Opinion
C094957
08-08-2022
In re J.L., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. v. J.L., Defendant and Appellant. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
(Super. Ct. No. SCRDJDSQ203095905)
HULL, Acting P. J.
Defendant J.L. appeals from an order to pay victim restitution in the amount of $16,728.49 to Steven N. under Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.6. (Statutory section citations that follow are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.) Defendant contends the lost wages Steven N. claimed as restitution was the result of Steven N.'s termination from his job for violating company policy and not defendant's battery of Steven N. at his workplace. Defendant also claims that the trial court failed to ascertain the full amount of unemployment benefits Steven N. received to offset against his claimed lost income. We affirm the trial court's order.
FACTS AND HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS
On June 21, 2017, J.L. was declared a ward of the court under section 602 and placed on probation.
On November 12, 2020, a juvenile wardship petition alleged that on September 21, 2020, defendant struck Steven N. multiple times in violation of Penal Code section 242. On February 3, 2021, J.L. admitted the allegations of the petition. On March 10, 2021, the trial court conducted a disposition hearing and issued various orders, including an order requiring J.L. to pay restitution to Steven N. in an amount to be determined by the court. On July 22, 2021, a probation officer submitted a memorandum to the court that Steven N. requested restitution in the amount of $12,015.20 and defendant requested a hearing on restitution.
On August 26, 2021, the trial court conducted a hearing on restitution at which Steven N. was the sole witness.
Steven N. testified that he was working at a Speedway gas station, when J.L. came in the building and asked to use the restroom. Steven N.'s coworker said that the restroom was closed and J.L. needed a shirt to be in the store. She added, "You're adorable though," which infuriated J.L. and he started shouting obscenities at her. Steven N. asked J.L. to leave and he stepped outside the door. Steven N. told his coworker to call the police and give him the key. Steven N. came around the counter and went to the door to lock it. As Steven N. went to the door, J.L. stopped in the doorway and turned around. J.L. was stuck in the door and Steven N. could not close it.
Another customer spoke to J.L. and they went into the adjacent parking lot. Steven N. stepped outside the door so he could see J.L.'s vehicle and get the license plate number. Steven N. went back inside to get the keys from his coworker, but she had gone outside to try to resolve the situation between J.L. and the other customer. J.L. returned to the doorway and Steven N. stayed inside the store. J.L. came in throwing punches. Three or four caught Steven N. on the chin. Steven N. ended up backwards across the counter.
After being interviewed by police, Steven N. finished his night shift and told his boss what had happened when she came in at 6:00 a.m. the next day. She reported it to upper management. Thereafter, Steven N. was not allowed to clock in for another shift until he met with his manager and assistant manager on October 6, 2020. At the October 6 meeting, they reviewed surveillance video of the attack with Steven N. to show him why they could no longer employ him. The primary issue was Steven N.'s taking two steps outside the store to get J.L.'s license plate number. That Steven N. came around from behind the counter was a "compounding issue." Company policy was not to put yourself in harm's way. Steven N.'s managers asserted that by going outside the store he had put himself in harm's way.
Steven N. was out of work from October 2020 to the beginning of June 2021. Steven N. collected unemployment for six of these eight months.
The court reviewed Steven N.'s W-2s and paystubs documenting his wages, as well as unemployment records showing he received $2,651 in unemployment. The court also reviewed a letter from the assistant manager of Speedway stating her belief that Steven N. "would have never been terminated had it been for the individual that is observed on surveillance attacking [Steven N.]."
At the time he was terminated, Steven N. was paid $13.26 per hour and he worked about 39.5 hours per week. The amount of $12,015.20 in claimed restitution was based on an hourly rate of $13.06 for 40 hours a week for 23 weeks. Steven N. acknowledged that he made the error in providing an hourly rate of $13.06; he had received a raise before the incident.
After argument by counsel for the parties, the trial court ruled that defendant had raised two issues: (1) whether wage loss was recoverable under section 730.6, and (2) whether J.L.'s conduct was a substantial factor in causing the wage loss.
Addressing the substantial factor issue first, the court said: "It's very clear that if [J.L.] had not done what he did on September 21st of 2020, that in all likelihood [Steven N.] would still be working where he was working that day. [Steven N.'s] response was a natural and human reaction to [J.L.'s] conduct. Maybe it was in violation of corporate policies; maybe not. That's up to the employer to determine. But his reaction was natural and appropriate. And if [J.L.] had not done what he did, [Steven N.] would not have been fired. And so that indicates to me that -- that [J.L.'s] conduct was a substantial factor."
The court agreed that wage loss was not a specifically enumerated loss under section 730.6 or the parallel statute for adults, Penal Code section 1202.4. However, case law indicated that the purpose of the statutes is to ensure full restitution, consistent with the policy of the California Constitution. The court found that wage loss was recoverable under section 730.6.
