People v. Johnson

7 Citing cases

  1. People v. Hernandez

    2016 Ill. App. 130366 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016)

    ¶ 13 Defendant argues that his petition presented an arguable claim that trial counsel's advice, that a bench trial and a jury trial were the same thing, was objectively unreasonable because a jury trial helps "protect the criminal defendant against potentially arbitrary judges" (Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 547-48 (2000)), and there is "no jury at a bench trial—the trial judge is the trier of fact" (People v. Johnson, 333 Ill. App. 3d 935, 946 (2001) (Welch, J., dissenting). Defendant reasons that trial counsel's statement to the court that defendant wanted a bench trial does not shed light on defendant's understanding of this difference.

  2. Maag v. Illinois Coalition for Jobs, Growth & Prosperity

    368 Ill. App. 3d 844 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006)   Cited 22 times
    Finding statements not actionable in their broader context, because the statements were too vague to be verifiable

    Judge Maag reduced a criminal's sentence for a brutal stabbing because he didn't think it was `exceptionally brutal' and `wantonly cruel' . . . the victim was stabbed in the face, neck and chest with a butcher knife. People v. Romell Johnson, Docket DONo. 5-99-0637, 333 Ill.App.3d 935Letting a Murderer Back on the Streets

  3. People v. Townsell

    336 Ill. App. 3d 340 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003)   Cited 5 times   1 Legal Analyses

    Several other courts have reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., People v. Mena, 329 Ill. App. 3d 12 (2002); People v. Swift, 322 Ill. App. 3d 127 (2001), appeal allowed, 197 Ill. 2d 580 (2001); People v. Johnson, 333 Ill. App. 3d 935 (2001); People v. Bryant, 325 Ill. App. 3d 448 (2001); People v. Chanthaloth, 318 Ill. App. 3d 806 (2001); People v. Beachem, 317 Ill. App. 3d 693 (2000). In each of these cases, the defendant's conviction resulted from a trial.

  4. People v. Callahan

    334 Ill. App. 3d 636 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002)   Cited 12 times

    The majority of Illinois Appellate Court decisions have held Apprendi prohibits a trial court in a noncapital case from imposing a sentence beyond the normal range merely because it finds the defendant engaged in exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior if that aggravating factor is not submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. See People v. Johnson, 333 Ill. App. 3d 935, 940 (2001) (Fifth District); People v. Bryant, 325 Ill. App. 3d 448, 457, 758 N.E.2d 430, 437-38 (2001) (First District, Fourth Division); People v. Nitz, 319 Ill. App. 3d 949, 968, 747 N.E.2d 38, 54 (2001) (Fifth District); People v. Chanthaloth, 318 Ill. App. 3d 806, 816, 743 N.E.2d 1043, 1050 (2001) (Second District). In these cases, the findings of brutality and wanton cruelty improperly increased the defendants' exposure to greater punishment.

  5. People v. Mena

    329 Ill. App. 3d 579 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002)   Cited 5 times

    2(b)(2), 5-8-2 (a)(1) (West 1996)). The appellate court has repeatedly held that the statutory scheme for extended-term sentences denies defendants due process, because the statute permits the court to sentence a defendant to a term in excess of the maximum permitted by statute for the charge submitted to the jury, based on a finding of fact never submitted for jury determination. E.g., People v. Nitz, 319 Ill. App. 3d 949, 962-69, 747 N.E.2d 38 (2001); People v. Swift, 322 Ill. App. 3d 127, 129-31, 750 N.E.2d 294 (2001); People v. Reynolds, 327 Ill. App. 3d 1027 (2002); People v. Johnson, 333 Ill. App. 3d 935 (2001). As the court explained in Nitz:

  6. People v. Palmer

    328 Ill. App. 3d 348 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002)   Cited 2 times

    Thurow, 318 Ill. App.3d at 135. In People v. Johnson, No. 5-99-0637 (October 23, 2001), following a bench trial, the defendant was found guilty of attempted murder, aggravated battery, and unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon. At the sentencing stage, the trial judge found that the attempted murder was accompanied by exceptionally brutal behavior indicative of wanton cruelty.

  7. People v. Reynolds

    327 Ill. App. 3d 1027 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002)   Cited 3 times

    By way of example, we note that the majority of this court's decisions have held that Apprendi prohibits a trial court in a noncapital case from imposing a sentence beyond the normal range merely because it finds that the defendant engaged in "exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior" ( 730 ILCS 5/5-8-2(a)(2), 5-5-3.2 (b)(2) (West 2000)), if that aggravating factor is not submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., People v. Johnson, No. 5-99-0637 (October 23, 2001); People v. Bryant, 325 Ill. App.3d 448 (2001); People v. Nitz, 319 Ill. App.3d 949, 968 (2001); People v. Chanthaloth, 318 Ill. App.3d 806, 816 (2001). We note that in all of these cases, the different panels of this court found that each of the trial court's subsequent findings that the respective crimes were accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty necessarily and improperly increased the defendant's exposure to greater punishment.