsequent to a hearing adjudging him incompetent. The State argues the Johnson opinion is erroneous and urges us to disregard it.

  2. People v. Greene

    102 Ill. App. 3d 639 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981)   Cited 29 times
    Finding the fitness hearing was insufficient where the parties stipulated not only to the contents of experts' reports, but also stipulated to the fact that the defendant was fit for trial

    This presumption continues until there has been a valid subsequent hearing adjudicating him fit. People v. Williams (1980), 92 Ill. App.3d 608, 612; People v. Johnson (1973), 15 Ill. App.3d 680, 685, 687, 304 N.E.2d 688; People v. McKinstray (1964), 30 Ill.2d 611, 617, 198 N.E.2d 829. • 1, 2 The defendant contends that the May 27, 1977, pretrial hearing accorded him was not a valid or sufficient fitness hearing.

  3. People v. Lewis

    103 Ill. 2d 111 (Ill. 1984)   Cited 48 times
    Holding that a finding of fitness did not offend defendant's due process rights where the court relied not only on stipulations that the expert's would testify defendant was fit, but also on its observations of defendant and a review of the psychological report

    Defendants submit that the appellate court's decisions are consistent with People v. Reeves (1952), 412 Ill. 555, and its progeny. See, e.g., People v. Johnson (1973), 15 Ill. App.3d 680. In People v. Reeves (1952), 412 Ill. 555, 560-61, in reversing a finding, based on a directed verdict, that defendant had been restored to sanity, the court said:

  4. Weeks v. State

    257 So. 3d 894 (Ala. Crim. App. 2018)   Cited 2 times
    In Weeks v. State, 257 So. 3d 894 (Ala. Crim. App. 2018), the court expressly stated that the only issue on appeal was the defendant's competency to stand trial; it said nothing at all about the defendant's specific intent to commit the attempted first-degree assault crime.

    ial judge regarding defendant's present sanity or competence to stand trial, it becomes his duty to certify the defendant for a sanity hearing; the matter is jurisdictional and cannot be waived by defendant or his counsel’); Miller v. State, 498 S.W.2d 79 (Mo. App. 1973) (trial counsel held to be ineffective because he purported to waive a competency determination and allow the defendant to plead guilty); Demos v. Johnson, 835 F.2d 840 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1023, 108 S.Ct. 1998, 100 L.Ed. 2d 229 (Ala. 1988) (despite defendant's statement that he was capable of assisting in his defense, the failure of the trial court ‘to grant a psychiatric examination or to make further inquiry into the accused's competence constituted a Pate violation and denied him a fair trial’ under federal and Alabama law); People v. Lowe, 109 A.D.2d 300, 491 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1985) (incompetent defendant cannot waive safeguards enacted to ensure that an incompetent person cannot be convicted); People v. Johnson, 15 Ill. App. 3d 680, 304 N.E.2d 688 (1973) (neither defendant nor trial counsel could waive defendant's right to jury trial in restoration hearing to determine the defendant's competency); Adams v. Wainwright, 764 F.2d 1356 (11th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1073, 106 S.Ct. 834, 88 L.Ed. 2d 805 (1986) ; (right to a competency hearing cannot [be] waived) )."Roy, 680 So.2d at 938–39.

  5. People v. Gillon

    2016 Ill. App. 4th 140801 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016)   Cited 17 times
    In Gillon, the evaluation evaluating defendant's fitness was conducted only two weeks after he was found unfit by the circuit court.

    " Reeves , 412 Ill. at 561, 107 N.E.2d 861.See also People v. Johnson , 15 Ill.App.3d 680, 686, 304 N.E.2d 688 (1973).¶ 32 III. CONCLUSION