The court calculated Steven N.'s loss based on 37 weeks when he was out of work from September 21, 2020 to June 7, 2021, multiplied by 39.5 hours a week at a rate of $13.26 an hour. Based on these numbers, Steven N.'s wage loss totaled $19,379.49, from which the court deducted $2,651 in unemployment benefits for a final amount of $16,728.49. The court observed that burden of proof on restitution is preponderance of the evidence, and, once a prima facie showing has been made, J.L. may rebut it but he had not. The court awarded $16,728.49 in victim restitution payable to Steven N.
On September 20, 2021, the court entered an order requiring defendant to pay the amount of $16,728.49 to Steven N. Defendant timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I
General Legal Principles
In In re S.E. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 795, the appellate court provided a comprehensive statement of the general principles applicable here:" 'Enacted in 1982, Proposition 8, the "Victims' Bill of Rights," amended the California Constitution to provide that "all persons who suffer losses" resulting from crime are entitled to "restitution from the persons convicted of the crimes causing the losses." (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (b)(13)(A).) In 1983, the Legislature enacted Penal Code section 1202.4, which requires a full victim restitution order in criminal cases for every determined economic loss unless there are compelling and extraordinary reasons not to do so. (Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subd. (f).) In 1994, the Legislature enacted section 730.6 to provide "parallel restitutionary requirements for juvenile offenders." [Citation.]' [Citation.] '" 'In keeping with the [voters'] "unequivocal intention" that victim restitution be made, statutory provisions implementing the constitutional directive have been broadly and liberally construed.'" [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (In re S.E., supra, at p. 803.)
" 'An order of direct victim restitution acts to make the victim whole, rehabilitate the minor, and deter future delinquent behavior [citations], and is reviewed for abuse of discretion [citations].' [Citation.] 'However, where the specific issue is whether a court has the authority to issue restitution, we review that question of law independently. [Citation.] And where the specific issue is whether the court's factual findings support restitution, we review those findings for substantial evidence. [Citations.]' [Citation.]" (In re S.E., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 803.)
" 'No abuse of discretion will be found where there is a rational and factual basis for the amount of restitution ordered." '[T]he standard of proof at a restitution hearing is by a preponderance of the evidence, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt.'" [Citation.]' [Citation.] Nevertheless, '[a] restitution order that is based on a demonstrable error of law constitutes an abuse of the trial court's discretion. [Citation.]' [Citation.] 'No court has discretion to make an order not authorized by law, or to find facts for which there is not substantial evidence.' [Citation.]" (In re S.E., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at pp. 803-804.) "Section 730.6 subdivision (a)(1) provides: 'It is the intent of the Legislature that a victim of conduct for which a minor is found to be a person described in section 602 who incurs an economic loss as a result of the minor's conduct shall receive restitution directly from that minor.' (Italics added.) Penal Code section 1202.4, subdivision (a)(1) similarly provides: 'It is the intent of the Legislature that a victim of crime who incurs an economic loss as a result of the commission of a crime shall receive restitution directly from a defendant convicted of that crime.' (Italics added.)" (In re S.E., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 804.)
"The emphasized portion of each statute 'is language of causation.' [Citation.] Two aspects of causation are at play: 'cause in fact (also called direct or actual causation), and proximate cause.' [Citation.]" [¶]' "An act is a cause in fact if it is a necessary antecedent of an event." [Citation.]' [Citation.]' "[T]hat the defendant's conduct was a necessary antecedent of the injury does not resolve the question of whether the defendant should be liable.... '[T]he consequences of an act go forward to eternity, and the causes of an event go back to the dawn of human events, and beyond. But any attempt to impose responsibility upon such a basis would result in infinite liability for all wrongful acts ....' [Citation.] Therefore, the law must impose limitations on liability other than simple causality. These additional limitations are related not only to the degree of connection between the conduct and the injury, but also with public policy. [Citation.]"' [Citation.]" (In re S.E., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 804.)
" 'California courts have adopted the "substantial factor" test in analyzing proximate cause. [Citation.]" 'The substantial factor standard is a relatively broad one, requiring only that the contribution of the individual cause be more than negligible or theoretical.' [Citation.] Thus, 'a force which plays only an "infinitesimal" or "theoretical" part in bringing about injury, damage, or loss is not a substantial factor' [citation], but a very minor force that does cause harm is a substantial factor [citation]."' [Citation.]' "The substantial factor standard . . . subsumes the 'but for' test while reaching beyond it to satisfactorily address other situations, such as those involving independent or concurrent causes in fact. [Citations.]" [Citation.]' [Citation.] Thus, so long as the minor's conduct was a substantial factor in causing the economic loss incurred by the victim or victims, it need not have been the sole cause of that loss. [Citation.]" (In re S.E., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at pp. 804-805; see also Luis M. v. Superior Court (2014) 59 Cal.4th 300, 304-305; In re S.O. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1094, 1098; In re A.M. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 668, 673.)
