We have so held. See People v. Singletary (1995), 273 Ill. App.3d 1076, 652 N.E.2d 1333 (undisclosed confidential informant gave police defendant's first name and address); People v. Johnson (1990), 202 Ill. App.3d 417, 559 N.E.2d 1041 (unknown men identified defendant as someone who ran from the scene of a burglary); People v. Lopez (1987), 152 Ill. App.3d 667, 504 N.E.2d 862 (police officers testified unnamed woman and crowd of people identified defendant as the shooter when he was put into a squadrol). Hearsay testimony identifying the defendant as the one who committed the crime cannot be explained away as "police procedure," even where the trial judge limits the evidence to a nonhearsay purpose.
As such, our courts have repeatedly held that the State may not use the limited investigatory procedure exception to place into evidence the substance of any out-of-court statement that the officer hears during his investigation, but may only elicit such evidence to establish the police investigative process. See Hunley , 313 Ill.App.3d at 33–34, 245 Ill.Dec. 826, 728 N.E.2d 1183 ; Jura , 352 Ill.App.3d at 1085, 288 Ill.Dec. 318, 817 N.E.2d 968 ; see also Gacho , 122 Ill.2d at 248, 119 Ill.Dec. 287, 522 N.E.2d 1146 (it was permissible for a police officer to testify that after he spoke to the victim he went to look for the defendant, but court indicated that it would have been error to permit the officer to testify to the contents of that conversation); People v. Jones , 153 Ill.2d 155, 160, 180 Ill.Dec. 68, 606 N.E.2d 1145 (1992) ; People v. Johnson , 202 Ill.App.3d 417, 421–22, 147 Ill.Dec. 701, 559 N.E.2d 1041 (1990). We explained the rationale for this principle in People v. Trotter , 254 Ill.App.3d 514, 527, 193 Ill.Dec. 553, 626 N.E.2d 1104 (1993) :
An out-of-court identification of the accused by people who cannot be cross-examined is error and the prejudice is palpable. People v. Rivera, 277 Ill. App.3d 811, 819, 661 N.E.2d 429 (1996); see also People v. Singletary, 273 Ill. App.3d 1076, 652 N.E.2d 1333 (1995) (undisclosed confidential informant gave police defendant's first name and address); People v. Johnson, 202 Ill. App.3d 417, 559 N.E.2d 1041 (1990) (unknown men identified defendant as someone who ran from the scene of a burglary). Even though Halvorsen never specifically identified the source of his information, he was allowed to tell the jury that information he received named defendant as a suspect for this offense.
Hearsay identification is reversible error only when it serves as a substitute for courtroom identification or when it is used to strengthen or corroborate a weak identification. People v. Colon, 162 Ill.2d 23, 34, 642 N.E.2d 118 (1994); People v. Johnson, 202 Ill. App.3d 417, 426, 559 N.E.2d 1041 (1990). If it is merely cumulative or supported by a positive identification and by other corroborative circumstances, it constitutes harmless error. Colon, 162 Ill.2d at 34; Johnson, 202 Ill. App.3d at 426.
If, however, the testimony is merely cumulative or is supported by a positive identification and by other corroborative circumstances, it constitutes harmless error. (See People v. Johnson (1990), 202 Ill. App.3d 417, 426.) We find here that the defendant was positively identified by two other witnesses in addition to a substantial amount of corroborative evidence.
¶ 96 Illinois courts have repeatedly held that the State may not use the limited investigatory procedure exception to place into evidence the substance of any out-of-court statement that the officer hears during his investigation, but may only elicit such evidence to establish the police investigative process. See People v. Gacho, 122 Ill.2d 221, 248 (1988); People v. Jones, 153 Ill.2d 155, 160 (1992); People v. Hunley, 313 Ill.App.3d 16, 33-34 (2000); Jura, 352 Ill.App.3d at 1085; People v. Johnson, 202 Ill.App.3d 417, 421-22 (1990).
(Emphasis in original.) Id. (citing People v. Hunley, 313 Ill.App.3d 16, 33-24 (2000); People v. Jura, 352 Ill.App.3d 1080, 1085 (2004); People v. Gacho, 122 Ill.2d 221, 248 (1988) (noting that the admission of the officer's testimony would constitute hearsay had the officer testified to the substance of the conversation); People v. Jones, 153 Ill.2d 155, 160 (1992); People v. Johnson, 202 Ill.App.3d 417, 421-22 (1990)). The rationale behind this proposition is explained in People v. Trotter, 254 Ill.App.3d 514, 527 (1993), which states:
¶ 69 Defendant has cited People v. Mullen, 141 Ill. 2d 394 (1990) and People v. Johnson, 202 Ill. App. 3d 417 (1990), in support of his claim. In Mullen, the trial court excluded evidence of a witness' reasons for initially refusing to testify.
Testimony about the steps of an investigation may not include the substance of a conversation with a nontestifying witness. People v. Gacho, 122 Ill.2d 221, 248, 119 Ill.Dec. 287, 522 N.E.2d 1146, 1159 (1988); People v. Jones, 153 Ill.2d 155, 160, 180 Ill.Dec. 68, 606 N.E.2d 1145, 1147 (1992); People v. Johnson, 202 Ill.App.3d 417, 421–22, 147 Ill.Dec. 701, 559 N.E.2d 1041, 1044 (1990). ¶ 108 In People v. Cameron, 189 Ill.App.3d 998, 1004, 137 Ill.Dec. 505, 546 N.E.2d 259, 263 (1989), this court discussed the theory upon which out-of-court statements are admitted to explain a course of police conduct and the danger of misuse of such statements, as follows:
Rivera, 277 Ill.App.3d at 823, 214 Ill.Dec. 575, 661 N.E.2d 429. See also People v. Virgin, 302 Ill.App.3d 438, 236 Ill.Dec. 252, 707 N.E.2d 97 (1998) (in a closely balanced case, the cumulative effect of hearsay errors was plain error); People v.Furby, 228 Ill.App.3d 1, 9, 169 Ill.Dec. 360, 591 N.E.2d 533 (1992) (given closely balanced evidence, a hearsay statement from an anonymous source that the defendant “was possibly involved" in theft was plain error); People v. Johnson, 202 Ill.App.3d 417, 147 Ill.Dec. 701, 559 N.E.2d 1041 (1990) . Rivera is distinguishable.