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People v. Jensen

Court of Appeals of California, Second Appellate District, Division One.
Nov 21, 2003
B161587 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2003)

Opinion

B161587.

11-21-2003

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JAMES JENSEN, Defendant and Appellant.

Marilee Marshall & Associates and Marilee Marshal for Defendant and Appellant. Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Victoria B. Wilson and Jaime L. Fuster, Supervising Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.


INTRODUCTION

Defendant James Jensen appeals from a judgment of conviction. The trial court initially found defendant mentally incompetent to stand trial. After the court found defendants competence had been restored, defendant entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity.

Defendant admitted that he committed acts amounting to one count of willful, deliberate and premeditated attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 664), two counts of assault with a deadly weapon or by means likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)), one count of kidnapping (§ 207, subd. (a)), one count of attempted carjacking (§§ 215, subd. (a), 664), one count of attempted second degree robbery (§§ 211, 664) and one count of kidnapping for the purpose of carjacking (§ 209.5, subd. (a)). Defendant also admitted personally inflicting great bodily injury upon the victim when attempting murder (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)), personally using a deadly and dangerous weapon, a knife, when attempting murder, when kidnapping, when attempting robbery and when kidnapping for the purpose of carjacking (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)) and previously suffering a felony conviction within the meaning of the "Three Strikes" Law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12) and within the meaning of subdivision (a) of section 667 and section 667.5, subdivision (b).

Following a non-jury trial, the court found defendant was sane when he committed the offenses. The court then sentenced defendant to state prison for consecutive terms of four years plus two life terms, one of which was enhanced by three years and the other of which was enhanced by one year. With respect to each of the life terms, defendant faced a minimum parole eligibility term of 14 years.

Defendant contends the court never found him competent to stand trial and erroneously rejected evidence that he was legally insane when he committed the offenses. Inasmuch as we disagree, we affirm the judgment.

FACTS

In April 2000, John Head (Head) and defendant lived in a boarding house where they previously had been roommates. During their joint residency in the boarding house, defendant and Head had many conversations. Defendant never said anything to Head about being persecuted by the FBI or aliens from another planet, hearing voices, having multiple personalities or anything of that nature. Defendant never made irrational statements to the residence manager. Defendants grooming was appropriate.

On April 15, 2000, defendant became angry when Head refused to make many copies of defendants resumé. When Head returned from work at approximately 4:00 p.m. on April 18, he saw defendant embroiled in a heated discussion with the manager about defendant being evicted from the boarding house. Defendant was refusing to leave the premises immediately as instructed by the manager. Head went to his room, changed his clothes, and then returned to the living room where he had a conversation with another tenant. In the meantime, defendant had gone into the kitchen and retrieved a knife. Defendant returned to the living room, ran towards Head, accused him of being one of the people who wanted defendant out of the house and stabbed Head in the arm as Head attempted to shield his chest from the blow. After defendant stabbed Heads arm a second time, Head managed to kick defendant away from him. Defendant fled.

Defendant approached a car in a nearby driveway that Aida Quinones (Quinones) was driving. He told Quinones to stop and get out of the car. He put a knife to her chest and threatened to kill her if she did not comply. Quinones removed the keys from the ignition and stepped out of the car. Defendant got into the car but was unable to start it. With the knife still in his hand, he ran toward Crenshaw Boulevard.

While Eun Han Hoo (Hoo) was stopped at a traffic signal at Pico Boulevard and Norton Avenue at approximately 4:40 p.m. on April 18, 2000, defendant opened the passenger door, got into the car and pointed a knife at Hoos ribs. Hoo complied with defendants order that she drive away. He told her to pull over to a side street. He said his life was over and it was "a bad luck day" for Hoo. She kept driving and ultimately tried to turn into an auto body shop to ask for help. Defendant motioned to her not to stop and stabbed her arm. While the car was stopped near the entrance of the shop, Hoo struggled with defendant over control of the knife. The police arrived immediately and arrested defendant. He did not make any irrational statements and did not resist arrest. Defendant remained coherent during the booking process.