II
Sufficiency of the Substantial Factor Evidence
Defendant contends that the evidence at the restitution hearing did not support the trial court's finding that defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in the wage loss that Steven N. suffered, because the battery perpetrated by defendant occurred after Steven N. left the store in violation of company policy, which was the basis for his termination. Defendant argues that Steven N.'s termination was unforeseeable, extraordinary and abnormal occurrence that rose to the level an exonerating, superseding cause.
Defendant's battery of Steven N. was part of a single course of conduct that began when defendant entered the store to use the restroom and, for some reason, took umbrage at a compliment from Steven N.'s coworker culminating in defendant punching Steven N. Along the way, when Steven N. went outside to get defendant's license plate number, he violated company policy by, in the view of his managers, putting himself in harm's way. Their conclusion that Steven N. put himself in harm's way cannot be separated from the fact that defendant's conduct actually harmed Steven N., notwithstanding his assistant manager's letter--which is not in the record but was paraphrased by the court--that Steven N. would not have been terminated simply for being battered.
This was not a situation where Steven N. was terminated for a reason unrelated to defendant's conduct. Defendant put in motion the circumstances that led to Steven N.'s termination and wage loss. Steven N. would never have gone outside the store had defendant not exhibited the disruptive behavior and loss of self-control that led to the battery. We agree with trial court that "if [J.L.] had not done what he did, [Steven N.] would not have been fired." Thus, defendant's conduct was more than a negligible or theoretical contributor to Steven N.'s termination and wage loss. (In re S.E., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 805.) We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in causing Steven N.'s wage losses.
Defendant ignores the substantial factor test and instead relies on People v. Cervantes (2001) 26 Cal.4th 860, to argue that Steven N.'s wage loss was due to an independent, intervening cause. In Cervantes, the California Supreme Court said:" 'In general, an "independent" intervening cause will absolve a defendant of criminal liability. [Citation.] However, in order to be "independent" the intervening cause must be "unforeseeable . . . an extraordinary and abnormal occurrence, which rises to the level of an exonerating, superseding cause." [Citation.]'" (Id. at p. 871; see also People v. Foalima (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1376, 1397; Schrimsher v. Bryson (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 660, 664 ["The general test of whether an independent intervening act, which operates to produce an injury, breaks the chain of causation is the foreseeability of that act. [Citation.] [¶] An act is not foreseeable and thus is a superseding cause of the injury 'if the independent intervening act is highly unusual or extraordinary, not reasonably likely to happen . . . .' "].)
It certainly was not unforeseeable, extraordinary, or abnormal that Steven N. would follow defendant far enough to identify him if possible. And the decision to terminate Steven N. was "foreseeable" in that it was not highly unusual or extraordinary that gas station management would find that Steven N. had violated company policy in responding to criminal conduct at the station, of which he was ultimately the victim. Steven N. testified that he had seen "numerous occasions of unlawful activity" at the property and that company policy was to report such incidents to the police, which occasioned his going outside at times to document license plate numbers for law enforcement. It was not company policy for employees not to go outside; the policy was only for employees not to put themselves in harm's way. Thus, it was not unforeseeab le that, in the course of this incident where Steven N. was responding to perceived unlawful activity and in doing so became the victim of a battery by defendant, Steven N. might end up violating company policy. Thus, Steven N.'s wage loss was not the result of an independent, intervening cause.
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding restitution to Steven N. for lost wages after he was terminated.
III
Credit for Unemployment Benefits
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in not inquiring of Steven N. about other funds he received to credit against his wage loss. Defendant requests that we remand the case for the trial court to determine additional amounts that Steven N. received in unemployment benefits. Defendant contends that the documentary evidence Steven N. submitted of the unemployment benefits he received in the amount of $2,651 only covered two or three months at the end of 2020, but he testified he received $2,600 benefits for six months. Defendant suspects that Steven N. received additional unemployment benefits in 2021.
However, defendant had the burden of proof as to any offset or credit to the restitution award. (See People v. Vazquez (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1126, 1137; see also People v. Prosser (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 682, 691 ["Once the victim has made a prima facie showing of his or her loss, the burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate that the amount of the loss is other than that claimed by the victim"].) Defendant has not carried his burden. He cannot fault the court for not inquiring into evidence that defendant failed to produce.
DISPOSITION
The restitution order is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: DUARTE, J., HOCH, J.