Opinion
1 CA-JV 24-0050
09-24-2024
IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO J.M., JR.
Robert D. Rosanelli Attorney at Law, Phoenix By Robert D. Rosanelli Counsel for Appellant Justin M. Holly D., Paulden Appellee Law Office of Florence M. Bruemmer, P.C., Anthem By Florence M. Bruemmer Counsel for the Child
Not for Publication - Rule 111(c), Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court
Appeal from the Superior Court in Yavapai County No. S1300SV202300014 The Honorable Anna C. Young, Judge
Robert D. Rosanelli Attorney at Law, Phoenix
By Robert D. Rosanelli
Counsel for Appellant Justin M.
Holly D., Paulden
Appellee
Law Office of Florence M. Bruemmer, P.C., Anthem
By Florence M. Bruemmer
Counsel for the Child
Judge Andrew M. Jacobs delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Maria Elena Cruz and Judge Samuel A. Thumma joined.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
JACOBS, Judge:
¶1 Justin M. ("Father") appeals the juvenile court's termination of his parental rights as to his son, J.M., Jr. ("J.M."). Father argues the court's findings of abandonment and neglect under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(1) and (2), and that termination was in J.M.'s best interests, were clearly erroneous. Because reasonable evidence supports the juvenile court's abandonment and best interests rulings, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2 J.M. was born to Father and Holly D. ("Mother") in February 2014. Father and Mother wed in September 2014, divorced in October 2015 in Arizona superior court, and then shared joint custody of J.M. Mother later married Michael D. ("Stepfather"). In 2020, the court entered a modified visitation order ("2020 Visitation Order"), adjusting Mother's and Father's visitation and awarding visitation to J.M.'s paternal grandmother Eileen D. ("Grandmother").
¶3 In April 2023, Mother filed a Petition for Termination of Parent-Child Relationship ("Petition") against Father. The Petition alleged Father did not exercise his parental visitation rights over J.M. from July 2022 to the time of filing.
¶4 The juvenile court held a contested adjudication of Mother's Petition. During it, Father admitted he did not see J.M. from July 2022 to April 2023, although the 2020 Visitation Order gave him the right to do so. He further admitted he did not provide any financial support to J.M. during that time.
¶5 Finding the evidence supported the Petition, the court terminated Father's parental rights as to J.M., citing abandonment and neglect. A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(1) and (2). As to abandonment, the court found Father's failure to see J.M. from July 2022 to April 2023 "well in excess of the six-month period that constitutes a prima facie case of abandonment." The court also found Father's failure to provide any clothing or financial support to J.M. during this time further evidence of abandonment. The court found neglect under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2) from the same evidence, as well as J.M.'s exposure to domestic violence and Father's failure to participate in J.M.'s medical appointments and treatments.
¶6 The court also found that termination of Father's parental rights would serve J.M.'s best interests. First, the court noted that Stepfather currently has a father-son relationship with J.M. and seeks to adopt him, thus demonstrating J.M.'s adoptability. Additionally, the court had serious concern as to what it found to be the "toxic, violent, and revengeful" relationship between Mother and J.M.'s paternal relatives. The court reasoned that "[w]hile this court acknowledges Mother's part in the significant dysfunction, it is Mother that has provided for the child's needs consistently and Father who denies the child's delays and need for medication and treatment."
¶7 Father timely appealed. We have jurisdiction. A.R.S. §§ 8-235, 12-120.21, -2101(A)(1); Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 9.
DISCUSSION
¶8 Terminating a parental relationship under A.R.S. § 8-533(B) is a two-step inquiry. Alma S. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 149 ¶ 8 (2018). The court must first find a statutory ground in § 8-533(B) proven by clear and convincing evidence. Id.; see A.R.S. § 8-547(B). The court must then decide if evidence shows that termination is in the child's best interests by the preponderance of the evidence. Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 150 ¶ 8.
¶9 We view the facts in the light most favorable to upholding the court's order. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. v. Matthew L., 223 Ariz. 547, 549 ¶ 7 (App. 2010). The juvenile court "is in the best position to weigh the evidence, observe the parties, judge the credibility of the witnesses, and resolve disputed facts." Jordan C. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 223 Ariz. 86, 93 ¶ 18 (App. 2009) (quoting Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. v. Oscar O., 209 Ariz. 332 ¶ 4 (App. 2004)). We accept factual findings "if reasonable evidence and inferences support them." Brionna J. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 255 Ariz. 471 ¶ 30 (2023) (citation omitted). We do not reweigh evidence. Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 151 ¶ 18.
I. Reasonable Evidence Supports Termination of Father's Rights Based on Abandonment Under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(1).
¶10 A parent abandons a child where they fail "to provide reasonable support and to maintain regular contact with the child, including providing normal supervision." A.R.S. § 8-531(1). A parent also abandons their child where they have made "only minimal efforts to support and communicate with the child." Id. Central to this case, "[f]ailure to maintain a normal parental relationship with the child without just cause for a period of six months constitutes prima facie evidence of abandonment." Id.
