Opinion
Appeal No. 14632 Ind No. 130/81Case No. 2019-1222
11-18-2021
Janet E. Sabel, The Legal Aid Society, New York (Ellen Dille of counsel), for appellant. Darcel D. Clark, District Attorney, Bronx (Felicia A. Yancey of counsel), for respondent.
Janet E. Sabel, The Legal Aid Society, New York (Ellen Dille of counsel), for appellant.
Darcel D. Clark, District Attorney, Bronx (Felicia A. Yancey of counsel), for respondent.
Before: Webber, J.P., Kern, González, Mendez, Shulman, JJ.
Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Efrain Alvarado, J.), entered on or about July 29, 2016, which denied defendant's Correction Law § 168-o (2) petition to modify his sex offender classification, unanimously affirmed, without costs.
We have previously held that an order denying the modification of sex offender classification is appealable under the general principles relating to civil appeals contained in CPLR 5701 (a) (People v Shaljamin, 164 A.D.3d 1169 [1st Dept 2018]). We decline to revisit this holding.
The court providently exercised its discretion when it declined to grant a downward modification of defendant's level three classification (see People v Lashway, 25 N.Y.3d 478 [2015]). Notwithstanding his significant progress, defendant, who had committed a horrific rape and assault, had, as of the filing of the petition, been on parole supervision for only slightly more than four years (see People v Bernstein, 187 A.D.3d 607 [1st Dept 2020], lv denied 36 N.Y.3d 905 [2021]; People v Greene, 177 A.D.3d 536 [1st Dept 2019], lv denied 35 N.Y.3d 903 [2020]). This was an insufficient passage of time to reliably predict defendant's risk of reoffense.
Finally, the Static-99R evaluation presented by defendant has only limited value because it fails to account for the seriousness of an offender's crime or the harm that could be inflicted in the event of reoffense (see People v Roldan, 140 A.D.3d 411 [1st Dept 2016], lv denied 28 N.Y.3d 904 [2016]).