People v. Johnson

23 Citing cases

  1. People v. Rivera

    277 Ill. App. 3d 811 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996)   Cited 42 times
    In Rivera, the State argued in closing that by testifying, a witness "took his life in his own hands" and that lying and framing an innocent Latin King "would be to sign his own death warrant." Id. at 820.

    We have so held. See People v. Singletary (1995), 273 Ill. App.3d 1076, 652 N.E.2d 1333 (undisclosed confidential informant gave police defendant's first name and address); People v. Johnson (1990), 202 Ill. App.3d 417, 559 N.E.2d 1041 (unknown men identified defendant as someone who ran from the scene of a burglary); People v. Lopez (1987), 152 Ill. App.3d 667, 504 N.E.2d 862 (police officers testified unnamed woman and crowd of people identified defendant as the shooter when he was put into a squadrol). Hearsay testimony identifying the defendant as the one who committed the crime cannot be explained away as "police procedure," even where the trial judge limits the evidence to a nonhearsay purpose.

  2. People v. Ochoa

    2017 Ill. App. 140204 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017)   Cited 21 times
    In Ochoa, two detectives testified at length about their questioning of the defendant's codefendants at the police station, and the information that was garnered from those interviews.

    As such, our courts have repeatedly held that the State may not use the limited investigatory procedure exception to place into evidence the substance of any out-of-court statement that the officer hears during his investigation, but may only elicit such evidence to establish the police investigative process. See Hunley , 313 Ill.App.3d at 33–34, 245 Ill.Dec. 826, 728 N.E.2d 1183 ; Jura , 352 Ill.App.3d at 1085, 288 Ill.Dec. 318, 817 N.E.2d 968 ; see also Gacho , 122 Ill.2d at 248, 119 Ill.Dec. 287, 522 N.E.2d 1146 (it was permissible for a police officer to testify that after he spoke to the victim he went to look for the defendant, but court indicated that it would have been error to permit the officer to testify to the contents of that conversation); People v. Jones , 153 Ill.2d 155, 160, 180 Ill.Dec. 68, 606 N.E.2d 1145 (1992) ; People v. Johnson , 202 Ill.App.3d 417, 421–22, 147 Ill.Dec. 701, 559 N.E.2d 1041 (1990). We explained the rationale for this principle in People v. Trotter , 254 Ill.App.3d 514, 527, 193 Ill.Dec. 553, 626 N.E.2d 1104 (1993) :

  3. State v. Rodriguez

    312 Ill. App. 3d 920 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000)   Cited 76 times
    In Rodriguez, this court reversed the defendant's conviction for first degree murder after finding that the identification testimony from two witnesses was conflicting and unreliable.

    An out-of-court identification of the accused by people who cannot be cross-examined is error and the prejudice is palpable. People v. Rivera, 277 Ill. App.3d 811, 819, 661 N.E.2d 429 (1996); see also People v. Singletary, 273 Ill. App.3d 1076, 652 N.E.2d 1333 (1995) (undisclosed confidential informant gave police defendant's first name and address); People v. Johnson, 202 Ill. App.3d 417, 559 N.E.2d 1041 (1990) (unknown men identified defendant as someone who ran from the scene of a burglary). Even though Halvorsen never specifically identified the source of his information, he was allowed to tell the jury that information he received named defendant as a suspect for this offense.

  4. People v. Davis

    285 Ill. App. 3d 1039 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996)   Cited 11 times
    Holding that the admission of a witness's out-of-court identification of the defendant was harmless error where the defendant was positively identified in court by the victims of the crime, so that any out-of-court identification would have merely been cumulative

    Hearsay identification is reversible error only when it serves as a substitute for courtroom identification or when it is used to strengthen or corroborate a weak identification. People v. Colon, 162 Ill.2d 23, 34, 642 N.E.2d 118 (1994); People v. Johnson, 202 Ill. App.3d 417, 426, 559 N.E.2d 1041 (1990). If it is merely cumulative or supported by a positive identification and by other corroborative circumstances, it constitutes harmless error. Colon, 162 Ill.2d at 34; Johnson, 202 Ill. App.3d at 426.

  5. People v. Colon

    162 Ill. 2d 23 (Ill. 1994)   Cited 29 times
    In Colon, the Illinois Supreme Court found the gang evidence was properly admitted to establish motive and affirmed the defendant's conviction for murder committed during the course of a drive-by shooting.