Dr. Joseph Ortego was defendants treating psychiatrist for approximately four months while defendant was housed in the Twin Towers County Jail. Dr. Ortego diagnosed defendant as having antisocial personality disorder, as well as some aspects of narcissistic and borderline personalities. In addition to a significant history of substance abuse and attention deficit behavioral problems, defendant might have a mood disorder. Defendant did not suffer from schizophrenia, however, and there was only a remote possibility that he suffered from schizoaffective disorder. Dr. Ortego based his diagnoses on four months of personal contact with defendant and on the opinions and notes of other psychiatrists, nurses and social workers.

Dr. Ortego and other treating psychiatrists believed defendant was malingering, or feigning or exaggerating symptoms of mental illness for his own gain. In July 2000, defendant clearly feigned symptoms of schizophrenia or split personality. He later portrayed himself as depressed and suicidal. When that did not achieve his aims, defendant began acting paranoid, hearing voices and expressing fear of aliens. When Dr. Ortego confronted defendant with his malingering, defendant threatened to kill Dr. Ortego. Defendant told Dr. Ortego on several occasions that he would manipulate the court into thinking he was mentally ill.

Dr. Hy Malinek, a clinical and forensic psychiatrist, examined defendant on February 11 and April 24, 2003. He also reviewed the arrest report, preliminary hearing transcripts and records from the prosecution, the Los Angeles County Sheriffs Department, Patton State Hospital, the Department of Corrections and other doctors appointed to examine defendant in this case. In Dr. Malineks opinion, defendant suffered from paranoid schizophrenia, alcohol abuse and antisocial personality disorder. Paranoid schizophrenia is a chronic but intermittent illness. Those affected by it do not always suffer from delusions. Dr. Malinek did not believe that defendant had multiple personalities.

Dr. Malinek initially formed the opinion that defendant was legally insane when he stabbed Head but not when he committed the crimes against Quinones and Hoo. That is, rather than acting under the influence of delusions in the latter instances, defendant merely wished to avoid apprehension for stabbing Head. When Dr. Malinek learned that there had been an ongoing dispute between defendant and Head at the time of the stabbing, however, that information suggested "that this was not an unprovoked assault, and it would lead one to consider that even the [stabbing] was not really a product of a delusion as required by the insanity clause. [¶] If he had an agenda and anger, a strife with the victim, then he had a reason in his own mind to assault him. [¶] I think it casts further doubt . . . as to whether there was a delusionally driven act when he stabbed [Head]." Dr. Malinek also acknowledged that defendant had malingered in the past.

Defense

Dr. Lorna Carlin, staff psychiatrist at Patton State Hospital, diagnosed defendant as a paranoid schizophrenic. It was a difficult diagnosis, however, given defendants criminal history and malingering. Dr. Carlin had received information that defendants father suffered from similar mental illness, and there is a genetic component to schizophrenia. If not medicated, defendant was highly prone to violence. In Dr. Carlins view, defendant had genuine mental problems but also malingered. She did not believe defendant had multiple personalities.

After examining records and interviewing defendant, Dr. Kaushal Sharma diagnosed defendant as suffering from schizophrenia. He also might suffer from psychosis and depression, as well as antisocial personality disorder. Defendant did not have multiple personalities. Dr. Sharmas schizophrenia diagnosis was based in part on defendants current history of delusions. The validity of the diagnosis could be called into question, however, given that defendant did not mention delusions to anyone before stabbing Head. Moreover, defendant had not been diagnosed with schizophrenia before 2000 even though he had periodic mental examinations during his nine years in state prison.

