People v. Johnson

6 Citing cases

  1. People v. Puckett

    221 Ill. App. 3d 594 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)   Cited 4 times
    In People v. Puckett (3d Dist. 1991), 221 Ill. App.3d 594, 582 N.E.2d 225, and People v. Johnson (3d Dist. 1990), 202 Ill. App.3d 809, 560 N.E.2d 430, the court held that the mere filing of a petition to rescind was sufficient to trigger the 30-day time limit.

    We do not agree. This issue was recently addressed by this court in People v. Johnson (1990), 202 Ill. App.3d 809, 560 N.E.2d 430, where the petitioner filed a petition to revoke his statutory summary suspension with the circuit clerk and did nothing further. After 30 days elapsed, the petitioner filed a motion to strike the summary suspension for failure to hold a timely hearing.

  2. People v. Schaefer

    154 Ill. 2d 250 (Ill. 1993)   Cited 41 times
    In Schaefer, this court answered a number of questions that had arisen under section 2-118.1(b) of the Vehicle Code. The case involved three consolidated appeals, the facts of which provide an insight into the confusion that existed in this area of the law.

    One line of cases holds that the statutory 30-day period begins to run upon the filing of a proper petition, served upon the State, in accordance with rules of this court and rules of practice of the circuit court of venue. ( People v. Johnson (1990), 202 Ill. App.3d 809, 811.) The other line of cases holds that the mere filing of the petition is not enough.

  3. People v. Schaefer

    219 Ill. App. 3d 654 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)   Cited 2 times

    A review of the applicable Illinois case law reveals that the decisions are in conflict as to whether the filing of a petition to rescind is sufficient to commence the running of the 30-day period under section 2-118.1(b). In People v. Johnson (1990), 202 Ill. App.3d 809, 560 N.E.2d 430, the third district held that the defendant's obligation had been satisfied by the mere filing of a petition to rescind. Once the defendant's burden had been met, the burden shifted to the State to ensure that a hearing date was set within 30 days.

  4. People v. Mills

    234 Ill. App. 3d 368 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992)   Cited 1 times

    The third district has three cases interpreting the 30-day provision of section 2-118.1(b). In People v. Puckett (3d Dist. 1991), 221 Ill. App.3d 594, 582 N.E.2d 225, and People v. Johnson (3d Dist. 1990), 202 Ill. App.3d 809, 560 N.E.2d 430, the court held that the mere filing of a petition to rescind was sufficient to trigger the 30-day time limit. However, in People v. Joiner (3d Dist. 1988), 174 Ill. App.3d 927, 929, 529 N.E.2d 268, 270, the court held that following a defendant's motion for substitution of a judge, the 30-day time limit did not begin to run until the defendant notified the new judge of his request for a hearing.

  5. People v. Miklos

    393 Ill. App. 3d 205 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009)   Cited 5 times

    We are aware that this court previously held that the Code requires the State to hold a hearing within 30 days of the filing of a petition to rescind. See People v. Puckett, 221 Ill. App. 3d 594, 597, 582 N.E.2d 225, 226 (1991); People v. Johnson, 202 Ill. App. 3d 809, 811, 560 N.E.2d 430, 431 (1990). However, in those cases, the issue was whether hearings had to be scheduled within 30 days of the filing of the petition to rescind.

  6. People v. Hill

    219 Ill. App. 3d 259 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)   Cited 3 times
    In Hill, the defendant filed a petition for rescission of statutory summary suspension on March 15, 1991, and requested a hearing date at that time.

    Trainor, 156 Ill. App.3d at 922, 510 N.E.2d at 617. Defendant also relies on People v. Johnson (1990), 202 Ill. App.3d 809, 560 N.E.2d 430. The defendant in Johnson filed a petition for a judicial driving permit (JDP) and a petition to rescind the summary suspension of his driver's license.