¶11 Father argues that "there is simply no evidence of abandonment in this case." Not so. As the juvenile court found, the trial evidence shows that Father had not seen J.M. from July 2022 to April 2023, which is "a period well in excess of the six-month period that constitutes a prima facie case of abandonment." Father admitted he did not see J.M. from July 2022 through April 2023 despite the visitation afforded to him in the 2020 Visitation Order. The trial evidence also shows that Father did not provide clothing to J.M., except for one time in August 2023. Father also provided no financial support to J.M. from July 2022 and April 2023. While Father argues he was not ordered to provide financially for J.M., his failure to do so nonetheless supports the finding of abandonment. See Pima Cnty. Severance Action No. S-1607 , 147 Ariz. 237, 239 (1985) (recognizing that failure to provide financially for child cannot establish abandonment, but is one factor to consider, particularly when there is a poor history of visitation).
¶12 After Mother filed the Petition, Father started seeing J.M. again, but only during Grandmother's visitation time. Given his undisputed periods of abandoning contact with J.M., Father's post-petition contacts do not undercut the juvenile court's abandonment finding. See Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-500274, 167 Ariz. 1, 8 (1990) (recognizing that a prima facie case of abandonment is not "rebutted merely by postpetition attempts to reestablish a parental relationship[,]" although such efforts may be relevant to the child's best interests).
¶13 Father also argues that Mother interfered with his parenting time, and her obtaining an order limiting Father's parenting time and refusing financial aid precluded an abandonment finding. See Calvin B. v. Brittany B., 232 Ariz. 292, 293-94 ¶ 1 (App. 2013). Yet because Father conceded he did not exercise any parenting time from July 2022 to April 2023, Father was the cause of his own lack of time with J.M., not Mother. Calvin B. does not aid Father.
¶14 For these reasons, reasonable evidence supports the finding of the juvenile court that Father abandoned J.M. under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(1). Given that conclusion, we do not address the juvenile court's parallel finding of neglect under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2). See Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 280 ¶ 3 (App. 2002).
II. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Finding That Terminating Father's Parental Rights Serves J.M.'s Best Interests.
¶15 We review a juvenile court's findings for best interests for an abuse of discretion and reverse only if there is "no reasonable evidence to support [the findings]." Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 47 ¶ 8 (App. 2004) (quoting Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JV-132905 , 186 Ariz. 607, 609 ¶ 8 (App. 1996)). When considering the child's best interests, the court must consider the totality of the circumstances. Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 150 ¶¶ 12-13.
¶16 The juvenile court must find by a preponderance of the evidence that termination is in the child's best interests. See Brionna J., 255 Ariz. at ¶ 20; Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 284 ¶ 22 (2005). "[A] determination of the child's best interest[s] must include a finding as to how the child would benefit from a severance or be harmed by the continuation of the relationship." JS-500274, 167 Ariz. at 5 (citations omitted). The court may consider a "child's adoptability and the parent's rehabilitation." Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 148 ¶ 1.
¶17 First, Father argues termination is not in J.M.'s best interests because Father harbors concerns regarding the parental abilities of Mother and Stepfather, even calling Mother an "unfit parent." Father's argument fails because reasonable evidence supports the juvenile court's best interests finding. The court considered the dysfunction between Father and Mother, noting that "the contentious relationship between Mother and paternal relatives is of a great deal of concern and that the 'toxic, violent, and revengeful, relationship' is an unhealthy thing for the child to be exposed to." While evaluating the evidence of family dysfunction, the court concluded that Mother "has provided for [J.M.'s] needs consistently." Given Mother's provision of J.M.'s needs during Father's long periods of being out of contact with J.M., and his failures to provide J.M. money and clothes, reasonable evidence supports the juvenile court's best interests finding.
¶18 Second, Father disputes the court's finding that termination would result in a benefit to J.M. because it would further a plan of adoption between J.M. and Stepfather. See Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, 4-5 ¶¶ 16-17 (2016) (holding that adoption benefits the best interests of a child). Father argues Stepfather is unlikely to be approved as an adoptive parent. But the question under Demetrius L. is whether J.M. is adoptable, which the juvenile court could properly conclude Stepfather's interest in adopting him proved - not Stepfather7 s personal bona fides as an adoptive parent. Because the juvenile court found Stepfather has a father-son relationship with J.M. and would like to adopt J.M., there is reasonable evidence supporting the court's finding that J.M. is adoptable.
¶19 Because reasonable evidence shows terminating Father's parental rights serves J.M.'s best interests and that "it would be detrimental to [J.M.'s] well-being for his relationship with Father to remain intact[,]" the court did not abuse its discretion in making such a determination. Mary Lou C., 207 Ariz. at 47 ¶ 8.
CONCLUSION
¶20 We affirm.