Dr. Sharma was hesitant to render an opinion as to defendants sanity in light of conflicting evidence about the crimes that defendant and other independent sources provided to him. In Dr. Sharmas opinion, if defendants explanation of events were true, that "would seem to suggest that his actions were largely due to his paranoid belief system, and he was acting, in his mind, as if he was trying to protect himself . . . [and, therefore,] because of mental illness, [he] was not able to distinguish right from wrong." Dr. Sharma was concerned, however, that defendants version of events might not be true. Dr. Sharma also could not rule out malingering on defendants part. He acknowledged that defendant had malingered in the past.

Dr. Kyle Boone, a clinical neuropsychologist, evaluated defendant while he was housed at Twin Towers. Defendant performed normally on tests dealing with language, attention, mental speed and problem solving. His intelligence was at the lower end of the normal range. Further tests showed that the right half of defendants brain was not working correctly as demonstrated by low scores for visual memory and "visual-spatial, constructional skills." The right half of the brain controls expression and emotion. Given the test results, defendant might have difficulty controlling his emotional expression. The results were not typical of someone suffering from schizophrenia, however.

In the opinion of Dr. Sara Arroyo, a clinical psychologist, defendant was a paranoid schizophrenic who had multiple personalities. He also displayed traits of antisocial personality disorder. Defendant told Dr. Arroyo that he stabbed Head because Head was trying to hurt him. He also mentioned that aliens were working with the FBI. In Dr. Arroyos opinion, defendants insight and judgment were impaired to such an extent when he committed the crimes that he did not know right from wrong. Had Dr. Arroyo known of defendants argument with Head two days before the stabbing, however, that knowledge might have affected her opinion. She would have conducted additional testing and discussed the evidence at length with defendant.

Frank Abney (Abney) is a psychiatric social worker at Patton State Hospital. Abney observed that defendant frequently exhibited delusional tendencies and an alternative personality. While defendant was at the hospital, he received letters from his father warning him to stay away from certain races and types of people. Abney did not believe defendant was malingering but conceded he lacked the professional expertise necessary to make that determination.

According to defendants sister and mother, defendants father abused defendant extensively both physically and emotionally. Defendants father acted bizarrely. He was extremely paranoid. While defendant was an adolescent, he had problems at school and suffered head injuries. When he was in his early teens, defendant began experiencing delusions and expressing bizarre ideas. After defendant was released from prison, he told his mother about his feminine alternate personality, Jamie. Approximately one week before he committed these crimes, defendant told his mother that he was afraid of the people living with him because they were going to get him.

CONTENTIONS

Defendant contends the trial court denied him due process of law by reinstating criminal proceedings without finding him mentally competent to proceed. The court did find him mentally competent to proceed.

Defendant asserts the trial court erroneously rejected evidence that he was legally insane when he committed the offenses, thus mandating reversal of his convictions. The court did not err.

DISCUSSION

Determination of Competence to Stand Trial

After a criminal prosecution has been suspended due to a finding that the defendant is mentally incompetent to stand trial, a specified mental health official makes periodic written reports to the court "concerning the defendants progress toward recovery of mental competence." (§ 1370, subd. (b)(1).) In the event that the specified mental health official "determines that the defendant has regained mental competence," that official "shall . . . fil[e] a certificate of restoration" to competence. (§ 1372, subd. (a)(1).) The defendant then must be "returned to . . . court" "for further proceedings." (Id., subd. (a)(2).)

At this juncture, there is a presumption that the defendant is mentally competent unless a preponderance of the evidence proves the opposite. (People v. Rells (2000) 22 Cal.4th 860, 867-868.) The parties may submit the question of recovery to mental competence on the certificate of restoration, thereby eschewing a formal trial of the issue. (Id. at p. 871; cf. People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 903-905.)

After receiving the certification of mental competency, the court asked counsel on August 13, 2001 whether there was any reason why defendant should not be deemed competent. Defense counsel responded, "Well, at this point in time the mental health people say he is competent." In so responding, defense counsel implicitly submitted the question of defendants then-existing mental competency on the certification of mental competency. The court thereafter declared that defendant was "certified as mentally competent to [proceed] under Penal Code section 1372." Nothing more was required.