    If, however, the testimony is merely cumulative or is supported by a positive identification and by other corroborative circumstances, it constitutes harmless error. (See People v. Johnson (1990), 202 Ill. App.3d 417, 426.) We find here that the defendant was positively identified by two other witnesses in addition to a substantial amount of corroborative evidence.

  6. People v. Williams

    2023 Ill. App. 192463 (Ill. App. Ct. 2023)   Cited 6 times

    ¶ 96 Illinois courts have repeatedly held that the State may not use the limited investigatory procedure exception to place into evidence the substance of any out-of-court statement that the officer hears during his investigation, but may only elicit such evidence to establish the police investigative process. See People v. Gacho, 122 Ill.2d 221, 248 (1988); People v. Jones, 153 Ill.2d 155, 160 (1992); People v. Hunley, 313 Ill.App.3d 16, 33-34 (2000); Jura, 352 Ill.App.3d at 1085; People v. Johnson, 202 Ill.App.3d 417, 421-22 (1990).

  7. People v. Dorn

    2022 Ill. App. 200196 (Ill. App. Ct. 2022)

    (Emphasis in original.) Id. (citing People v. Hunley, 313 Ill.App.3d 16, 33-24 (2000); People v. Jura, 352 Ill.App.3d 1080, 1085 (2004); People v. Gacho, 122 Ill.2d 221, 248 (1988) (noting that the admission of the officer's testimony would constitute hearsay had the officer testified to the substance of the conversation); People v. Jones, 153 Ill.2d 155, 160 (1992); People v. Johnson, 202 Ill.App.3d 417, 421-22 (1990)). The rationale behind this proposition is explained in People v. Trotter, 254 Ill.App.3d 514, 527 (1993), which states:

  8. People v. Martinez

    2014 Ill. App. 120002 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014)   Cited 1 times

    ¶ 69 Defendant has cited People v. Mullen, 141 Ill. 2d 394 (1990) and People v. Johnson, 202 Ill. App. 3d 417 (1990), in support of his claim. In Mullen, the trial court excluded evidence of a witness' reasons for initially refusing to testify.

  9. People v. Boling

    2014 Ill. App. 4th 120634 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014)   Cited 70 times
    Finding that the evidence was closely balanced and declining to add weight to the victim's claims simply because the victim repeated the claims to four other witnesses

    Testimony about the steps of an investigation may not include the substance of a conversation with a nontestifying witness. People v. Gacho, 122 Ill.2d 221, 248, 119 Ill.Dec. 287, 522 N.E.2d 1146, 1159 (1988); People v. Jones, 153 Ill.2d 155, 160, 180 Ill.Dec. 68, 606 N.E.2d 1145, 1147 (1992); People v. Johnson, 202 Ill.App.3d 417, 421–22, 147 Ill.Dec. 701, 559 N.E.2d 1041, 1044 (1990). ¶ 108 In People v. Cameron, 189 Ill.App.3d 998, 1004, 137 Ill.Dec. 505, 546 N.E.2d 259, 263 (1989), this court discussed the theory upon which out-of-court statements are admitted to explain a course of police conduct and the danger of misuse of such statements, as follows:

  10. People v. Cox

    377 Ill. App. 3d 690 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007)   Cited 68 times
    Holding that admission of a police detective's testimony that a witness viewed the lineup and identified the defendant as the shooter did not rise to the level of plain error because the State's evidence against the defendant was overwhelming, where two additional occurrence witnesses identified the defendant in a lineup and two other occurrence witnesses testified before the grand jury that they identified the defendant in a lineup

    Rivera, 277 Ill.App.3d at 823, 214 Ill.Dec. 575, 661 N.E.2d 429. See also People v. Virgin, 302 Ill.App.3d 438, 236 Ill.Dec. 252, 707 N.E.2d 97 (1998) (in a closely balanced case, the cumulative effect of hearsay errors was plain error); People v.Furby, 228 Ill.App.3d 1, 9, 169 Ill.Dec. 360, 591 N.E.2d 533 (1992) (given closely balanced evidence, a hearsay statement from an anonymous source that the defendant “was possibly involved" in theft was plain error); People v. Johnson, 202 Ill.App.3d 417, 147 Ill.Dec. 701, 559 N.E.2d 1041 (1990) .           Rivera is distinguishable.