  6. Roy v. State

    680 So. 2d 936 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996)   Cited 6 times

    of the trial judge regarding defendant's present sanity or competence to stand trial, it becomes his duty to certify the defendant for a sanity hearing; the matter is jurisdictional and cannot be waived by defendant or his counsel"); Miller v. State, 498 S.W.2d 79 (Mo.App. 1973) (trial counsel held to be ineffective because he purported to waive a competency determination and allow the defendant to plead guilty); Demos v. Johnson, 835 F.2d 840 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1023, 108 S.Ct. 1998, 100 L.Ed.2d 229 (Ala. 1988). (despite defendant's statement that he was capable of assisting in his defense, the failure of the trial court "to grant a psychiatric examination or to make further inquiry into the accused's competence constituted a Pate violation and denied him a fair trial" under federal and Alabama law); People v. Lowe, 109 A.D.2d 300, 491 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1985) (incompetent defendant cannot waive safeguards enacted to ensure that an incompetent person cannot be convicted); People v. Johnson, 15 Ill. App.3d 680, 304 N.E.2d 688 (1973) (neither defendant nor trial counsel could waive defendant's right to jury trial in restoration hearing to determine the defendant's competency); Adams v. Wainwright, 764 F.2d 1356 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1073, 106 S.Ct. 834, 88 L.Ed.2d 805 (1986); (right to a competency hearing cannot waived).

  7. People v. Thompson

    158 Ill. App. 3d 860 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987)   Cited 24 times
    Finding that whether the trial court questioned the defendant directly is a factor, although not dispositive

    • 2 A prior adjudication of unfitness raises the presumption that a defendant remains unfit and the presumption continues until there has been a valid hearing finding him fit. ( People v. Williams (1980), 92 Ill. App.3d 608, 612, 415 N.E.2d 1192.) This presumption continues until there has been a valid subsequent hearing adjudicating him fit. ( People v. Johnson (1973), 15 Ill. App.3d 680, 685, 687, 304 N.E.2d 688.) Given this presumption of unfitness, a finding of fitness may not be based on a stipulation to psychiatric conclusions. ( People v. Greene (1981), 102 Ill. App.3d 639, 643, 430 N.E.2d 219.)

  8. People v. Lewis

    115 Ill. App. 3d 389 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983)   Cited 9 times

    " 412 Ill. 555, 560. Further, Illinois courts have held that an initial adjudication of unfitness creates a presumption that the defendant remains unfit which continues until there has been a valid subsequent hearing adjudicating him fit. ( People v. Greene (1981), 102 Ill. App.3d 639, 430 N.E.2d 219; People v. Williams (1980), 92 Ill. App.3d 608, 415 N.E.2d 1192; People v. Johnson (1973), 15 Ill. App.3d 680, 304 N.E.2d 688.) The procedural requirements of a restoration hearing are equally as stringent as those of an initial competency hearing and the trial record must affirmatively show the exercise of judicial discretion where a finding of fitness is made.

  9. People v. Williams

    415 N.E.2d 1192 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980)   Cited 11 times

    ( People v. Lang (1975), 26 Ill. App.3d 648, 653, 325 N.E.2d 305; People v. Santoro (1973), 13 Ill. App.3d 426, 301 N.E.2d 175; People ex rel. Suddeth v. Rednour (1965), 33 Ill.2d 278, 285, 211 N.E.2d 281.) This presumption continues until there has been a valid subsequent hearing adjudicating him fit. ( People v. Johnson (1973), 15 Ill. App.3d 680, 685, 687, 304 N.E.2d 688; People v. McKinstray (1964), 30 Ill.2d 611, 617, 198 N.E.2d 829; People v. Reeves (1952), 412 Ill. 555, 560, 107 N.E.2d 861.) Although there is no longer a statutory right to a jury trial in a restoration hearing (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 1005-5-2(b); People v. Manning (1979), 76 Ill.2d 235, 390 N.E.2d 903), all of the previously cited cases envision an adversarial hearing and have disapproved of verdicts of fitness based solely upon unsupported stipulations, agreements pleas made by the accused or his counsel. • 2 Here, the People argue that there was a judicial finding of fitness on November 9, 1978, but an examination of the transcript of the proceedings for that date does not support this argument.

  10. Brown v. Sexner

    85 Ill. App. 3d 139 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980)   Cited 21 times
    In Brown v. Sexner (1980), 85 Ill. App.3d 139, there were no specific time requirements, and the plaintiff contributed to the time delay by failing to secure counsel.

    Delay so occasioned cannot be relied on as error. See People v. Johnson (1973), 15 Ill. App.3d 680, 304 N.E.2d 688. After the denial of Brown's motion for reinstatement and back pay, he filed other prehearing motions which substantially contributed to the delay in initiating a hearing.