Legal Sanity

When a criminal defendant asserts that he is not guilty by reason of insanity, he must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was incapable of knowing or understanding the nature and quality of his act or of distinguishing right from wrong as the result of mental illness at the time he committed the offense. (§ 25, subd. (b); People v. Skinner (1985) 39 Cal.3d 765, 782.) A finding of legal insanity may not be based "solely on the basis of a personality or adjustment disorder, a seizure disorder, or an addiction to, or abuse of, intoxicating substances," however. (§ 25.5.)

On appeal, we determine whether, as a matter of law, the court reasonably could not reject the evidence of insanity. (People v. Skinner (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 1050, 1059.) Even unanimity of expert opinion that a defendant is insane will not warrant reversal unless "`the evidence is uncontradicted and entirely to the effect that the accused is insane." (Ibid.)

Here, the one mental health care professional who had frequent contact with defendant in the three to four months immediately following the commission of the crimes, Dr. Ortego, was convinced that defendant did not suffer from schizophrenia but only from a personality disorder and that defendant was malingering. When he committed the offenses, defendant had an ongoing dispute with Head over what defendant perceived to be unfair treatment. This led to a heated argument two days before the stabbing during which they exchanged harsh words. Defendant had not displayed any delusions or bizarre behavior in the presence of fellow boarding house residents. His frequent disagreements with other residents led the manager to evict defendant from the boarding house. This also angered defendant. All of this evidence supports a finding that when he stabbed Head, defendant was motivated by anger rather than a delusion that he was in mortal danger.

Dr. Malinek, who diagnosed defendant with schizophrenia and initially expressed the opinion that defendant was legally insane when he stabbed Head, viewed the foregoing evidence in the same light. He acknowledged that defendant had not shared with him information concerning defendants hostility toward Head. Dr. Malinek considered that information important. "It would suggest that this was not an unprovoked assault, and it would lead one to consider that . . . the [stabbing] was not really a product of a delusion as required by the insanity clause. [¶] If he had an agenda and anger, a strife with the victim, then he had a reason in his own mind to assault him. [¶] I think it casts further doubt . . . as to whether there was a delusionally driven act when he stabbed [Head]." Dr. Malinek also acknowledged that defendant had malingered in the past.

Dr. Sharma likewise was hesitant to render an opinion as to defendants sanity in light of conflicting evidence about the crimes that defendant and other independent sources provided to him. In Dr. Sharmas opinion, if defendants explanation of events were true, that "would seem to suggest that his actions were largely due to his paranoid belief system, and he was acting, in his mind, as if he was trying to protect himself . . . [and, therefore,] because of mental illness, [he] was not able to distinguish right from wrong." He was concerned, however, that defendants version of events might not be true. Dr. Sharma also could not rule out malingering on defendants part. He acknowledged that defendant had malingered in the past.

Dr. Arroyo also acknowledged that evidence of defendants hostility towards Head might well have affected her opinion that he was legally insane when he committed the offenses. Had Dr. Arroyo known of defendants argument with Head two days before the stabbing, she would have conducted additional testing and discussed the argument at length with defendant. Dr. Carlin, who diagnosed defendant as a paranoid schizophrenic but did not render an opinion as to defendants sanity when he committed the crimes, also acknowledged that defendant had malingered in the past.

Given the totality of the evidence before the court, it was entirely reasonable for it to reject the evidence of insanity. The courts finding therefore need not be reversed. (People v. Skinner, supra, 185 Cal.App.3d at p. 1059.)

The judgment is affirmed.

We concur: ORTEGA, J., MALLANO, J. --------------- Notes: All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.


Summaries of

People v. Jensen

Court of Appeals of California, Second Appellate District, Division One.
Nov 21, 2003
B161587 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2003)
Case details for

People v. Jensen

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JAMES JENSEN, Defendant and…

Court:Court of Appeals of California, Second Appellate District, Division One.

Date published: Nov 21, 2003

Citations

B161587 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2003)