Opinion
E069731
10-22-2018
In re J.N., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. J.N., Defendant and Appellant.
Lillian Hamrick, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Melissa Mandel, Meredith S. White and Tami Falkenstein Hennick, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super.Ct.No. J270812) OPINION APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Pamela P. King, Judge. Affirmed. Lillian Hamrick, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Melissa Mandel, Meredith S. White and Tami Falkenstein Hennick, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On May 2, 2017, a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 alleged that defendant and appellant J.N. committed battery under Penal Code section 242. On July 21, 2017, J.N. entered into a stipulated informal probation agreement, which included orders not to communicate with the victim and to complete 60 hours of community service. Following a contested restitution hearing, the court ordered J.N. to pay the victim's father, Zamora, $964.11 in restitution for income lost while attending court in the matter.
All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise specified. --------
On January 17, 2018, the juvenile court accepted the probation officer's determination that J.N. had completed a program of informal supervision and dismissed the petition.
J.N. filed a timely notice of appeal.
B. FACTUAL HISTORY
On March 15, 2017, J.N. confronted the victim on his way to class and accused him of "talking shit" about J.N.'s girlfriend. J.N. pushed the victim into a wall and punched him between five and seven times in the face. The victim suffered lacerations to his lips and gums, which caused swelling.
DISCUSSION
A. THE RESTITUION ORDER WAS PROPER
J.N. contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in calculating the amount of restitution for the days Zamora missed work to attend the court proceedings in this matter. J.N. argues that the receipts provided by Zamora did not constitute substantial evidence to support the restitution award. We disagree.
1. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Section 730.6 provides for victim restitution when a minor described in section 602 causes a victim to incur economic loss as a result of the minor's conduct. (§ 730.6, subd. (a)(1).) Upon finding a minor to be a person described in section 602, the juvenile court must order the minor to pay victim restitution. (§ 730.6, subd. (a)(2)(B).) The juvenile court shall order full restitution unless it finds compelling and extraordinary reasons not to do so and states them on the record. (§ 730.6, subd. (h).) The restitution order shall be in an amount sufficient to fully reimburse the victim for all determined economic losses incurred as a result of the minor's conduct. (Ibid.) In addition to making the victim whole, victim restitution also has a deterrent and rehabilitative effect. (People v. Cookson (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1091, 1097.)
The juvenile court is vested with considerable discretion in determining the amount of restitution. " '[W]hile the amount of restitution cannot be arbitrary or capricious, "there is no requirement the restitution order be limited to the exact amount of the loss in which the defendant is actually found culpable, nor is there any requirement the order reflect the amount of damages that might be recoverable in a civil action." ' " (In re Brittany L. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1132, fn. omitted.) The juvenile court abuses its discretion when it acts contrary to law or when there is no factual and rational basis for the amount of restitution ordered. (In re Anthony M. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1016.)
2. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On August 17, 2017, Probation Officer Michael Watts filed a restitution memo. In the memo, Watts stated:
"The father of the victim . . . is requesting restitution for lost wages for the two days he attended court. Mr. Zamora indicated he is a dog groomer, and closed his business down for the two days he attended court. He is requesting $400.00 for June 26, 2017 and $400 for July 21, 2017 for a total of $800 in lost wages."
At the contested restitution hearing, Zamora testified that his girlfriend, Miranda, owned a dog washing business where they both worked; they were the only employees. Zamora worked in the back washing dogs and his girlfriend worked out front grooming dogs. On the days that Zamora had to be in court, Miranda had to close the business. This resulted in the loss of income for both Zamora and Miranda.
In support of his restitution claim, Zamora submitted receipts from the day before the closures of business, and the day after the closures, in order to provide an average by which to calculate the loss of income.
Defense counsel argued that Zamora was not entitled to restitution because he was not the owner of the business and his name was not listed on the receipts he provided to the court.
The court awarded Zamora $321.37 for each day of work missed, which included the date of the contested restitution hearing.
3. ANALYSIS
J.N. contends that Zamora failed to provide evidence of his own lost wages, and instead, only provided evidence of Miranda's lost income. Therefore, J.N. argues that the court did not have substantial evidence upon which to order restitution. J.N. points only to the fact that Miranda's name appears on the receipts Zamora provided to the court to document the daily income from the dog grooming business.
Contrary to J.N.'s argument, no particular kind of proof is required to establish economic loss. (See People v. Lehman (2916) 247 Cal.App.4th 795, 801.) Moreover, there is no requirement that a victim must prove the amount of restitution beyond a reasonable doubt, or that restitution must be set at the exact amount of the loss attributable to the minor's conduct. (See In re Brittany L., supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 1391.)
In this case, Zamora testified that Miranda owned the dog grooming business. He and Miranda were the only employees of the business and they worked as a team—he washed the dogs and Miranda groomed them. When Zamora had to attend court in this matter, the business had to be closed; both he and Miranda lost income as a result. The receipts and Zamora's testimony provided a factual and rational basis for the amount of restitution ordered.
Notwithstanding the evidence, J.N. argues that there was insufficient evidence because Zamora's name is "nowhere on the documents" and "there is no evidence that Zamora was entitled to any of the income from [Miranda's] business." J.N. argues there is not substantial evidence to support the award because Zamora's testimony contradicted the documentary evidence and the case should be decided solely on the documentary evidence. We disagree. Zamora's testimony does not contradict the documentary evidence. Instead, his testimony supplemented the documents and explained the situation to the court. In essence, J.N. is challenging the credibility of Zamora. However, in deciding whether substantial evidence supports the decision of the lower court, we do not resolve issues of credibility or evidentiary conflicts. (People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181.) Here, the juvenile court heard Zamora's testimony—which was amply challenged by J.N.'s counsel—and decided that Zamora was a credible witness. Resolution of conflicting evidence and credibility issues is for the trier of fact to decide. (People v. Martinez (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1324, 1331.)
Therefore, we hold that the juvenile court acted well within its discretion in awarding restitution in this matter. (In re Anthony M., supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 1016; In re Johnny M. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1132.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS.
MILLER
J. We concur: RAMIREZ
P. J. RAPHAEL
J.